Watson v. Cain

• Decision Date: 18 January 1911
• Parties: WATSON v. CAIN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

54 So. 610

171 Ala. 151

WATSON v. CAIN.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 18, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Morgan County; D. W. Speake, Judge.

Action by Robert H. Watson against James F. Cain. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The following are the charges refused to the plaintiff:

(1) "Information received from third party, if not believed is not a sufficient predicate upon which to commence a prosecution against another."

(4) "If you believe that defendant, Cain, caused or instigated the prosecution against the plaintiff, and that he did not at the time believe the plaintiff guilty of the offense with which he was charged, then the said Cain did not have probable cause for the commencement of the prosecution."

The following charges were given at the instance of the plaintiff:

(1) "The court charges the jury that in the event you arrive at the conclusion, after full consideration of the evidence that the defendant caused the plaintiff to be arrested, as charged in the complaint, on a charge of robbery, that said charge has been judicially investigated, and said plaintiff discharged, and said prosecution ended, and you are further reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant was in the possession of such facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create reasonable suspicions, and to warrant a cautious man in the belief that said Watson was guilty of the offense, then you should find the issue in favor of the defendant."

(10) "In determining whether defendant Cain had probable cause for causing plaintiff, Watson, to be arrested and imprisoned (if defendant did do this), I charge you that Cain's belief in the guilt or innocence of Watson on the charge of robbery cannot be considered by you, if defendant at that time was informed of facts which would have justified a reasonable and cautious man in believing that plaintiff Watson, was guilty of robbery, then I charge you this would constitute probable cause."

(13) "If, from the facts and the evidence, you find that they were sufficiently strong as to create a reasonable ground of suspicion that plaintiff was guilty of the offense of robbery, and sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man in the belief that plaintiff was guilty of that offense, and that these facts were known or made known to the defendant and that because of this knowledge or information (if such was a fact) defendant did what he was charged in the complaint filed in this cause that he did, then, if you find this to be true, your verdict should be for the defendant."

(15) "The court charges the jury that although you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in the case that the defendant maliciously instigated the prosecutions against the plaintiff, and you are further reasonably satisfied that defendant was in possession of facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create reasonable grounds of suspicion, and to warrant a cautious man in the belief that Watson was guilty of the offense of robbery, then this would constitute probable cause, as defined by the law, and in deciding upon the existence of probable cause, as hereinabove defined by the court, the court charges you that you cannot consider the belief or nonbelief of the defendant in the guilt or innocence of said Watson."

Callahan & Harris, for appellant.

Kyle & Hutson, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE J.

This is an action of malicious prosecution, based upon a complaint which follows in its general averments the form prescribed by the Code. The bill of exceptions shows that some of the evidence introduced at the trial in the court below tended to show an absence of belief in the guilt of the plaintiff on the part of the defendant at the time he instigated the prosecution complained of.

The assignments of error are predicated upon the refusal of the trial court to give charges 1 and 4 at the request of the plaintiff, and the giving of charges 1, 10, 13, and 15 at the request of the defendant. The single vital question presented for our determination is whether or not the criminal prosecution here complained of was founded upon probable cause, if the prosecutor did not at the time of its institution believe in the guilt of the defendant, although he was informed, or had knowledge, of facts sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable man in the belief that the accused was guilty. The rulings of the court complained of by the appellant withdrew from the jury any consideration of this feature, and instructed them that the prosecutor's knowledge of such facts, without any belief on his part in the guilt of the accused, would require a verdict at their hands for the defendant.

There can be no doubt but that, as respects these charges, the action of the trial...