Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hospitals, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 15840,15840
• Citation: 111 Idaho 44,720 P.2d 632
• Parties: , 105 Lab.Cas. P 55,636, 1 IER Cases 1540 Bernetta WATSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. IDAHO FALLS CONSOLIDATED HOSPITALS, INC., and Sandra Covert, Defendants- Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 632

720 P.2d 632

111 Idaho 44, 105 Lab.Cas. P 55,636, 1 IER Cases 1540

Bernetta WATSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. IDAHO FALLS CONSOLIDATED HOSPITALS, INC., and Sandra Covert, Defendants- Appellants.

No. 15840.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 2, 1986.

Lary S. Larson, Idaho Falls, for defendants-appellants.

Dean Charles Brandstetter and John Ohman (argued), Idaho Falls, for plaintiff-respondent.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered following a jury trial and verdict in favor of plaintiff-respondent Watson in her action for wrongful discharge from employment and from denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We affirm.

Watson was hired as a nurse's aide by defendant-appellant Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., in 1975. Although Watson was given an employee handbook when she was hired, no written employment contract was executed. During her employment Watson became eligible for and received medical, life and long-term disability insurance, sick leave, vacation and retirement benefits. She received yearly pay increases, and reviews of her job performance resulted in average and above-average evaluations. In 1978 Watson became a hospital ward clerk. In 1979 a number of hospital employees, including Watson, organized in an attempt to unionize the hospital. The hospital opposed such unionization, but Watson actively supported the efforts. An election was held and a majority of the employees rejected the attempt to unionize the hospital.

Watson testified that during the course of the attempt to unionize the hospital, head nurse Covert advised Watson to discontinue the union activity or Watson would lose her job. The National Labor Relations Board held hearings at which Watson reported the statement allegedly made by Covert. Watson testified that Covert again made threats regarding Watson's termination. Covert testified that she was unaware of Watson's testimony at the NLRB hearings, and denied ever threatening Watson with termination.

Some time in mid-1983 the hospital held an employees meeting at which time a revised edition of the handbook was delivered to all employees, including Watson. All employees were required to sign an acknowledgment of receipt of this revised handbook which explained hospital policy, discipline, counseling and termination. A policy and procedures manual was placed on each floor of the hospital which also outlined termination procedure. Ten categories of misconduct are listed which would result in immediate dismissal, including intentional falsification of business records.

Watson had been placed on probation from July to October 1983 due to an excessive number of absences. On November 22, 1983 Watson was terminated on the basis that she had falsified her employment time records. That accusation related to events of November 14. On that day Watson was scheduled to work a regular shift from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., but called in sick and asked to be placed "on call" for that shift. According to the hospital Watson was not placed "on call" but rather another employee was called in to cover five hours of Watson's shift. It is not disputed that Watson was absent the entire shift.

The remainder of the testimony was sharply controverted, but the jury was free to, and obviously did, accept the Watson version of the events which followed. Watson testified that she met with her immediate supervisor, Covert, who was to pick up Watson's "justification sheet," which is a handwritten form used to report working hours not properly recorded in the hospital's computerized time clock system. Watson testified that she complained to Covert that she, Watson, should have been called into work on November 14, but another worker was called. Watson testified that in order to make her point to Covert she wrote on her justification sheet that she was on call eight hours, and was called in five hours on November 14. Watson testified that Covert then stated that Watson had just "hung [herself] with that union stuff." According to Watson's testimony, Covert walked away with the justification sheet although Watson asked Covert to remove the entry since it had only been made for illustration purposes. Covert's testimony was sharply contradictory, indicating no such explanation from Watson, but that Watson had falsified the time entries to indicate Watson's working five hours on November 14. After receiving employee "justification sheets," supervisors fill out "time and attendance" summaries for each employee, and it is undisputed that Covert indicated on Watson's time and attendance summary that Watson had worked five hours on November 14, 1983.

As indicated above, Watson was terminated and thereafter filed action against the hospital and Covert individually, alleging wrongful discharge, that her termination was accomplished without taking steps to rehabilitate or salvage her employment, that Covert had intentionally interfered with her employment relationship with the hospital, that both defendants had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Watson, and that the accusations prior to discharge constituted slander.

Defendants made a motion for summary judgment which was granted in part as to the claims for slander and interference with contractual relations. No appeal was taken from that partial summary judgment, and hence no issue is presented herein. A jury trial was held upon the two remaining issues. The jury found for the defendants on the emotional distress claim. No appeal is taken therefrom, and hence no issue on that claim is presented herein. The jury found in favor of Watson, and against the hospital, for breach of contract resulting in wrongful discharge, and awarded damages therefor in the amount of $20,000.00. The hospital moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and requested alternatively that Watson's damages be reduced to the actual pretrial pecuniary losses. Those motions were denied. Covert is not a party to the appeal since the jury verdict was in favor of the defendants on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The hospital first argues that the district court erred in failing to grant it summary judgment on all of Watson's claims, asserting that there was no showing of a contractual agreement which limited the hospital's right to discharge plaintiff at will. The hospital would thus have us review the order denying in part its motion for summary judgment as a subcomponent of its appeal from the final judgment. We decline to do so. An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final order, and a direct appeal ordinarily cannot be taken from it. Wilson v. DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562, 494 P.2d 566 (1972). Compare with Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 649 P.2d 1209 (1982). An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Evans v. Jensen, 103 Idaho 937, 655 P.2d 454 (Ct.App.1982). The review of a judgment entered upon a jury verdict should not be limited to the facts as they were developed at the time of the motion for summary judgment. See Vincen v. Lazarus, 93 Idaho 145, 456 P.2d 789 (1969) (McFadden, J. and Donaldson, J. concurring specially).

The hospital next asserts that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the requirements for proof of the existence of a contract, the construction of a contract, and ambiguity in a contract. We here note that Watson's case at trial was that the hospital had become contractually bound by written statements contained in its handbook and its manual, as well as by oral statements, to the effect that Watson's employment would continue unless and until she violated the rules and procedures of the hospital, or did not perform her job. The district court agreed that Watson had so carried her burden of proof and instructed the jury that a contract of employment did exist between the plaintiff and the hospital. The hospital's defense at trial was that Watson intentionally falsified her time records without either excuse or explanation. The district judge correctly instructed the jury as to the contention of the hospital in that regard. On appeal, however, the hospital now asserts that no such contract of employment existed which prohibited the hospital from terminating Watson's employment without reason, in accordance with the employment-at-will doctrine.

Employment is at the will of either employer or employee, and the employer may terminate the relationship at any time for any or no reason without incurring liability, except or unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be discharged. MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hospital, 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977). An employee at will may not, however, be discharged for a reason contravening public policy. MacNeil, supra; Jackson, supra. In the case at bar the district court correctly found that the hospital manual and the employee handbook were part of the employment contract, and that the reasons for which Watson could be terminated were limited by those documents.

The employee handbook provided in pertinent part:

"3. TERMINATION BY DISCHARGE.

Termination may occur from infractions of accepted standards of performance or failure to adhere to hospital or department policy."

The handbook as to conduct which "may result in immediate discharge," provides in pertinent part:

"ACTIONS WHICH MAY RESULT IN IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE

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"B. Intentional falsifications of records required in the transaction of business."

Neither the handbook nor the manual expressly or by fair inference provide for discharge without cause.

We hold that the district court did not err in instructing the jury that a...