Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co.

• Citation: 632 F.2d 646
• Decision Date: 11 December 1980
• Docket Number: 80-3522,Nos. 80-3494,s. 80-3494
• Parties: Mrs. Lessie Mae WATSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CALLON PETROLEUM COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. Mrs. Barbara Ann Parker LILLIE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. H & N OPERATING, INC., Defendant-Appellant. Summary Calendar. . Unit A
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 646

632 F.2d 646

Mrs. Lessie Mae WATSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CALLON PETROLEUM COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

Mrs. Barbara Ann Parker LILLIE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. H & N OPERATING, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 80-3494, 80-3522

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Unit A

Dec. 11, 1980.

Daniel, Coker, Horton, Bell & Dukes, Joel W. Howell, III, Jackson, Miss., for defendant-appellant in No. 80-3494.

Jack E. Pool, Natchez, Miss., Daniel J. O'Beirne, John R. Kingsafer, Natchez, Miss., for Mrs. Lessie Mae Watson et al.

Joel W. Howell, III, Jackson, Miss., E. C. Ward, Natchez, Miss., for defendant-appellant in No. 80-3522.

Daniel J. O'Beirne, John R. Kingsafer, Natchez, Miss., Reeves & Owens, Harrisonburg, La., for plaintiffs-appellees in No. 80-3522.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before BROWN, POLITZ and TATE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The sole issue presented by these consolidated appeals is the commencement date for the computation of interest on judgments rendered pursuant to jury verdicts.

The Watson Case

On December 13, 1977, the court entered a judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of $175,398.60 plus legal interest and costs. On January 9, 1978, the district court granted defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, setting aside the judgment for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed and on February 15, 1980, we reversed the judgment n.o.v. and issued our mandate directing the district court to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment thereon.

On April 9, 1980, defendant tendered to counsel for plaintiffs one draft for the principal judgment of $175,398.60 and a second draft for $2,114.20, representing court costs and interest from February 15, 1980 to April 9, 1980. Simultaneously with this tender, defendant filed a motion with the district court seeking entry of judgment, pursuant to our mandate, for the principal sum but allowing interest only from February 15, 1980, the date of our reversal of the judgment n.o.v. The district court denied defendant's motion and entered judgment on May 22, 1980, reinstating the judgment of the court upon the jury verdict entered on December 13, 1977, in the amount of $175,398.60 together with legal interest from December 13, 1977 until April 9, 1980, together with all costs of court, and allowing a credit in the amount of $177,512.80 (the total of the two tendered drafts). Defendant appeals from that portion of the judgment which grants interest prior to February 15, 1980. Plaintiffs counter with a request for damages for frivolous appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Fed.R.App.P. 38. We affirm the judgment of the district court and award damages for frivolous appeal.

The Lillie Case

On November 14, 1978, the court entered judgment upon a jury verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $214,000 plus legal interest from date of judgment and costs. The judgment was filed on November 15, 1978. On December 27, 1978, the district court granted defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, setting aside the judgment for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed and on February 15, 1980, we reversed the judgment n.o.v. and issued our mandate directing the district court to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment thereon.

On March 28, 1980, defendant tendered to counsel for plaintiffs a draft for the principal judgment of $206,986.21 (the $214,000 less a subrogation claim of $7,013.79), a draft for costs totaling $1,972.48, and a draft for interest on the judgment from February 15, 1980 to March 28, 1980, totaling $1,950.48. On April 21, 1980, the defendant filed a motion with the district court seeking entry of judgment, pursuant to our mandate, for the principal sum but allowing interest only from February 15, 1980, the date of our reversal of the judgment n.o.v. The district court denied defendant's motion in a thorough, scholarly memorandum opinion, and on June 13, 1980, reinstated the judgment upon the jury verdict in the principal amount of $214,000, together with legal interest at the rate of 8% per annum from date of judgment until March 29, 1980, and all costs, and allowing a credit in the amount of $217,922.96 (the total of the tendered drafts and the subrogation credit). Defendant appeals from that portion of the judgment granting interest prior to February 15, 1980. Plaintiffs counter by moving for damages for frivolous appeal. We affirm the judgment of the district court and award damages for frivolous appeal.

The Law

We are to apply the substantive law of Mississippi in determining the award of interest in these diversity jurisdiction cases. Petersen v. Klos, 433 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1970); Texaco, Inc. v. Lirette, 410 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1969). As we recently reminded in Avery v. Maremont Corp., 628 F.2d 441, 446 (1980), "A federal district court judge's determination on the law in his state is, as a rule, entitled to great weight on review," citing Petersen v. Klos, supra; Southern Ry. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 49, 52 (5th Cir. 1973); Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967). In the two cases at bar, two different district judges are in full agreement as to the applicable law and the resolution of this interest issue. The usual deference given to a district judge's determination of the law in his state is thus enhanced.

These appeals do not present a novel or unsettled question of Mississippi law. Defendants rely on the decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Grice v. Central Electric Power Association, 230 Miss. 437, 92 So.2d 837, suggestion of error overruled in part and sustained in part, 96 So.2d 909 (Miss.1957), as dispositive of the interest issue. Plaintiffs vigorously argue that Grice is not a controlling decision adverse to their position, but that in fact it supports their position. We agree with plaintiffs. Our reading of the original decision in Grice, as modified by its decision on suggestion of error, convinces us that under the statutory law of Mississippi, as interpreted and applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court, interest accrues from the date of entry of a valid...