Watson v. Edelen

• Decision Date: 05 January 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:12cv365/MCR/EMT.
• Parties: Tyson N. WATSON, Plaintiff, v. Lieutenant EDELEN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

76 F.Supp.3d 1332

Tyson N. WATSON, Plaintiff

v.Lieutenant EDELEN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:12cv365/MCR/EMT.

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division.

Signed Jan. 5, 2015.

Tyson N. Watson, Milton, FL, pro se.

Cedell Ian Garland, Lance Eric Neff, State of Florida, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

M. CASEY RODGERS, Chief Judge.

This cause comes on for consideration upon the chief magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation dated November 18, 2014. (Doc. 166). The parties have been furnished a copy of the Report and Recommendation and have been afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). I have made a de novo determination of any timely filed objections.

Having considered the Report and Recommendation, and any objections thereto timely filed, I have determined that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted.

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED as follows:

1. The chief magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated by reference in this order.

2. The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants (doc. 124) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

a. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 124) is DENIED as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Edelen and Johnson regarding the use of force (i.e., slamming Watson onto the concrete face first, striking his head, nose, back, and feet, and twisting his wrists and fingers) on March 1, 2012;

b. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 124) is DENIED as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force against Defendants Edelen and Rogers regarding the use of force (i.e., three applications of chemical agents) on March 4, 2012;

c. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff's claims for compensatory and punitive damages related to the uses of force of March 1 and 4, 2012;

d. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's remaining claims; and

e. Defendant Hawkins is DISMISSED from this action.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Tyson N. Watson (“Watson”), an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”), proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Watson sues Lieutenant Christopher Edelen (“Lieutenant Edelen”), Correctional Officer Robert Johnson (“Officer Johnson”), Sergeant Daryle Rogers (“Sergeant Rogers”), and Senior Licensed Practical Nurse Bobby Hawkins (“SLPN Hawkins”), all of whom were employed by the FDOC at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution (“SRCI”) at the time of the events giving rise to this action. Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion for Sanctions or Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 124), to which Plaintiff has responded in opposition (doc. 155).

The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Watson initiated this action on July 23, 2012, by filing a civil rights complaint under § 1983 (doc. 1). His Second Amended Complaint (doc. 33), which is the operative pleading, includes three counts:

Count 1: Defendants Edelen and Johnson used excessive force against him on March 1, 2012, and Defendants Edelen, Rogers, and Hawkins used excessive force against him on March 4, 2012, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

Count 2: Defendants Edelen and Hawkins were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs on March 1, 2012, and Defendants Edelen, Rogers, and Hawkins were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs on March 4, 2012, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and

Count 3: Defendants Edelen, Rogers, and Hawkins were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs on March 4, 2012, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

(id. at 19–20).¹ Suing Defendants in their individual capacities (see id. at 1), Watson seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as costs and attorney's fees (id. at 19, 21).

Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions or Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment on April 14, 2014 (doc. 124). They argue they are entitled to dismissal of some of Watson's claims, as a sanction for his malicious fabrication of those claims (id. at 15–22). Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Watson's claims, because he cannot establish a constitutional violation against any Defendant, and they are entitled to qualified immunity (id. at 22–43). Defendants submitted evidence in support of their arguments (doc. 124, Exhibits). The undersigned issued an order on April 16, 2014, informing the parties of the importance and ramifications of summary judgment consideration, providing them with information as to the requirements for materials submitted for review pursuant to Rule 56, directing Watson to respond to the motion by a certain date, and advising the parties that the court would take the motion under advisement upon Watson's filing his response (doc. 126). On September 17, 2014, Watson responded in opposition to Defendants' motion and submitted evidence in support of his position (docs. 155, 159). Defendants' motion is now ripe for review.

II. WATSON'S ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANTS' SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE DURING DISCOVERY

Before addressing the merits of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court first turns to Watson's contention that Defendants' motion should be denied as a sanction for spoliation of evidence and failure to produce evidence during discovery (doc. 155, Declaration of Tyson N. Watson ¶¶ 227–44). Watson alleges Lieutenant Edelen destroyed the handheld video camera recordings filmed by Officer Jacobus on March 1, 2012, and Officer Burt on March 4, 2012 (Watson Decl. ¶¶ 227–41, see also doc. 155 at 82–88). He contends the alleged spoliation entitles him to an “adverse inference” at the summary judgment stage and an “adverse inference” jury instruction at trial (id. ). Watson also asserts Defendants objected to certain discovery requests, specifically, requests for production of inmate grievances concerning his medical and mental health treatment, his entire medical record, and documents showing “bed assignments” of inmates (Watson Decl. ¶¶ 242–44).

Watson has not shown he is entitled to sanctions for Defendants' alleged discovery violations. If Watson believed that Defendants' objections to his discovery requests violated the discovery rules, he could have and should have filed a motion to compel or for sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Watson obviously knew of the availability of this procedural mechanism because he used it during this litigation (see docs. 102, 137). Further, Watson has not made any showing that Defendants' discovery objections were not well-founded or that he was otherwise entitled to an order compelling production. Moreover, the summary judgment record demonstrates Watson has submitted copies of numerous inmate grievances, medical records, and inmate declarations, and he has not shown that Defendants' alleged failures to produce additional grievances, medical records, and documents showing inmate bed assignments would have meaningfully assisted him in responding to Defendants' summary judgment motion.² Therefore, Watson failed to demonstrate he is entitled to sanctions for Defendants' alleged discovery violations.

The court next addresses Watson's spoliation claim. “[S]poliation is defined as the destruction of evidence or the significant and meaningful alteration of a document or instrument.” Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir.2003). The doctrine of spoliation permits the trier of fact to draw an inference that, if evidence was destroyed in bad faith, the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. See Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir.1997) ; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir.1995) ; Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir.1985). At the summary judgment stage, the spoliation doctrine provides a basis for denying a motion for summary judgment where there is sufficient probative evidence for a jury to find an act of spoliation and to draw the inference derived from such an act. A factual finding of spoliation is necessary only where the court seeks to impose a particular sanction beyond submitting the issue to the jury. Upon a finding of spoliation, the court may impose the sanction of a jury instruction on spoliation, which instructs the jury that it may infer that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for the destruction. See Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir.2005) ; see also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

For a spoliation sanction to apply, it is essential that the evidence in question be within the party's control, that is, the party actually destroyed or was privy to the destruction of the evidence. See Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334. Further, the party having control over the evidence must have an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed, and generally be on notice of a claim or potential claim at the time of the destruction. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2007). No unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the evidence in question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is otherwise properly...