Watson v. State

• Decision Date: 31 October 2019
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-49
• Citation: 135 N.E.3d 982
• Parties: Stanley WATSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

135 N.E.3d 982

Stanley WATSON, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-49

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed October 31, 2019

Attorney for Appellant: Leanna Weissmann, Lawrenceburg, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Samuel J. Dayton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Baker, Judge.

[1] After serving nearly eleven years in the Department of Correction as an habitual offender, Stanley Watson attained post-conviction relief and had his habitual offender status vacated. The State then filed a new petition alleging that Watson was an habitual offender based on other information. After continuances, delays, and recusals amounting to another six and two-thirds years, Watson was once again adjudicated to be an habitual offender. Now, Watson appeals his habitual offender status, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). Finding that the State failed to bring Watson to court within the one-year deadline, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Watson's habitual offender status.

Facts¹

[2] In 2001, Watson was convicted of Class A felony dealing in cocaine and Class A conspiracy to deliver cocaine following a jury trial. In a separate hearing, the jury also adjudicated Watson to be an habitual offender based on convictions from 1990, 1992, and 1997. Then, on August 28, 2001, the trial court sentenced Watson to fifty years imprisonment, enhanced by thirty years due to the habitual offender adjudication, for an aggregate sentence of eighty years.

[3] However, on April 2, 2012, the trial court granted Watson's petition for post-conviction relief and vacated the habitual offender adjudication, finding that two of the three felonies cited by the State could not form the basis of an habitual offender adjudication. The State was granted leave to amend the information, and on November 28, 2012, the State refiled its habitual offender allegation based on three other convictions from 1972, 1977, and 1981.

[4] The following represents the long procedural history of this case after the State refiled the habitual offender allegation:

• On January 11, 2013, Watson moved to continue the hearing originally set for January 29, 2013. The trial court granted the motion on January 14, 2013, and scheduled the new hearing for September 10, 2013.

• On September 13, 2013, Watson moved to continue the hearing again, with Watson's counsel stating that he had been "unable to secure [Watson's] attendance," appellant's app. vol. ii p. 102, for the September 10, 2013, hearing because Watson was in federal prison for an unrelated matter. The trial court granted Watson's motion and scheduled the new hearing for June 3, 2014.

• On November 14, 2013, the trial court sua sponte —and without explanation—rescheduled Watson's hearing for July 8, 2014.

• On June 12, 2014, Watson again moved to continue the July 8, 2014, hearing because Watson's counsel was working on a murder trial and could not be present at the July 8 hearing. On June 16, 2014, the trial court granted Watson's motion and rescheduled the hearing for February 10, 2015.

• Then, on January 21, 2015, the trial court judge issued an order recusing himself from all proceedings related to Watson's habitual offender status, citing a conflict of interest.

• A new special judge was appointed for the matter on January 28, 2015. However, the new special judge did not accept his appointment until August 12, 2015, after entering an order detailing his assignment.²

• On October 20, 2015, the trial court set the matter for pretrial conference on March 8, 2015,³ and for hearing on April 5, 2016. On March 2, 2016, the trial court sua sponte rescheduled the pretrial conference for March 9, 2016.

• At the March 9, 2016, pretrial conference, the State moved to continue the proceedings, which the trial court granted over Watson's objections. The trial court then scheduled the new pretrial conference for September 12, 2016, and the new hearing for October 18, 2016. Later, on May 10, 2016, the trial court sua sponte moved the hearing to October 4, 2016, two weeks earlier than originally planned. All parties attended the September 12, 2016, pretrial conference.

• On October 3, 2016, the State moved to continue the October 4, 2016, hearing. The trial court granted the motion that same day and rescheduled the hearing for March 21, 2017.

• On April 11, 2017, Watson, without the assistance of counsel, requested a copy of his Chronological Case Summary from the trial court clerk after he had not been transported to court for the March 21, 2017, hearing. In that request, Watson did not ask for a speedy trial but complained of his counsel's ineffectiveness.

• On October 5, 2017, the State moved for a new hearing date, but before the trial court could respond, the special judge recused himself because he was no longer serving as a senior judge.

• A second special judge was appointed to Watson's case on October 11, 2017, but he issued an order recusing himself on October 12, 2017, due to a conflict of interest. The trial court clerk then appointed a third special judge to this matter on that same date.

• On November 20, 2017, the trial court set the matter for a final pretrial conference on April 2, 2018, and for hearing on May 15, 2018. However, on March 19, 2018, Watson, without the assistance of counsel, moved to continue the hearing for a later date because he had not been in contact with his counsel for more than a year. The trial court granted his motion.

• On April 10, 2018, Watson's counsel moved to withdraw himself due to scheduling conflicts, which the trial court granted on April 13, 2018. Watson's new counsel filed an appearance on April 17, 2018.

• Then, on April 26, 2018, Watson moved to continue the pretrial conference and hearing, and the trial court granted the motion on April 30, 2018. The trial court set the new dates for the pretrial conference on October 22, 2018, and the hearing on November 27-28, 2018.

• On November 15, 2018, Watson moved to dismiss the case, citing a violation of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) and his right to a speedy trial. Following a separate November 20, 2018, hearing on this matter, the trial court denied Watson's motion to dismiss on November 28, 2018.

[5] In denying Watson's motion to dismiss, the trial court made the following conclusions of law:

[ ] Of the six and 2/3 years of delay in this case, slightly less than four years is attributable to either the State or this Court....

[ ] Seven hundred and thirty-two (732) days of delay in this case are directly attributable to continuance requests by Watson's original attorney. This weighs against Watson.

[ ] Four hundred and seventy-seven (477) days of delay can be directly attributable to the State, based on its two continuance motions and the time period between when post-conviction relief was granted and when it requested a[n] habitual offender [rehearing]. This weighs against the State. There is no evidence, however, that this period of delay was the result of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to delay [rehearing] in order to prejudice Watson....

[ ] Nine hundred and eighty (980) days of delay are attributable to actions of this Court. Again, this weighs against the State, but less so than delays directly caused by the State.

[ ] The Court also notes that much of its delay was caused by the need to appoint two different special judges during the pendency of this case. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that, at least with respect to Criminal Rule 4(C), delays in trial caused by the need to appoint a special judge are not attributable to the State. State v. Larkin , 100 N.E.3d 700, 705-06 (Ind. 2018). The Court acknowledges that a constitutional speedy trial analysis is different than a Rule 4(C) analysis. SeeLogan [v. State , 16 N.E.3d 953, 963 (Ind. 2014) ]. Still, delays related to special judge appointments in this case should not weigh heavily against the State.

[ ] Two hundred and thirty-two (232) days of delay in this case are attributable to the withdrawal of Watson's original attorney and the need for his new attorney to prepare for trial. Watson did not directly cause this delay and it should not weigh against him. However, it also seems unfair to charge the State with this delay. The Court views this period of delay as a neutral factor, weighing for or against neither party.

Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 148-49 (some internal citations omitted). In sum, the trial court determined that the trial court and the State were jointly responsible for 1,457 days of delay and that Watson was responsible for 732 days of delay. Neither party disputes these findings.

[6] Following the November 27-28, 2018, rehearing, the jury adjudicated Watson to be an habitual offender. Accordingly, the trial court re-enhanced Watson's sentence by thirty years on December 20, 2018. Watson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] We consolidate Watson's multiple arguments into one dispositive issue: whether the State failed to bring Watson to court within the one-year deadline articulated in Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C).

[8] Generally, "[i]n reviewing Criminal Rule 4 claims, we review questions of law de novo, and we review factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard." Bradley v. State , 113 N.E.3d 742, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Because the facts here are undisputed, our review is de novo. Id. at 749 ; see also Austin v. State , 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039-40 (Ind. 2013).

[9] Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) states, in pertinent part, that:

[n]o person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later[.]

"This rule is intended to give effect to the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by both the federal...