Watson v. State

• Jurisdiction: Oregon
• Parties: Richard Thomas WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Oregon and Faith Darlene Stadler, Respondents. 16-83-02462; CA A29628.
• Citation: 694 P.2d 560,71 Or.App. 734
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 08 March 1985

Page 560

694 P.2d 560

71 Or.App. 734

Richard Thomas WATSON, Appellant, v.STATE of Oregon and Faith Darlene Stadler, Respondents.

16-83-02462; CA A29628.

Court of Appeals of Oregon In Banc.

Argued and Submitted May 21, 1984.

Resubmitted in banc Nov. 7, 1984.

Decided Jan. 23, 1985.

Reconsideration Denied March 8, 1985.

David Moule, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief, for appellant.

Roy E. Pulvers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause, for respondentState of Or.With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol.Gen., Salem.

No appearance for respondent Stadler.

WARREN, Judge.

Plaintiff sued to vacate a judgment in which he was adjudicated to be the father of defendant Stadler's child and ordered to pay child support.The trial court dismissed the complaint, on defendants' motion, for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim.We affirm.

Defendants petitioned the court in 1980 to establish that plaintiff is the father of the child.During the pendency of that proceeding, defendant Stadler testified in a deposition that plaintiff is the father of her child and that she had not had sexual relations with any one other than plaintiff during the probable time of conception.Plaintiff did not seek blood tests during that proceeding, although he could have required the mother and child to submit to the tests under ORS 109.252.Instead of litigating the issue of his paternity, he stipulated that he is the father.The court entered a judgment.Plaintiff did not appeal.

In 1982, plaintiff experienced doubts as to his paternity and arranged to have blood tests performed on himself, the child and the mother.The results of those tests exclude plaintiff as the biological father.In his complaint in this proceeding, plaintiff alleged that he"was prevented from impeaching the paternity and the judgment of paternity by the fraud, accident or the act of DefendantFaith Darlene Stadler, unmixed with negligence or fraud on his own part."

Considering plaintiff's complaint in its most favorable light, we construe it as a prayer to vacate a judgment procured by fraud.¹ Because of a strong policy favoring the finality of judgments, courts will vacate a judgment on the ground of fraud only in exceptional cases.

" 'A court of equity will not lend its aid unless the party claiming its assistance can impeach the judgment by facts or on grounds of which he could not have availed himself at law, or was prevented from doing it by fraud or accident or the act of the opposite party, unmixed with negligence or fraud on his own part.When a party has once an opportunity of being heard, and neglects to do so, he must abide the consequences of his neglect.A court of equity can not relieve him, though the judgment is manifestly wrong.' "Mattoon v. Cole, 172 Or. 664, 670, 143 P.2d 679(1943), quoting2 Freeman on Judgments, Second Edition, § 486.

In order for plaintiff to show that he was prevented from impeaching the judgment by defendant's fraud, he must plead and prove fraud extrinsic to the proceedings; an allegation of perjury in the course of the proceedings is insufficient.

" * * * It is not every species of fraud, however, that vitiates a judgment.It is fraudulent to give perjured testimony and such evidence may result in a judgment but, according to the great weight of authority, equity will not interfere for that reason alone, since the unsuccessful party had his opportunity to refute the false testimony.If the rule were otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.* * *

" * * *

"It is only when the fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matter actually tried that equity will enjoin enforcement of the judgment * * *."O.-W.R. & N. Co. v. Reid, 155 Or. 602, 609-10, 65 P.2d 664(1937).

See alsoSlate Const. Co. v. Pac. Gen. Con., Inc., 226 Or. 145, 151, 359 P.2d 530(1961).

United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93(1878), was a suit to set aside a decree allegedly obtained by the use of a fraudulent document and perjured testimony.In affirming the circuit court's sustaining a demurrer to the bill, the Supreme Court described the types of extrinsic fraud which may support the setting aside of a judgment.

" * * * Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practised on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,--these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing.* * *

" * * *

"On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed * * * "98 U.S. at 65-66, 25 L.Ed. 93.

It is clear that the fraud alleged in this case, perjured deposition testimony, was intrinsic to the proceeding.Intrinsic fraud may not provide the basis for setting aside a judgment, and it does not matter that the judgment was entered pursuant to a stipulation and not after a trial on the merits.Judgments entered after default or on the parties' stipulation have the same solemn character as judgments entered after trial.Although we have not found any Oregon cases in which a stipulated judgment was attacked for fraud, a similar case was decided by the highest court of New York.

Crouse v. McVickar, 207 N.Y. 213, 100 N.E. 697(1912), was a suit to set aside a decree in a probate proceeding.The executors of the will had brought an action to determine whether a person was a legitimate child of the deceased and entitled to share in the estate.Before trial of the action, the parties entered into a stipulation that the person should receive one-half of the residuary estate, and judgment was entered dividing the estate as stipulated.Subsequently, suit was filed to set aside the judgment on the ground that the claim was fraudulent and that plaintiff had relied on the false statements in entering into the stipulation.The New York Court of Appeals held that the complaint alleged intrinsic fraud and did not state facts sufficient to constitute a basis to set the judgment aside.

"The fact that the decree now sought to be vacated rests on stipulation does not differentiate it in principle from one where the judgment was rendered after hearing evidence.The stipulation acted as a substitute for evidence.Each party being afraid of the effect of the evidence of the adverse party stipulated that the adversary's claim should prevail to the extent of one-half.No fraud is charged except in statements made as to the issue itself.If perjury in that respect made on the witness stand and inducing a court or jury to render an erroneous decision would not support an action to set aside the judgment, it is difficult to see why it should be of more moment because it frightened the parties into a compromise."207 N.Y. at 219, 100 N.E. 697.

We hold that the circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.The fraud of which plaintiff complains, perjured deposition testimony, was intrinsic to the proceeding below, because it concerned the very issue in dispute, and cannot provide the basis for setting aside the judgment.Although plaintiff may have been induced by the mother's deposition to stipulate to a judgment, he was not prevented from disputing her testimony and attempting to disprove his paternity.The strong policy favoring the finality of litigation dissuades us from allowing plaintiff to upset a judgment to which he consented without seeking to present evidence on the disputed issue.

Affirmed.

ROSSMAN, Judge, dissenting.

Surely, justice cannot be so blind.This is no way to create a father.Plaintiff was fraudulently induced by mother's outright lie to enter into a stipulated judgment of paternity.Blood tests have now conclusively proved that he cannot possibly be the child's biological father.Nevertheless, the majority, in the name of finality of judgments, concludes that plaintiff is not entitled to relief from this manifest injustice.Because I believe that the majority misinterprets the law in this area and completely ignores very significant public policies, I must dissent.

As the majority notes, judgments cannot be attacked collaterally, except for fraud, duress or some equally egregious reason.Eagen and Eagen, 292 Or. 492, 496, 640 P.2d 1019(1982).It also is necessary to establish that one was not negligent in the manner in which the original judgment was procured.There is no claim of any duress in this case, so in order for plaintiff to prevail he must show that the judgment was induced by fraud or some other egregious circumstances and that he was not himself negligent.

In order to set aside a judgment for fraud, one must plead and prove fraud extrinsic to the proceedings.The majority characterizes mother's false testimony as intrinsic fraud and therefore concludes that it does not provide a basis for setting aside the judgment.I believe that the majority drastically oversimplifies the analysis.In so doing, it looks outside our jurisdiction for guidance and completely ignores Oregon case law which has a direct bearing on this matter.Admittedly, plaintiff must prove extrinsic fraud.However, the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud...