Watson v. Clark

• Decision Date: 08 March 2019
• Docket Number: 1:16-cv-0874
• Parties: JAMES WATSON, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL E. CLARK, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

JAMES WATSON, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL E. CLARK, et al., Respondents.

1:16-cv-0874

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 8, 2019

Hon. John E. Jones III

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner James Watson ("Petitioner" or "Watson"), a state inmate files the instant petition (Doc. 1) for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from the Judgment of Sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, Pennsylvania, on November 22, 2002, following convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit homicide, kidnapping, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and other related offenses. (Doc. 1).

For the reasons set forth below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus, which is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 ("AEDPA"), will be denied.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a January 15, 2016 decision adjudicating Watson's appeal from the December 31, 2014 order of the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") court, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history:

Generally, the evidence at trial, consisting of eyewitness testimony, established that in the afternoon of April 17, 2001, an argument developed between Jason Ryans [("Victim")] and the Watson brothers [(Kenny Watson and [James Watson])] at Kenny Watson's home in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The Watsons believed that [Victim] had stolen a handgun and a safe containing marijuana and money. During the argument, Kenny Watson punched [Victim]. In an ensuing struggle, [James Watson] grabbed a knife and inflicted multiple wounds to [Victim's] hands and arms. [Victim] was also punched and kicked repeatedly by the Watsons. The Watsons then bound the wrists of [Victim], either for the purpose of stopping his bleeding or to prevent his escape, or both. [Victim] was then placed in a vehicle and transported to a rural area near the Village of Camptown in Bradford County. There, [Victim] was taken from the vehicle and shot twice in the back of the head by [James Watson]. [Victim] apparently died immediately.

The evidence against [James Watson] and Kenny Watson diverged with respect to their criminal culpability following the altercation in Wilkes-Barre. After [Victim] was bound, the Watsons then informed others at the house that they would be taking [Victim] to a hospital, but would seek a rural hospital. The evidence revealed that [James Watson] was in fact simply looking for a secluded place to murder [Victim], but the evidence also suggested that Kenny Watson, among others, was duped into accompanying [James Watson] to Bradford County. The jury at least had a reasonable doubt as to Kenny Watson's complicity in any plan to kill [Victim], for it acquitted him of all charges of homicide and conspiracy to commit homicide. Kenny Watson's counsel admitted to the jury that his client was guilty of assault, but denied his involvement in any action or plan intended to kill [Victim].

Procedurally, the jury reached a verdict on September 12, 2002, convicting [James Watson] of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit homicide, kidnapping, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and other related offenses. The court sentenced [James Watson] on that day to life imprisonment for his murder conviction, but deferred sentencing on the remaining convictions. On November 22, 2002, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty-six (46) to ninety-two (92) years' imprisonment for [James Watson's] remaining convictions, consecutive to [his] life sentence.

This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 20, 2004, and our Supreme Court subsequently denied allowance of appeal on April 18, 2005. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 860 A.2d 1136 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 717, 872 A.2d 1199 (2005). [The sole issue raised on appeal was "Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [James Watson's] motion for a mistrial when the co-defendant's attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 410 and made reference in his opening statement regarding plea discussions and [] [James Watson's] willingness to accept a deal? (Doc. 10-4, p. 4)] On May 18, 2005, [James Watson] timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. The court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on April 9, 2008. The court held hearings on the petitions on April 7, 2008, April 9, 2008, and January 6, 2010. The court denied PCRA relief on January 4, 2011. [The court determined it had improperly imposed separate sentences for each of [James Watson's] conspiracy convictions; consequently, the court granted PCRA relief in that respect]. On January 26, 2011, [he] filed a notice of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 202 MDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at 1-2 (Pa. Super filed June 1, 2012)(some internal citations omitted); (Doc. 10-19, pp. 1-3).

[[Watson] raise[d] six issues for [] review:

[1.] Did the District Attorney's trial summation, as it pertained to the fact that [James Watson], co-defendant Kenny Watson and anunindicted alleged co-conspirator and accomplice - Michael Robinson, did not testify at trial, constitute prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial? (Ineffective assistance of trial counsel)[.]

[2.] Did [James Watson's] trial attorney have a conflict of interest which prejudiced [James Watson] when he represented [James Watson] while and after he also represented Rodney Watson thus causing the need for a new trial? (Ineffective assistance of counsel)[.]

[3.] Did the recantation testimony of Myrna Taitt's trial testimony, and a pretrial statement she gave the Pennsylvania State Police to the effect that [James Watson] confessed to having committed the homicide at issue, warrant a new trial?(Newly found evidence)[.]

[4.] Did Rodney Watson's post-homicide behavior and statement establish that he was more than a witness to the [Victim's] murder, that he was actively criminally involved, so much so that [James Watson] is entitled to a new trial? (Newly found evidence) (A) Rodney Watson's statement that he didn't see [James Watson] commit the homicide; (B) Rodney Watson's theft of a safe which precipitated the homicide [footnote omitted]; (C) Rodney Watson said he wasn't going to spend his life in jail for the homicide at issue[.]

[5.] Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance to [James Watson], given that Janelle Prato, pretrial, told the defense attorney's investigator that Jennifer Barr (who at trial testified that she was an eyewitness to the homicide and [James Watson] told her he killed [Victim]) told her [James Watson] didn't kill [Victim]? (Ineffective assistance of trial counsel)[.]

6. Was [James Watson's] right to appeal violated - (Ineffective assistance of counsel)[?]

(Doc. 10-19, pp. 3-5).]

On appeal this Court affirmed in part and remanded the case for the PCRA to make additional findings with regard to two of [James Watson's] issues. See Id. Following remand, the PCRA court againdenied relief on January 2, 2015. [James Watson] filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30, 2015.

(Doc. 10-24, pp. 1-3). Watson raised two issues:

[1] Did the PCRA court commit error regarding the Prato-Barr conversation when, making a credibility determination that Prato's testimony did not necessitate PCRA relief for [Watson], the court found that [Watson] first failed to establish that his trial attorney knew or should have known of the Prato-Barr conversation and had Prato testify at trial, and second, that [Watson] failed to establish prejudice because the absence of Prato testimony at trial [?]" On January 15, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's order. (Id. at 10).

[2] Did the court commit error regarding the preservation of [Watson's] appellate rights in first not finding that [Watson's] appellate rights were not preserved not employing a "per se" prejudice statement in this case, and second no reaching real credibility determinations.

(Id. at 3, 4). The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court order denying relief. (Id. at 10). Thereafter, Watson timely filed the instant petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

II. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 STANDARDS OF REVEW

A habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the proper mechanism for a prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only onthe ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(b)(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;

...

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 2254 clearly sets limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 536 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 2014). A federal court may consider such a petition...