Watson v. Riverside Osteopathic Hosp., 99-70189.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-70189.,99-70189.
• Citation: 78 F.Supp.2d 634
• Parties: Barbara A. WATSON, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSIDE OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL and Service Employees International Union Local 79 of the AFL — CIO, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

78 F.Supp.2d 634

Barbara A. WATSON, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSIDE OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL and Service Employees International Union Local 79 of the AFL — CIO, Defendants.

No. 99-70189.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

December 22, 1999.

Charles W. Palmer, Taylor, MI, for Plaintiff.

Renate Klass, Southfield, MI, Elizabeth M. Pezzetti, Bloomfield Hills, MI, H. Elliot Parnes, Southfield, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Barbara A. Watson, a registered nurse, commenced this suit on January 19, 1999 against her former employer, Defendant Riverside Osteopathic Hospital ("Riverside") and her former bargaining representative, Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 79 of the AFL — CIO ("Local 79"), asserting hybrid breach-of-contract and duty of fair representation claims under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Riverside discharged her without just cause in violation of its collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Local 79, and that Local 79 breached its duty of fair representation by failing to timely seek arbitration of Plaintiff's grievance. The Court's subject matter jurisdiction is founded upon federal questions arising under the LMRA.

By motions filed on September 30, 1999, Defendants Riverside and Local 79 now seek summary judgment in their favor on both of Plaintiff's claims. Defendants argue that Local 79 has provided an adequate explanation for its failure to timely seek arbitration of Plaintiff's grievance. In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was properly discharged for cause under the CBA and the "Standards of Conduct" promulgated by Riverside, after she was found sleeping or "assuming the position of sleep" on her job as a nurse supervisor. Plaintiff filed a joint response to these two motions on October 20, 1999, and Defendants each filed a reply brief in further support of their motions on October 29, 1999.¹

The Court held a hearing on Defendants' motions on December 16, 1999. Having reviewed the briefs and supporting materials submitted by the parties, and having considered the arguments of counsel at the December 16 hearing, the Court is now prepared to rule on these motions. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion and Order, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Discharge by Defendant Riverside Osteopathic Hospital

Plaintiff Barbara Watson was employed at Defendant Riverside Osteopathic Hospital in Trenton, Michigan from 1990 until February 3, 1997, when she was discharged for allegedly sleeping or "assuming the position of sleep" on the job in violation of "Standards of Conduct" issued by Riverside. At the time of her discharge Plaintiff was working the midnight shift as a charge nurse in Riverside's mental health unit. Her employment at Riverside was governed by a CBA between Riverside and Plaintiff's bargaining representative, Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 79 of the AFL—CIO.

On January 30, 1997, the night of the incident which led to her discharge, Plaintiff was the only registered nurse on her floor and, as the charge nurse, was responsible for the safety of all of the patients and staff on that floor. At her deposition, Plaintiff described some of the patients in the unit as combative, but could not recall whether any were suicidal. (Plaintiff's Dep. at 97.) During her shift that night, Plaintiff entered a conference room, propped her feet up on a chair, tilted her head back, and closed her eyes.² She was discovered in this position by her supervisor, Kathy Potesta, the patient care director for Riverside's mental health unit, who roused Plaintiff by saying, "Barbara, you need to wake up." (Id. at 98.)

Following this incident, Plaintiff was suspended pending further investigation. On February 3, 1997, Riverside discharged Plaintiff, citing her alleged violation of Rule 38 of Riverside's "Standards of Conduct for Employees," which lists "[s]leeping or assuming posture or position of sleeping during working hours" as an example of "unacceptable behavior." (Riverside's Motion, Ex. 4, ¶ 38.)

B. Riverside's Policies and Prior Warnings Regarding Sleeping on the Job

Under its CBA with Local 79, Riverside retains the right "to promulgate from time to time, and to enforce, reasonable rules and regulations which it considers necessary or advisable for the safe, effective and efficient operation of the Hospital, so long as they are not inconsistent" with the terms of the CBA. (Riverside's Motion, Ex. 6, CBA Article III, § 3.) This portion of the CBA further provides that "[a]ny nurse who violates or fails to comply [with these rules and regulations] shall be subject to discipline or discharge subject to the grievance procedure." (Id.) In Article IX, entitled "Discipline or Discharge," the CBA provides that "[n]urses covered by this Agreement shall not be disciplined or discharged without just cause," and that "[d]isciplinary action will be on a corrective progressive basis, utilizing verbal warnings, then written warning followed by disciplinary suspensions, ... followed by discharge, if necessary." (Id., Article IX, § 1.) This same section, however, states that "[t]he Hospital and the Union recognize ... that there are some offenses which, by their nature, may justify discharge or discipline in the first instance without any prior warnings." (Id.)

Pursuant to its authority under the CBA, Riverside issued its "Standards of Conduct for Employees," which lists forty examples of "unacceptable behavior." (Riverside's Motion, Ex. 4.) As noted earlier, one such example is "[s]leeping or assuming posture or position of sleeping during working hours." (Id., ¶ 38.) The preamble to these Standards states that "[i]t is the established policy of this Hospital that any conduct, which, in its opinion, interferes with or adversely affects employment is sufficient grounds for disciplinary action ranging from oral or written warnings to suspension or immediate dismissal," and that "[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary, progressive discipline is not required." (Id. at 1.) This introductory section also lists "[f]actors that may be considered in ascertaining the appropriate disciplinary action," including (i) "[s]eriousness of conduct," (ii) "[e]mployment record," (iii) "[e]mployee's ability to correct conduct," (iv) "[a]ction taken with respect to similar conduct by other employees," (v) "[e]ffect on patients and/or visitors," and (vi) "[s]urrounding circumstances." (Id.) Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she was given a copy of these Standards, had reviewed them, and had signed a document acknowledging that she had received them. (Plaintiff's Dep. at 77-78.)

On May 7, 1992, Plaintiff and her supervisor, Kathy Potesta, discussed the prohibition against sleeping on duty, as well as other matters relating to scheduling and breaks during the midnight shift. (Potesta Dep. at 14-15.) Later that day, Potesta issued a memorandum to Plaintiff reviewing the points addressed in their discussion, including that "[s]leeping while on duty is not allowed and disciplinary action, up to, and including termination will result in the event that this occurs." (Local 79's Motion, Ex. B.)

A few months later, in September of 1992, Potesta issued a written reprimand to Plaintiff, which stated:

On September 21, 1992, employee [i.e., Plaintiff] failed to fulfill the responsibilities of a charge nurse by failing to follow a directive given to her on May 12, 1992 stating that:

1. Employees are not allowed to sleep during their unpaid break period in patient care areas.

2. Employees can not utilize hospital supplies (ie. blankets and pillows) to sleep.

3. Employees are responsible for ending their unpaid break period at the appropriate time without assistance of other hospital personnel to wake them up.

Any further occur[r]ences of this nature will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination.

(Local 79's Motion, Ex. C.) Potesta testified at her deposition that this reprimand resulted from an incident involving a health care worker, Melissa Kalo, who Potesta discovered sleeping in the mental health unit during the midnight shift. (Potesta Dep. at 13-14.) Because Plaintiff was the charge nurse on duty that night, she was written up for failing to adequately supervise an employee under her charge. (Id. at 14.)³

On October 17, 1995, following another incident where a health care worker, Scott Hall, was found sleeping in the mental health unit,⁴ Potesta issued another memorandum addressing the subject of sleeping on the job:

It has come to my attention that it is a practice on the midnight shift that staff are allowed to take their "breaks" in the offices and sleeping is allowed during that time. So that there is no misunderstanding of the policy on this unit, SLEEPING IS PROHIBITED. Disciplinary action will be taken against anyone found to be sleeping on this unit, up to, and including termination. All staff are expected to initial that they have read this memo.

(Local 79's Motion, Ex. D.) Plaintiff initialed this memorandum, and also attended a meeting on October 19, 1995, at which the subject of sleeping on the job was discussed and the employees were again reminded that such conduct was prohibited. (Plaintiff's Dep. at 79-82; see also Local 79's Motion, Ex. E, Minutes of 10/19/95 Meeting.)⁵

C. Plaintiff's Grievance over Her Discharge

Following her discharge on February 3, 1997, stemming from the January 30, 1997 incident, Plaintiff challenged Riverside's action through the five-step grievance process set forth in her employer's CBA with Local 79. (Riverside's Motion, Ex. 6, CBA at 7-8.) On February 5, 1997, Local 79...