Watson v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 30 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1743,20-1743
• Citation: 2 F.4th 1106
• Parties: Fred WATSON, Plaintiff – Appellee v. Eddie BOYD, III; City of Ferguson, Missouri, Defendants - Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

2 F.4th 1106

Fred WATSON, Plaintiff – Appellee

v.Eddie BOYD, III; City of Ferguson, Missouri, Defendants - Appellants

No. 20-1743

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 16, 2021

Filed: June 30, 2021

Samuel Henderson, Henderson Law Firm, Saint Louis, MO 63110, Blake A. Strode, John McCann Waldron, Arch City Defenders, Saint Louis, MO 63102, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Geri Lynn W. Arrindell, Mickes & O'Toole, Saint Louis, MO 63131, John M. Reeves, Reeves Law LLC, Saint Louis, MO 63105, for Defendant-Appellant Eddie Boyd, III.

(Aarnarian) Apollo D. Carey, Jacqueline Katrina Graves, Ronald Alan Norwood, Lewis & Rice, Saint Louis, MO 63101, for Defendant-Appellant City of Ferguson, Missouri.

Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

After he was cited at a Ferguson, Missouri park, Fred Watson brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Eddie Boyd and the City of Ferguson (the City) for violations of Watson's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court found that Officer Boyd was not entitled to qualified immunity and accordingly denied Officer Boyd and the City's joint motion for summary judgment. Officer Boyd and the City appeal. Having jurisdiction over the claims against Officer Boyd under the collateral order doctrine, we vacate the district court's order denying Officer Boyd and the City's joint motion for summary judgment and remand so that the district court may further consider Officer Boyd's asserted entitlement to qualified immunity. Further, we dismiss the City's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

This case arises out of a police interaction between Watson and Officer Boyd at a Ferguson, Missouri park. Officer Boyd seized Watson, searched Watson's vehicle, pointed his gun at Watson for roughly ten seconds, and ultimately cited Watson with the following nine violations: (1) driving without a driver's license; (2) driving without insurance; (3) having illegal windshield tint; (4) failing to register his vehicle in Missouri; (5) failing to display an inspection sticker; (6) failing to wear a seat belt; (7) possessing an expired Missouri license; (8) failing to comply; and (9) making a false statement.¹

Watson filed suit, asserting claims against Officer Boyd under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights to be free from unlawful searches, seizures, and force; his First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for requesting Officer Boyd's name and badge number; and his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution. Watson also asserted Monell ² claims under § 1983 against the City for maintaining a custom of unconstitutional conduct by police officers; failing to adequately screen Officer Boyd during the hiring process; inadequately training Officer Boyd; and failing to supervise or discipline Officer Boyd. Officer Boyd and the City filed a joint motion for summary judgment and a separate joint motion to strike certain materials not at issue on appeal. The district court found that Officer Boyd is not entitled to qualified immunity on Watson's claims of unlawful seizure, search, force, and retaliation because the parties disputed the facts in their entirety and a reasonable jury could find in favor of Watson. On Watson's malicious prosecution claim, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Boyd on the basis that he was entitled to qualified immunity, finding that this Court has yet to recognize such a claim under § 1983.³ Finally, the district court generally denied the City summary judgment on Watson's Monell claims because it found that Officer Boyd was not entitled to qualified immunity for the underlying conduct. Although it granted summary judgment to the City on Watson's inadequate-training claim, the district court found that a reasonable jury could find that the City had maintained a custom of unconstitutional conduct, failed to screen Officer Boyd, and failed to supervise or discipline Officer Boyd. Accordingly, it denied the City's request for summary judgment on those claims. Officer Boyd and the City appeal the district court's denial of qualified immunity and summary judgment.

II.

As an initial matter, Watson contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Officer Boyd's appeal because the district court denied summary judgment on the basis that genuine issues of material fact exist, and we lack jurisdiction to review whether an issue is genuine. "At summary judgment, qualified immunity shields a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless: ‘(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.’ " Stark v. Lee Cnty., 993 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). "[I]f there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue," a district court must deny summary judgment. Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is appealable under the "collateral order" doctrine, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), but our jurisdiction is limited. We lack jurisdiction to review "whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 320, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) ; see also Thurmond v. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 2020). Rather, our jurisdiction allows us to review orders denying qualified immunity to the extent "they resolve a dispute concerning an ‘abstract issu[e] of law’ relating to qualified immunity." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Here, Officer Boyd contends that the district court failed to conduct a proper qualified immunity analysis on both prongs. First, Officer Boyd argues that the genuine issues that the district court found precluded summary judgment were not "material" to Watson's claims, particularly Officer Boyd's entitlement to qualified immunity. While we lack jurisdiction under Johnson to review whether the issues are "genuine," whether the issues are "material"—that is, whether the facts in contention "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) —is a legal question reviewable under our limited jurisdiction. See New v. Denver, 787 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 2015). Second, Officer Boyd contends that the district court failed to adequately consider whether Watson's rights, if deprived by Officer Boyd's conduct, were clearly established at the time of the incident. See Appellant's Br. at 24 ("More significantly, neither Watson, nor the District Court, identified any clearly established case law (either in the form of controlling authority or any robust consensus of persuasive authority) that would have placed the various constitutional challenges raised by Watson beyond debate at the time of the stop."). Whether the district court upheld "its threshold duty to make ‘a thorough determination of [a law enforcement officer's] claim of qualified immunity’ " is a legal question that we may review even under our limited jurisdiction. See N.S. v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 933 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 2019) (reviewing the adequacy of the district court's qualified immunity analysis under limited jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1162-63 (8th Cir. 2012) (same); O'Neil v. City of Iowa City, 496 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2007) (same). Because neither of these issues " ‘require us to resolve any disputed issues of evidentiary sufficiency,’ we have jurisdiction." See Jones, 675 F.3d at 1161 (citation omitted).

III.

First, Officer Boyd claims that the district court erred by finding that the genuine issues of fact were material to determining whether his conduct violated Watson's constitutional rights. When reviewing a law enforcement officer's entitlement to qualified immunity at summary judgment, a district court "must take a careful look at the record, determine which facts are genuinely disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party as long as those facts are not so ‘blatantly contradicted by the record ... that no reasonable jury could believe [them].’ " O'Neil, 496 F.3d at 917 (alterations in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ). However, a district court cannot deny summary judgment by merely finding that genuine issues of fact exist; those issues must also be material—that is, affecting the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Schs., 931 F.3d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 2019) ("The mere existence of some factual dispute is not enough to defeat this [C]ourt's jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal: If the disputed facts are not material to this legal question, ‘the denial of summary judgment is [immediately] reviewable as a question of law.’ " (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

While Officer Boyd asks this Court to review the district court's materiality determination on the merits, we find that the district court's order failed to address materiality in a manner "sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review of the qualified immunity decision." Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). "Because qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability’ " and "is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial," Pearson...