Watson v. Solis, 10–6382.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: BOYCE F. MARTIN
• Citation: 693 F.3d 620
• Parties: Patricia D. WATSON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Hilda SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Defendant–Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 10–6382.,10–6382.
• Decision Date: 10 August 2012

693 F.3d 620

Patricia D. WATSON, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Hilda SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 10–6382.

United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 6, 2012.
Decided and Filed: Aug. 10, 2012.

[693 F.3d 622]

ARGUED:Douglas C. Weinstein, Slovis, Rutherford & Weinstein, P.L.L.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Anisha Dasgupta, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Douglas C. Weinstein, Slovis, Rutherford & Weinstein, P.L.L.C., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Anisha Dasgupta, Danielle Carim Gray, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before: MARTIN, SUTTON, and BALDOCK,^* Circuit Judges.

OPINION
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge.

Patricia Watson challenges the Department of Labor's interpretation and application of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 7384 et seq., which provides benefits to individuals or their survivors for illnesses incurred from exposure to toxic substances while working for the Department of Energy or certain related entities. Watson's father died of complications from Hodgkin's disease in 1964; Watson filed a claim in 2002 for survivor benefits under the Act. The Department of Labor denied Watson's claim, finding that she was not “incapable of self-support” and therefore not entitled to benefits under the Act as a “covered child.” Watson filed a complaint in the district court seeking review of the Department of Labor's decision. The district court denied her motion for summary judgment and dismissed her case with prejudice. Watson appeals, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the Department of Labor did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying her claim for benefits. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I.

Watson's father, Ethrage J. Hickle, worked as a contractor for the Department of Energy from 1954 to 1962. Hickle died of complications from Hodgkin's disease in 1964.

Congress enacted the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act in 2000 “to provide benefits to employees with illnesses caused by exposure to radiation and other toxic substances in the course of their work for the Department of Energy ... or its predecessor agencies, and certain of its contractors and subcontractors.” Hayward v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 536 F.3d 376, 377 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam). Under the Act, “covered employees or their eligible survivors may receive compensation in a lump sum payment of $150,000 plus medical benefits for covered individuals.” Harger v. Dep't of Labor, 560 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir.2009), abrogated on other grounds,569 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.2009). A covered employee's child is eligible for survivor compensation

[693 F.3d 623]

as a “covered child,” 42 U.S.C. § 7385s–3(d)(2), if said child:

[A]s of the employee's death—

(A) had not attained the age of 18 years;

(B) had not attained the age of 23 years and was a full-time student who had been continuously enrolled as a full-time student in one or more educational institutions since attaining the age of 18 years; or

(C) had been incapable of self-support.

When her father died, Watson was nineteen years old and not a full-time student. At the time of Hickle's death, Watson lived at her parents' residence, worked as a waitress, relied on her parents for economic support, and was listed as a dependent on her parents' income tax returns. She had left high school in the ninth grade due to a pregnancy, and in 1963—the year before her father's death—she began attending night school in an attempt to complete her high school education. She filed claims for survivor benefits with the Department of Labor in 2002.

Watson received a lump-sum compensation payment of $150,000 as a survivor of a covered employee with an occupational illness resulting from radiation exposure under a different section of the Act than that at issue here; she later filed the present claim under 42 U.S.C. § 7385s–3(d)(2)(C) for further compensation as a “covered child” under the Act. In her claim before the Department of Labor, Watson argued that she is eligible for compensation under the Act as a “covered child” because she was “incapable of self-support” at the time of Hickle's death. The Department of Labor found that she was not “incapable of self-support” because she did not provide evidence that she was “physically or mentally incapable of self-support,” as required by the Department's Procedure Manual to obtain coverage under section 7385s–3(d)(2)(C). The Department denied her “covered child” claim on this basis. In her action before the district court, Watson challenged the Department's interpretation of “incapable of self-support,” claiming that the Department impermissibly required a showing of physical or mental incapability. The district court denied her motion for summary judgment, finding that the Department of Labor provided a persuasive interpretation of the statute and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that Watson failed to provide sufficient evidence of being “incapable of self-support.” Watson appeals the denial of her summary judgment motion.

II.

We review the district court's denial of summary judgment de novo. Elkins v. Summit Cnty., Ohio, 615 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir.2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if the materials in the record show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Regan v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., 679 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under section 7385s–6(a) of the Act, a...