Watson v. Legacy Healthcare Fin. Servs., LLC
| Docket Number | 1-21-0279 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 2021 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (1st) 210279,196 N.E.3d 571,458 Ill.Dec. 267 |
| Parties | Brandon WATSON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEGACY HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, d/b/a Legacy Healthcare ; Lincoln Park Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, d/b/a Warren Barr Lincoln Park, a/k/a The Grove Lincoln Park ; and South Loop Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, d/b/a Warren Barr South Loop, Defendants (Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC, d/b/a Legacy Healthcare, and Lincoln Park Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, d/b/a Warren Barr Lincoln Park, a/k/a The Grove at Lincoln Park, Defendants-Appellees). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Alejandro Caffarelli and Alexis D. Martin, of Caffarelli & Associates Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.
Anne E. Larson, Harry J. Secaras, and Michael V. Furlong, of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., of Chicago, for appellees.
Debra R. Bernard, of Perkins Coie LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae LeadingAge Illinois.
Anneliese Wermuth and Jenny Goltz, of Cozen O'Connor, of Chicago, Meredith C. Slawe and Michael W. McTigue Jr., of Cozen O'Connor, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Angelo I. Amador, of Restaurant Law Center, and Deborah R. White, of Retail Litigation Center, Inc., both of Washington, D.C., amici curiae.
¶ 1 On this interlocutory appeal, plaintiff Brandon Watson appeals the trial court's order dismissing two of the defendants in this case: (1) Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC, d/b/a Legacy Healthcare (Legacy); and (2) Lincoln Park Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC d/b/a Warren Barr Lincoln Park a/k/a The Grove at Lincoln Park (Lincoln Park). The remaining defendant, South Loop Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, d/b/a Warren Barr South Loop (South Loop), was not dismissed and is not a party to this appeal.
¶ 2 The trial court's order dismissed Legacy and Lincoln Park pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2018)), which permits dismissal if "the action was not commenced within the time limited by law." The trial court found (1) that a person's claim under the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act) ( 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2018)) accrues the first time that his or her biometric information is obtained by a particular entity; (2) that the statute of limitations for the Act is five years; and (3) that more than five years had elapsed between when Legacy and Lincoln Park first obtained plaintiff's biometric information and when he filed suit, thereby requiring their dismissal from his suit.
¶ 3 On appeal, neither side contests the trial court's finding that the statute of limitations is five years. Defendants ask us to affirm the trial court's dismissal without challenging that finding, and plaintiff asks us to reverse the dismissal while preserving that finding. Thus, this issue, of the applicable term of years of the statute of limitations, is not before us on this interlocutory appeal.
¶ 4 For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 7 Since a section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint, we describe below the complaint's allegations regarding the parties and events giving rising to the suit. See, e.g. , DeLuna v. Burciaga , 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006).
¶ 8 On March 15, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that he had worked as a certified nursing assistant for defendants at different locations in Chicago. The complaint alleges that Legacy provides health care services at 26 facilities throughout the State of Illinois, and that it is "the sole member and owner" of both Lincoln Park and South Loop. Both Lincoln Park and South Loop provide residential health care services. Lincoln Park does so at its facility at 2732 Hampden Court, Chicago, while South Loop does so at its separate facility at 1725 South Wabash Street, Chicago. The complaint alleges that plaintiff worked at Lincoln Park from December 27, 2012, through February 21, 2019, and at South Loop from May 2017 through November 2017.
¶ 9 The complaint alleges that from the start of plaintiff's employment with defendants in 2012 through the end of his employment in 2019, he was "required to have his fingerprint and/or handprint collected and/or captured so that Defendants could store it and use it moving forward as an authentication method."1 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was "required to place his entire hand on a panel to be scanned in order to ‘clock in’ and ‘clock out’ of work" each day.
¶ 10 Plaintiff alleges that defendants committed four "distinct" types of violations under the Act. The Act requires an entity that utilizes biometric data (1) to publicly provide a written policy governing the retention and permanent destruction of biometric information, (2) to inform any subject in writing that his or her biometric information is being collected or stored, (3) to inform the subject in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which his or her biometric information is being stored and used, and (4) to obtain his or her written consent. 740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b) (West 2018). The complaint alleges that defendants violated the Act by failing to satisfy all four of these requirements.
¶ 11 In relief, plaintiff seeks, among other things, the statutory damages provided by the Act ( 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2018) ) and certification as a class action.
¶ 13 On May 20, 2019, defendants filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff's claim accrued on the first day they collected plaintiff's biometric information and that plaintiff's suit was time-barred. In the alternative, defendants argued that plaintiff's claim was preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act ( 820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2018)) and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) ( 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2018) ). In support of their motion, defendants attached the affidavit of Justin Choi, the human resources director of Lincoln Park, who averred that plaintiff was employed at Lincoln Park from December 27, 2012, to February 21, 2019, as a certified nursing assistant.
¶ 14 In response, plaintiff argued that his suit was not time-barred because the statute of limitations was five years and it accrued with each capture of his biometric information that defendants obtained without providing notice or obtaining consent.
¶ 15 In the alternative, plaintiff argued that, even if the trial court found that his claim accrued only with the initial scan of his hand, his claims against Legacy and South Loop could not be dismissed because he did not begin working for South Loop until May 2017. Plaintiff also argued that his claims were not preempted by either the Workers’ Compensation Act or LMRA.
¶ 16 On June 10, 2020, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding (1) that plaintiff's claim accrued with the initial scan on December 27, 2012; (2) that the statute of limitations was five years; and (3) that his suit, filed on March 15, 2019, was therefore time-barred.
¶ 17 The trial court observed: "This holding disposes of the case, but the Court will address Defendants’ other arguments for the record." The court then found that plaintiff's claim was not preempted by either the Workers’ Compensation Act or LMRA.
¶ 19 On July 9, 2020, plaintiff moved to reconsider on the ground that the trial court erred by failing to consider separately the accrual dates for each defendant. Specifically, plaintiff argued that he did not work for South Loop until 2017 and, thus, its first scan of plaintiff's hand was within the five-year statute of limitations found by the trial court. Plaintiff alleges that defendants "captured" and used his fingerprints or handscan during the entire period of his employment with them, which lasted from (1) December 27, 2012, through February 21, 2019, for Legacy and Lincoln Park and (2) May through November 2017, for South Loop.
¶ 20 Plaintiff also moved to reconsider on the ground of newly discovered evidence that showed that Lincoln Park did not exist as a legal entity until July 23, 2015. Plaintiff argued that, since Lincoln Park did not exist prior to that date, its first scan of plaintiff was within the five-year statute of limitations. The supporting evidence submitted by plaintiff was a printout from the Illinois Secretary of State's website showing that Lincoln Park filed its articles of organization on July 23, 2015.
¶ 21 Plaintiff conceded in his motion that, after July 23, 2015, he "noticed that certain changes had occurred, particularly that the name on the logos, uniforms, and building awnings had changed from *** ‘The Grove’ to ‘Warren Barr Lincoln Park’ " and that "his paychecks looked different." However, he asked the trial court to consider the information about this date newly discovered because he was "not aware that these changes had any legal significance or evidentiary relevance *** since his lived experience was simply that he continued working at the same place and in the same job."
¶ 22 The trial court found that plaintiff's evidence was not newly discovered, but it agreed that it had erred by not considering separately the accrual date for South Loop since plaintiff had made this argument in his response to defendants’ motion to dismiss. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion in part by vacating its decision to dismiss South Loop, but it affirmed its prior order in all other respects.
¶ 24 On February 23, 2021, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for entry of a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) ( ). The trial court found that there was no just reason...
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