Watson v. Kelloggs Co.
Decision Date | 26 May 2020 |
Docket Number | 8:20CV126 |
Parties | RAFAEL EUGENE WATSON, Plaintiff, v. KELLOGGS CO., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This matter is before the court for an initial review of Plaintiff's pro se, in forma pauperis Complaint (Filing 1) to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff states this action is based on "FMLA" and "EEOC/Discrimination." (Filing 1, p. 3.) For supporting facts, Plaintiff alleges:
I was suspended the defendant company to do FMLA. I never received a termination notice. I contacted my union worker rep. He has also been unable to get a strait [sic] answer from the defendant in regards to my job status.
(Filing 1, p. 4.) Attached to the Complaint is a copy of a charge of discrimination Plaintiff filed jointly with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission ("NEOC") and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on June 28, 2018, in which he states:
The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ().
"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Id., at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Liberally construing Plaintiff's Complaint, this is an action to redress alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also asserts companion claims for disability and racial discrimination under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act ("NFEPA"), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1101 et seq.
The Eighth Circuit has recognized three categories of FMLA claims arising under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2):
(i) entitlement claims, in which an employee alleges a denial of a benefit to which he was entitled under the statute; (ii) discrimination claims, in which an employee alleges that the employer discriminated against him in the terms and conditions of employment because the employee exercised rights to which he was entitled under the FMLA; and (iii) retaliation claims, in which an employee alleges that the employer took adverse action against him for opposing a practice made unlawful under the FMLA.
Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods., 779 F.3d 514, 517-18 (8th Cir. 2015).
"The first type [of FMLA claim], arising under § 2615(a)(1), occurs where an employer refuses to authorize leave under the FMLA or takes other action to avoid responsibilities under the Act." Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012); see Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1050 (8th Cir.2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). "An employee proceeding on this theory need not show that an employer acted with discriminatory intent." Id. (citing Throneberry v. McGehee Desha Cnty. Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 979 (8th Cir. 2005)).
Id. (citing Sisk v. Picture People, Inc., 669 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2012); Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1051 (8th Cir.2006)).2
Id. (citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff appears to be claiming discrimination, by alleging his employment was terminated on February 5, 2018, because he took FMLA leave beginning in October 2017.3 On the facts alleged, however, it only appears he was terminated because Defendant failed to follow its policy of dropping 3 points after 1,000 hours of work. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant initially charged him with unexcused absences because his doctor was only approving one day per month as medical leave, but there is no allegation that Defendant failed to change its records after the doctor submitted another document in November 2017 approving all days Plaintiff had previously taken off work. Thus, as currently alleged, no plausible claim for relief is stated.
The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A "qualified individual" must be able to perform the essential functions of the employment position, with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). "Disability" under the ADA means that the individual (a) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (b) has a record of such an impairment; or (c) is regarded as having such an...
To continue reading
Request your trial