Watson v. Republic Airlines, Inc., Civ. A. No. C82-1359.
| Decision Date | 30 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C82-1359. |
| Citation | 553 F. Supp. 939 |
| Parties | Melanie WATSON v. REPUBLIC AIRLINES, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
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Sonja L. Salo, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.
C. Michael Hardman, Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.
This action, filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.
On April 13, 1967, Melanie Watson was employed as a flight attendant by Southern Airways, which is now Republic Airlines, Inc. Pursuant to Southern Airways' policy of requiring flight attendants to resign or be terminated from employment upon becoming pregnant, Ms. Watson resigned on July 17, 1969.
At the time of Ms. Watson's resignation, a new contract was being negotiated between Southern Airways and the flight attendants. This new contract, which contained provisions for maternity leave for flight attendants, was signed in September of 1969 and was made retroactive to June of 1969. Ms. Watson claims that she was not notified of this contract and was not offered the possibility of reinstatement.
In March of 1974, Ms. Watson states that she became aware of the new company policy of offering maternity leave. At that time, she wrote a letter to the company requesting reinstatement. This request was denied. In August of 1980, she submitted an application for reinstatement, which was also denied. Ms. Watson made approximately four or five requests for reinstatement during the period from August of 1980 to March of 1981. She was granted an interview in May of 1981, but was not rehired by Republic. Ms. Watson claims that she made further inquiries about reinstatement up until April of 1982. The Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this suit on June 30, 1982.
At no time prior to instituting this action has Ms. Watson filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or attempted to pursue any legal remedies. Ms. Watson maintains that she relied on statements made by representatives of Republic Airlines that she had "no legal grounds for reinstatement because of the fact that she did not file a charge with the EEOC." Affidavit of Melanie Watson at 2.
The Plaintiff seeks the following relief: reinstatement in her former job or an equivalent position, accrued seniority, attorney's fees, costs and such other relief as the Court believes is proper.
The Defendant contends that the Complaint should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. This is claimed to be a product of the Complaint's failure to allege the timely filing of an EEOC charge.
Before bringing a Title VII action in federal district court, a private plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC against the discriminating party within 180 days of the alleged discrimination and must receive notice of the right to sue that party named in the charge. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 678 F.2d 992, 999 (11th Cir.1982). Accord Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, A Division of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.1982).1
Section 2000e-5 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:
Republic Airlines asserts that the procedural requirements outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) are jurisdictional prerequisites to instituting a suit in a federal district court.
The Supreme Court in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) addressed this very issue. The Court held that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling." 102 S.Ct. at 1132 (footnote omitted). Recently, the Eleventh Circuit in Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir.1982) concluded that the procedural requirements outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, which includes the filing of a charge with the EEOC, are not "jurisdictional prerequisites, which if not satisfied deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction." 678 F.2d at 1001 (footnote omitted). Accord Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 676 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir.1982). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a Title VII suit in federal court. Jackson, 678 F.2d at 999-1010. Accord Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1982).
The Motion to Dismiss is Denied.
The Defendant, in a separately filed Motion for Summary Judgment, also argues that the Plaintiff failed to plead and prove compliance with the mandatory conditions precedent to the initiation of a Title VII action in district court.2 Specifically, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC—or for that matter, any EEOC charge at all—entitles the Defendant to judgment in its favor.
Because the Court elects to dispose of this Motion upon the face of the pleadings, we will treat the Defendant's motion as a Motion to Dismiss for failure to allege performance of conditions precedent. When deciding a Motion to Dismiss, the material allegations are treated as admitted, and the Complaint should be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848, 23 L.Ed.2d 404, reh'g. denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 35, 24 L.Ed.2d 123 (1969). The Complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears that the Plaintiff could `prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 422, 89 S.Ct. at 1849, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Even though the filing requirements are not jurisdictional in nature, they are necessary prerequisites—conditions precedent—to filing a claim in federal court. Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1009-10. See also Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1217 (). In fact, the former Fifth Circuit, in a case very similar to the instant case, stated that the "failure to file a charge of discrimination within the statutory period entitled the defendant to treat the past act as lawful." McMonigle v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 556 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam) (cite omitted).3
The Eleventh Circuit, in Jackson, summarized the rules relating to conditions precedent. There, the circuit court stated that:
Our holding does not mean that plaintiffs no longer must prove that they have satisfied the conditions precedent to a Title VII action. To the contrary, a plaintiff must generally allege in his complaint that "all conditions precedent to the institution of the lawsuit have been fulfilled." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c). If the defendant doubts the veracity of the plaintiff's allegation, in whole or in part, then the defendant may deny "specifically and with particularity" that the preconditions have not been fulfilled. Id. The plaintiff then bears the burden of proving that the conditions precedent, which the defendant has specifically joined in issue, have been satisfied. If, however, the defendant does not deny the satisfaction of the preconditions specifically and with particularity, then the plaintiff's allegations are assumed admitted, and the defendant cannot later assert that a condition precedent has not been met.
678 F.2d at 1010 (cites omitted).
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff has not alleged in her Complaint that she satisfied the conditions precedent to bringing a Title VII suit. In fact, the Plaintiff admits that she never filed a charge with the EEOC. The Court therefore grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to allege performance of the conditions precedent to instituting this suit.4
Because the Court has the power to allow the Plaintiff to amend her Complaint, an issue remains whether the Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. In general, amendment should be freely allowed, unless it appears reasonably certain that no evidence is available that would enable the Plaintiff to allege satisfactorily the conditions precedent. Therefore, the Court must look to see whether the Plaintiff can ever allege that a timely charge was filed with the EEOC or whether the Plaintiff's claim is presently time barred.
The 180 day period to file an EEOC charge operates like a statute of limitations. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 102 S.Ct. at 1132 ().5 This 180 day "limitations period begins to run from the time that the complainant knows or reasonably should know that the challenged act has occurred."...
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