Watson v. Caruso
Decision Date | 02 December 2019 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-1666 (CSH) |
Citation | 424 F.Supp.3d 231 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Adrien WATSON, Plaintiff, v. Karen CARUSO and Mind Your Business Inc., Defendants. |
Adrien Watson, New Britain, CT, pro se.
John Edward MacDonald, Constangy, Brooks & Smith. LLP, Lawrenceville, NJ, for Defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pro se Plaintiff Adrien Watson ("Plaintiff" or "Watson") brings this action seeking damages from Mind Your Business, Inc. ("Defendant MYB" or "MYB"), and its founder and chief executive officer, Karen Caruso ("Defendant Caruso" or "Caruso"; and, collectively with MYB, "Defendants"). Doc. 1-2 ("Complaint").1
MYB is a provider of employment screening, background investigations, equal opportunity in employment ("EEO") investigations, and drug-screening services. Plaintiff alleges that MYB sold to Plaintiff's former employer a criminal background check that contained information about a prior conviction, even though a Connecticut state court had ordered the erasure of the criminal record because the offense had been decriminalized. Id. at 2. Defendants answered the Complaint. Doc. 10 ("Answer"). Plaintiff thereafter filed a response to Defendants' Answer, which contained documents to support the allegations in his Complaint. Doc. 11 ("Plaintiff's Response").
Defendants have now filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc. 25 ("Motion for Summary Judgment"); Doc. 25-6 ("Defendants' Statement of Material Facts"); Doc. 25-11 ("Defendants' Brief"). Defendants contend that Plaintiff's state law claims do not apply to the facts of this case, Doc. 25-11, at 9–13; Defendants did not violate the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), id. at 13–30; and, that Plaintiff's common law state claims, if any, are barred by the FCRA, id. at 31–32.2 Defendant Caruso also argues that all of Plaintiff's claims against her should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not made any factual allegations supporting individual liability against her. Id. at 30–31. Plaintiff has not filed any opposition. This Ruling resolves Defendants' motion.
The facts herein are taken from Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, which are accepted as true only for purposes of this Ruling.3
On or about October 23, 1998, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-71(a)(1). Doc. 25-6 ¶ 3. Plaintiff was convicted under that statute, on the basis that he had sexual contact with a person who was fifteen years of age when he was seventeen years of age. Id. ¶ 4. However, the Connecticut legislature decriminalized the Plaintiff's conduct in 2007. Id. ¶ 5. In consequence, on or about March 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Destruction of Record of Decriminalized Offense, which requested that the court erase Plaintiff's 1998 conviction. Id. ¶ 6. The petition was granted on or about July 7, 2016. Id. ¶ 7.
Plaintiff began working at St. Vincent DePaul Mission of Bristol ("SVDP") on or around July 22, 2018. Id. ¶ 8. About four days later, the Catholic Diocese of Hartford engaged MYB's services to prepare a criminal background report relating to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 9.4 MYB thereafter accessed the integrated platform of RapidCourt, LLC ("RapidCourt"), a third-party vendor, and undertook a national search of Plaintiff's name to obtain Plaintiff's criminal history records. Id. at ¶ 10.5 The search returned information relating to Plaintiff's 1998 conviction for "sexual assault;" and, the search results labeled Plaintiff "SEX OFFENDER" in its "jurisdiction" section. Id. ¶ 16. The search did not indicate that Plaintiff's 1998 conviction had been the subject of a Petition for Destruction of Record of Decriminalized Offence, or that the petition had been granted. Id. ¶ 18.
On or about July 31, 2018, MYB provided the Diocese of Hartford/SVDP with a copy of the criminal background report it prepared concerning Plaintiff, which included the 1998 sexual assault record. Id. ¶ 19. SVDP subsequently issued a letter to Plaintiff informing him that it was "not able to move forward with your employment as a result of your Background Verification Report." Id. ¶ 20.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Redd v. New York Div. of Parole , 678 F.3d 166, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2012). A "genuine issue" exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Id.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. See Celotex v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present "specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs. , 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, see Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, the nonmoving party nevertheless "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must support any assertion disputing the veracity of a fact or existence of an alleged dispute with specific citation to the evidentiary record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se , the Court must read his submissions "liberally" and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments" that they suggest. Chavis v. Chappius , 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, "[p]roceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant of the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro se party's bald assertions unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment."
Rodriguez v. Hahn , 209 F. Supp. 2d 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants claim that Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-142e does not apply to the facts of this case; and, as such, any possible claims that Plaintiff might have under that statute ought to be dismissed. Doc. 25-11, at 10. Alternatively, Defendants claim that the statute does not create a private right of action. Id. at 11–12. Defendants make similar arguments with respect to Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51i. Id. at 12–13.
Section 54-142e commands "[e]ach person"—including a consumer reporting agency—that has "purchased records of criminal matters of public record from the Judicial Department" to undertake two tasks prior to disclosing such records. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-142e(b).6
First, a consumer reporting agency must "purchase from the Judicial Department, on a monthly basis or on such other schedule as the Judicial Department may establish, any updated criminal matters of public record or information available for the purpose of complying with this section." Id.7 Second, a consumer reporting agency must "update its records of criminal matters of public record to permanently delete such erased records"; and, it must "not further disclose such erased records." Id.
Similarly, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51i requires consumer reporting agencies to "[m]aintain procedures designed to ensure that any criminal matter of public record reported is complete and up-to-date as of the date the consumer report is issued, which procedures shall, at a minimum, conform to the requirements set forth in section 54-142e." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51i(i)(2)(B).
A principal contention of Defendants is that section 54-142e does not apply to the facts of this case because MYB "did not purchase Plaintiff's criminal records ‘from the Judicial Department’ within the meaning of section 54-142e, but rather obtained them through a national search using" RapidCourt. Doc. 25-11, at 10 (emphasis added). Likewise, Defendants contend that section 31-51i does not apply because they did not "obtain Plaintiff's criminal history records from the Judicial Department ," and, therefore, the consumer report that MYB issued did not include "criminal matters of public record" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). Defendants do not cite to any case law—or any authorities, for that matter—to support these statutory interpretations. Nor do they cite any legislative history.
The core legal question is whether sections 54-142e and 31-51i apply (1) only when consumer reporting agencies purchase "criminal matters of public record" directly "from the Judicial Department"; or (2) if the statutes also apply when consumer reporting agencies purchase records from an intermediary (such as a contracted company, like RapidCourt). Presumably, the second statutory interpretation would reflect a perceived legislative policy and purpose that even though consumer reporting agencies had not directly transacted with the Judicial Department, the records they obtained from the intermediary nonetheless originally derived from the Judicial Department, and therefore they are still "criminal matters of public record." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-142e(b) ; id. § 31-51i(i)(1)(C) (...
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