Watson by Hanson v. Metropolitan Transit Com'n, C5-95-1052

• Citation: 553 N.W.2d 406
• Decision Date: 29 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. C5-95-1052,C5-95-1052
• Parties: Matthew WATSON, a minor by his mother and natural guardian, June HANSON, Respondent, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSIT COMMISSION, Petitioner, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 406

553 N.W.2d 406

Matthew WATSON, a minor by his mother and natural guardian, June HANSON, Respondent, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSIT COMMISSION, Petitioner, Appellant.

No. C5-95-1052.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 29, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

Plaintiff's negligence action against the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC) based on the MTC's decisions regarding the deployment of security personnel on its buses and the training of its bus drivers on security matters is barred by statutory immunity. Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (1994).

When decisions of a bus driver whether to use the bus intercom system or to stop the bus while a fight was taking place during which a passenger was assaulted by other passengers are protected by the common law doctrine of official immunity, the bus driver's employer, the MTC, is immune from suit for the effect of the bus driver's decisions.

Bennett, Brown, Ingvaldson, Coaty & McNeil, P.A., Frederick C. Brown, Donald R. McNeil, Minneapolis, Metropolitan Council, Jay M. Heffern, General Counsel, St. Paul, for Appellant.

Nelson Hanson Personal Injury Attorneys, Krister D. Johnson, St. Cloud, for Respondent.

League of MN Cities, Carla J. Heyl, St. Paul, for Amicus Curiae.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

On Saturday evening, April 16, 1994, plaintiff Matthew Watson was a passenger on a bus owned and operated by appellant, Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC), when he was assaulted by other passengers on the bus. Watson commenced an action against the MTC, alleging that the MTC breached its duty of care to him in failing to take reasonable steps to protect or assist him when he was assaulted. The MTC moved for summary judgment, contending that both statutory and official immunity ¹ protect the decisions of the MTC and its employees and insulate the MTC from liability. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, and pursuant to rule 103.03(h) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, certified to the Minnesota Court of Appeals as important and doubtful the following question:

Does the doctrine of statutory discretionary immunity apply and shield defendant MTC from a suit in negligence by a passenger seeking recovery of money damages for injuries sustained in an assault by another passenger?

The MTC also appealed the order denying summary judgment. The court of appeals answered the certified question in the negative, determining that statutory immunity does not apply, and affirmed the denial of the MTC's summary judgment motion with respect to official immunity because disputes of material fact remained on that issue. We reverse.

At approximately 8:30 p.m. on Saturday, April 16, 1994, plaintiff, Matthew Watson, a 17-year-old white male, and his companion boarded a bus owned and operated by the MTC at the Mall of America Transit hub. The 60-foot articulated bus was an express bus to downtown Minneapolis. A number of passengers were already on the bus, and Watson and his companion took seats in the back. After Watson and his companion boarded the bus, 14 or 15 African-American males, aged 14 to 17, got on board and also went to the back. Watson testified that as they entered the bus, the young men were "loud and obnoxious," voicing epithets such as "honky" and "white trash."

The bus driver was 25-year-old Peter Malcolm. At the time these events occurred, Malcolm had worked for the MTC for about six months. When he began driving for the MTC, Malcolm received about two weeks of classroom training. As part of this training, Malcolm was instructed to remain in his seat if an altercation developed and to call in immediately on the radio to the MTC's radio control center to get help. MTC bus drivers are prohibited from carrying weapons and Malcolm carried no weapon. The bus was equipped with a speaker system which allowed Malcolm to speak to persons in the back of the bus, but the bus had no speaker system which would allow Malcolm to hear what was going on in the back of the bus.

After the passengers boarded the bus, Malcolm shut the door and began the trip to Minneapolis, driving north on Highway 77 (Cedar Avenue) toward Highway 62 (Crosstown). After some moments, a fight broke out in the rear of the bus and some of the African-American males began assaulting Watson and his companion. Both Watson and his companion screamed to the bus driver to stop the bus. Watson testified that during the assault, the assailants shouted, "You white motherfuckers," and "We're going to kill you white honkies."

While the bus was northbound on Highway 77 approaching Highway 62, one of the passengers told Malcolm that there was a fight at the back of the bus and Malcolm immediately pushed the priority call button to communicate with the radio control center. The center responded within a few seconds and instructed Malcolm to drive north on Interstate 35W to Lake Street, where MTC police officers would be waiting.

Meanwhile, Watson's companion found mace in his pocket and sprayed the attackers. Passengers began moving toward the front of the bus to get away from the mace. Some of the passengers asked Malcolm to stop the bus to let them off, but Malcolm testified that he thought it unwise to let passengers off on the side of the freeway. Instead of stopping the bus, he instructed the passengers to open the windows to clear out the mace. Watson's companion decided to jump out of the moving bus through an emergency window exit, and he did so while the bus was navigating the Highway 62 cloverleaf. Shortly thereafter, one of the passengers informed Malcolm that someone had jumped out of the window.

Watson testified that soon after his companion fled, he felt two hands on his arms and back, and was himself thrown out the same emergency window exit. He also testified that his assailants had knives. Malcolm testified that he did not hear anyone saying "we're going to kill you," and that the bus quieted down after he was told that someone had jumped off.

MTC police officers met the bus when it arrived at the Lake Street stop. The officers watched the passengers disembark and then interviewed Malcolm concerning the incident. After the officers confirmed that Malcolm was prepared to continue the route, he was allowed to depart and he drove on to downtown Minneapolis, and then back to the Mall of America. When he arrived at the Mall, he was met by a state trooper and made a statement about the incident. Meanwhile, the Highway Patrol had taken Watson and his companion to the hospital.

Watson commenced an action against the MTC, claiming that the MTC owed a duty to exercise the highest degree of care to protect passengers, and that the MTC breached that duty in that it did not protect or assist him when he was injured in the assault. The MTC moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was protected by the doctrines of statutory and official immunity. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, and certified to the court of appeals the question whether statutory immunity applies to shield the MTC from a suit in negligence by a passenger seeking recovery of money damages for injuries sustained in an assault by another passenger. The court of appeals answered the certified question in the negative, holding that statutory immunity does not apply. Watson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 540 N.W.2d 94 (Minn.App.1995). The court of appeals also affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the basis of official immunity. We reverse.

I.

This case presents two questions for our review. First, we are asked to review the certified question regarding statutory immunity posed by the district court and answered in the negative by the court of appeals. A certified question is one of law and reviewable de novo by this court. See Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn.1992).

Second, we review the denial of the MTC's motion for summary judgment on the basis of official immunity. Appeal from the district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment is proper when, as here, the district court certifies that the question presented is important and doubtful. Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03(h). This court has also determined that an order denying summary judgment on the ground of immunity is appealable because immunity from suit is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1986). On an appeal from summary judgment, this court determines whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn.1988).

Review of these two questions implicates the doctrines of statutory and official immunity. A court reviewing immunity issues must examine with particularity the nature of the conduct the plaintiff alleges as the basis of a negligence claim. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn.1992). Here, Watson alleged in his complaint that the MTC negligently "failed to take reasonable steps to protect or assist the Plaintiff [Watson] when he sustained injury from fellow passengers." Watson provided four more particular allegations of negligence in his memorandum to the district court in opposition to summary judgment, asserting that the MTC breached its duty to protect Watson by (1) failing to have security personnel ride the bus, (2) failing to adequately train the bus driver, (3) failing to use the intercom system to warn the passengers to stop fighting or to warn that the driver would call the police, and (4) failing to pull over to the side of the road and to stop the bus when the fight began. It is these allegations of negligence which the district court analyzed in issuing its order denying summary judgment. Subsequently, to the court of appeals and to this court, Watson has alleged...