Watson v. Spence, 1 Div. 511

• Decision Date: 22 January 1953
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 511
• Citation: 258 Ala. 371,62 So.2d 919
• Parties: WATSON et al. v. SPENCE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 919

62 So.2d 919

258 Ala. 371

WATSON et al. v. SPENCE.

1 Div. 511.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Jan. 22, 1953.

Curtis L. Moody, Mobile, for appellants.

Harry Seale and Al J. Seale, Mobile, for appellee.

STAKELY, Justice.

This is a statutory action in ejectment brought by Percy H. Watson and Lettie N. Watson (appellants) against Elizabeth V. Spence (appellee), for the recovery of a certain lot of land situated in the City and County of Mobile, Alabama. There was verdict and judgment for the defendant. Hence this appeal.

The case was tried upon the following stipulation made between the counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendant before the court as follows: 'It is stipulated and agreed by and between counsel for plaintiffs and defendant, and the parties, present in Court, that under the abstract of title, agreed on as showing the correct status of the title, that the complainants are entitled to recover, unless the defendant shows by the evidence that reasonably satisfies the jury that they are in possession under an agreement, as a religious body, and have continued to function since the organization of the church. And if plaintiffs recover they are entitled to whatever the jury assesses, under the evidence, as fair damages for unlawful detention of the property.'

In order for the plaintiffs to recover in the present action, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to show that at the commencement of the suit they had legal title to the land sued for and the right to immediate possession. Carpenter v. Joiner, 151 Ala. 454, 44 So. 424. It is without dispute that the plaintiffs had the legal title at the time of the commencement of the suit. Accordingly the case turns on the question as to whether the plaintiffs had the immediate right to possession when the suit was filed. Referring to the stipulation which has been set forth above, it appears that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover unless the defendant shows by the evidence that reasonably satisfies the jury that possession is held by a religious body which has continued to function since the organization of the church.

The defendant introduced in evidence an agreement in writing dated September 2, 1942, made by the plaintiffs and by J. E. Spence and others, as Trustees for the Memphis Church of God.

It appears from the instrument that prior to the agreement there was such a religious organization with headquarters on the property here involved and that the aforesaid religious organization had prior to the agreement erected a small church building or tabernacle on the property. The religious organization is known as the Memphis Church of God according to the instrument. It further appears from the written instrument that the agreement shall continue to exist as long as the Memphis Church of God shall continue to function as a...