Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co.

• Decision Date: 21 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-3520,99-3520
• Citation: 235 F.3d 851
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) JOHNNY WATSON, APPELLANT, V. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 851

235 F.3d 851 (3rd Cir. 2000)

JOHNNY WATSON, APPELLANT,

V.

EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY.

No. 99-3520

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued October 24, 2000

Filed December 21, 2000

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania District Court Judge: Robert J. Cindrich (D.C. Civ. No. 98-01330)

Neal A. Sanders (argued) Law Offices of Neal Alan Sanders 1924 North Main Street Extension Butler, Pennsylvania 16001 Attorneys for Appellant

Michael A. Fitzhugh (argued) Fitzhugh & Associates 155 Federal Street, Suite 1700 Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Attorneys for Appellee

Before: Becker, Chief Judge, Scirica and Fuentes, Circuit Judges.

OPINION FOR THE COURT

Fuentes, Circuit Judge

Appellant Johnny Watson alleges that he was removed from his position of Account Executive at Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak") because of unlawful race and age discrimination. Under federal law, a complainant has 300 days from the date of the adverse employment decision to file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the Supreme Court held that an adverse employment action occurs, and the statute of limitations therefore begins to run, at the time the employee receives notice of that action and termination is a delayed but inevitable result. Relying on Ricks, the District Court measured the limitations period from the date on which Watson was notified of his termination from the Account Executive position, and dismissed Watson's claim as untimely. Watson asserts that Ricks's date of notification rule does not control the limitations period in his case because Kodak left open the possibility of Watson's continued employment with the company. We disagree. Because we concur with the District Court that the relevant date from which to measure the timeliness of Watson's discrimination claim is the date on which he was removed from the Account Executive position, and because we conclude that the mere speculative possibility of continued employment does not alter Ricks's date of notification rule, we will affirm.

I.

Johnny Watson began working for Kodak in 1979, and was promoted in 1988 to the position of Account Executive. He alleges that in that capacity he consistently met his sales quotas and received several employment awards, including five 100% club awards and one master club award for reaching 140% of his sales quota. He also reportedly received favorable performance evaluations and was not subject to any disciplinary action.

In December 1994, Watson transferred to Kodak's office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he was the only African-American Account Executive. Roger Gagnon was his immediate supervisor. Watson alleges that, from the outset, Gagnon interfered with his performance by refusing to provide support comparable to what he offered younger, white Account Executives. According to Watson, Gagnon's interference prevented him from meeting his sales quotas for 1995 and 1996.

In January 1997, Watson wrote a letter to Gagnon complaining about these matters and contending that race discrimination was the reason for that lack of support. Gagnon responded in a letter dated February 4, 1997, informing Watson that, due to poor performance, he was retroactively removed from his Account Executive classification effective January 1, 1997. It also stated that Watson would be allowed to remain with Kodak beyond March 7, 1997 only if he was successful in obtaining another position within the company, an effort with which Gagnon professed he would help. Watson failed to find another position. Consequently, Kodak terminated his employment on March 7, 1997.

Thereafter, Watson was hospitalized briefly in Pennsylvania. Upon his release, in June 1997, he traveled to Florida where he stayed at his mother's residence. While in Florida on December 31, 1997, realizing that the administrative deadline for filing a discrimination charge was about to expire, Watson filed a claim with the EEOC at its Miami, Florida branch, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. SS 621 to 634. When he filed the discrimination charge, Watson described the adverse action taken against him as follows:

I was employed by Eastman Kodak Company for eighteen years. During that time there were several situations revolveing [sic] around pay, assignments to territory and like [sic] of understanding. I believe that my race and age at the time of my termination from [sic] played a roll [sic] in their decision to release me.

The EEOC investigator informed Watson that the claim would be processed, then transferred back to Pennsylvania. On May 7, 1998, after retaining counsel, Watson filed an amended charge in which he added a pay discrimination claim.

Relying upon Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the District Court concluded that Watson's unlawful termination claim accrued on February 4, 1997, the date he received Gagnon's letter. Because Watson submitted his EEOC charge 330 days later, on December 31, 1997, the Court determined his claim fell outside the statutorily allotted 300 day filing deadline. Consequently, the Court granted Kodak summary judgment.

On appeal, Watson argues that the District Court misconstrued Ricks and that it erred in failing to conclude that his termination claim accrued on March 7, 1997, which is within 300 days of the date he filed his EEOC discrimination charge in Florida. He also contends that, even if we determine that the termination claim was untimely, we should find that his discrimination in compensation claim, based on a continuing violation theory, was timely.

II.

This Court's review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary, and the record is judged by the same standard district courts use. Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment motions. Subsection 56(c) provides, in part, that:

[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and summary judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find only for the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Doherty v. Teamsters Pension T rust Fund, 16 F.3d 1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1994).

III.

Under Title VII and the ADEA, plaintiffs residing in states having an agency authorized to grant relief for federally prohibited employment discrimination must resort to that state remedy before they will be allowed access to federal judicial relief. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(c) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. S 633(b) (ADEA); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 754-58 (1979). Such states are termed "deferral" states. See Evans, 441 U.S. at 758. It is undisputed that Pennsylvania is a deferral state. See 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 955(a), 959; Sharpe v. Pennsylvania Hous. Auth., 693 F.2d 24, 26 (3d Cir. 1982).

Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs such as Watson, who file in deferral states, must submit their administrative discrimination charge within 300 days of the challenged employment action. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2) (ADEA); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1413-15 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc). Therefore, Watson's attempt to obtain relief under federal law from Kodak's alleged employment discrimination on the basis of race and age may proceed only if he filed his administrative charge of discrimination within 300 days of the unlawful employment actions he challenges.

The crucial issue in this case is whether the actionable adverse employment decision was the one to separate Watson from the position of Account Executive or the one to terminate his employment with Kodak entirely. We begin our analysis of the timeliness issue with the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks. In Ricks, a professor at Delaware State College challenged the college's decision not to grant him tenure as being unlawfully based on national origin discrimination. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252. 101 S.Ct. 498 The professor pursued internal grievance procedures within the college to protest the tenure denial, and in the meantime the college, as it customarily did, entered into a one year "terminal" contract with him that allowed the professor one extra year of employment before his actual termination. Id. at 252-54.

Of primary importance in the case, due to the date the professor filed his administrative discrimination charge, was the date that his unlawful termination claim accrued. See id. at 254-56. The professor argued that it accrued on the date of his final day of employment under the one-year terminal contract. See id. at 257. The Supreme Court rejected his theory, ruling instead that his unlawful termination claim accrued when he initially received the college's notice that he had been denied tenure. Id. at 259, 261-62.

The Court emphasized that the key inquiry was identifying the precise alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. at 257. This was the central issue because the relevant federal statute, Title VII, measured the administrative charge's timeliness from the date " `the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.' " Id. at 256 (quoting 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)); accord 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2) (for ADEA claims, timeliness of administrative charge is measured from date "the alleged unlawful practice occurred"). The Supreme Court found it immaterial that the professor's denial of...