Watson v. Black

• Decision Date: 20 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 13897,13897
• Parties: Roger E. WATSON v. Donald F. BLACK, Judge, etc.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Page 664

239 S.E.2d 664

161 W.Va. 46

Roger E. WATSON v. Donald F. BLACK, Judge, etc.

No. 13897.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Dec. 20, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "In the determination of a claim that an accused was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel violative of Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution, courts should measure and compare the questioned counsel's performance by whether he exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law, except that proved counsel error which does not affect the outcome of the case, will be regarded as harmless error." Syllabus pt. 19, State v. Thomas, W.Va., 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974).

2. While an indigent defendant is entitled to competent counsel, he is not entitled to the appointment of any particular lawyer and may only reject representation by his court-appointed counsel for good cause.

3. Whenever it is suggested to the trial court that an indigent criminal defendant is dissatisfied with his court-appointed counsel, the trial court should conduct a hearing on the record before trial to determine whether good cause exists to discharge a court-appointed counsel and appoint another.

4. It is the obligation of an indigent criminal defendant to exert good faith efforts to cooperate with his court-appointed counsel and any objection which is made to a court-appointed counsel which is not made in good faith need not be accepted by the trial court and, therefore, the defendant proceeds at his own peril if he continues to be uncooperative with his court-appointed counsel.

5. Good cause for the relief of a court-appointed counsel consists of: (1) a conflict of interest; (2) a complete breakdown in communication with court-appointed counsel after the exhaustion of good faith efforts to work with counsel; or, (3) an irreconcilable conflict which might lead to an unjust verdict.

C. Lynch Christian, III and Gregory R. Gorrell, Charleston, for relator.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., John L. MacCorkle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondent.

NEELY, Justice:

This habeas corpus proceeding concerns a petitioner who may have deliberately developed conflicts with his court-appointed attorney. We are therefore, provided a vehicle to discuss the circumstances under which a defendant may change his court-appointed attorney.

Petitioner was arrested on July 3, 1976 for malicious wounding and his bond was set at $10,000.00. Thereafter, the Circuit Court of Wood County appointed James M. Bradley, Jr. to represent petitioner. Petitioner's preliminary hearing was continued several times, during which period petitioner and his counsel had a continuing disagreement concerning the advisability of having a preliminary hearing. Finally, on July 30, 1976, a preliminary hearing was held, and Bradley moved that the charges against petitioner be dismissed, on the ground that the location of the alleged crime had not been proved.

On August 2, 1976, petitioner was again taken before the magistrate, the original charges were dismissed, and petitioner was rearrested on a new warrant charging him with committing the same crime. A second preliminary hearing, this time on the new warrant, was scheduled for August 6, 1976. Again, as before, Bradley and petitioner had a disagreement concerning the merits of having a preliminary hearing. After this disagreement, petitioner says he asked Bradley to withdraw from the case. At the scheduled hearing, Bradley moved for a continuance, and the hearing was reset for August 16, 1976. Later, it was continued to August 20, 1976.

Petitioner confirmed his dissatisfaction with Bradley by writing him a letter on August 6, stating again, as he had during their earlier argument, that he was discharging Bradley. Nevertheless, Bradley came to the jail on August 16, 1976 to visit petitioner and to prepare for the preliminary hearing which had been continued. Petitioner again expressed dissatisfaction with Bradley and fired him.

Petitioner filed his own motion for change of venue, which resulted in his case's being transferred to another magistrate's court for preliminary hearing. Due to the transfer the preliminary hearing was continued to October 4, 1976. While waiting for this hearing, Bradley prepared a writ of habeas corpus on petitioner's behalf which petitioner signed on September 9, 1976 after he and Bradley had another interview in the jail. Later on the same day, petitioner apparently had second thoughts about the habeas petition and wrote two letters to the circuit judge in an attempt to have the petition withdrawn. These letters, which the judge denies receiving, also communicated petitioner's dissatisfaction with Bradley's representation of him. At the same time petitioner filed a complaint about Bradley with the State Bar, which was received. Petitioner later withdrew this complaint.

In accord with their agreement of the previous day, Bradley took petitioner before the circuit judge on September 10, 1976 to move for a reduction in petitioner's bond. At the hearing the judge reduced the bond from $10,000.00 to $8,000.00. Petitioner could not raise this reduced amount, and therefore remained in jail, where he wrote Bradley another letter discharging him on September 29, 1976.

Despite his alleged discharge, Bradley visited petitioner at jail on October 3, 12, 19, and 20, 1976, to discuss various matters concerning petitioner's case. Bradley's continued efforts on petitioner's behalf can perhaps best be explained by Bradley's statements in his first deposition filed with this Court:

I know on several occasions Roger (petitioner) and I would discuss these matters and we would be in agreement on them, but sometime after that, he would either write me a letter or as he did the day of the trial, appear and place some items on the record which were not consistent with Roger's discussions with me.

and later in the same deposition,

(A)fter I would receive letters from Roger, I would go talk with him. . . . Our conversations were, he didn't say it, but the tone of his conversation and the subject matter we discussed would indicate to me he didn't want me fired, that he did want me to represent him. My best recollection is that I probably received a letter after that to the contrary and I went to see him again and it was all right. . . . We could get along.

The inconsistency of petitioner's response to his appointed lawyer continued even into the first day of trial, when petitioner moved to represent himself. Under questioning by the circuit judge, petitioner equivocated by suggesting he only wanted the right to question some of the witnesses in conjunction with his appointed counsel, and then, finally, withdrew his motion, allowing Bradley to represent him at trial.

I

The exhibits in this case, which consist of over thirty pages of well-drafted letters and pro se petitions from petitioner to judge, counsel, and State Bar demonstrate that the petitioner in this case is not a novice in the criminal process. In fact, the petitioner's criminal record, which the respondent appended to his answer, demonstrates that since 1961 the petitioner apparently has spent more time behind bars or on parole than he has spent at liberty.

The observations concerning petitioner's skilled writ-writing ability and prior associations with criminals are relevant because this Court's careful reading of the voluminous record generated by petitioner's counsel in this habeas corpus proceeding demonstrates that petitioner did not have reasonable grounds for alleging a conflict with his court-appointed attorney. In fact, the record discloses that in spite of petitioner's obstreperous, insolent, and personally insulting...