Watson v. State

Decision Date27 July 1966
Docket NumberNo. 33699,33699
Citation190 So.2d 161
PartiesMack Charles WATSON, Jr., William Bailey and Jimmie Wilson, Appellants, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Philip Carlton, Jr., Miami, for appellants.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ERVIN, Justice.

The Appellants, defendants below, were found guilty of rape. The jury voted six to six on the issue of a recommendation of mercy. There being no majority vote for a recommendation as required by F.S. Section 794.01, F.S.A., the death sentence was imposed upon the Appellants. The judgment of conviction and death sentence rendered in the Circuit Court of Dade County have been appealed for review here.

In the transcript of testimony it appears three Mexican migratory workers, Frank Castillo, his wife Lydia Castillo, and his sister, Vita Castillo, has driven in their automobile from Texas to Goulds, Florida. They arrived late in the evening. Being unable to find Frank Castillo's brother with whom they were to stay, they parked along a side road near Goulds and fell asleep. They were awakened by intruders, three men who subsequently at gun point forced the two women into another car and drove away with them at high speed. In a secluded spot the car was stopped and the three men raped Lydia and Vita. Shortly thereafter the women were released from the car and ran down the road. Lydia fell into a deep roadside ditch. She was rescued and resuscitated from drowning by a man and woman who heard her sister-in-law's screams for help.

The defendants were apprehended due to the fact one of them, Mack Charles Watson, while being interrogated by a law officer regarding another crime told the officer he and the other defendants, William Bailey and Jimmie Wilson, committed the acts of rape. There was testimony from Vita and Lydia identifying one or more of the three as their assailants. In addition, there was introduced into evidence confessions from the three defendants allegedly given to an investigating police officer.

The foregoing is only a brief outline of the testimony taken at the trial which resulted in the conviction of the Appellants of the crime of rape. In considering the various contentions made by Appellants under their assignments of error pertinent parts of the testimony will be referred to in greater detail.

The Appellants first contend the trial judge erred in conducting extensive cross-examination of the defendants; making statements reflecting an attitude that the defendants' testimony lacked credibility while commenting favorably in respect to the truthfulness of the testimony of a state witness, all of which being in the presence of the jurors, was prejudicial to defendants and deprived them of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. and their rights to due process and equal protection of law under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Under this contention Appellants urge the following remark of the trial judge made in regard to an argument between counsel for the State and the defense concerning the introduction of oral and written confessions and their voluntariness prejudiced a fair trial: 'The defense will have ample opportunity when they put on their testimony to put in any evidence--if they have any evidence--of abuse.'

At another point in the trial the judge, after stating the State could have objected to prior defense cross-examination questions to a law officer witness concerning whether the officer was telling the truth, commented: 'Every witness is sworn.' The Appellants urge this statement of the trial judge emphasizes the credibility and veracity of the officer's testimony because the latter is under oath and contend the judge should have impartially left these considerations to the jury to determine without this comment.

Appellants point out that the judge interjected the following remark to a defendant 'Do you remember that answer?' during the State's cross-examination of that defendant; that after one of the defendants had answered a question from the trial judge the judge remarked: 'That's your testimony * * *?'; and that when a defendant testified he was unable to remember an answer to a question, the judge broke in and said 'Will you answer his (State's) questions?'

Appellants complain that after the State had cross-examined the defendant Mack Charles Watson, without going into the details of his confession, as it had with the other defendants, the trial judge ordered Watson to keep his seat on the witness stand and proceeded to vigorously cross-examine him in the manner of a prosecutor. In this examination Appellants contend the trial judge made certain prejudicial statements. The trial judge in his examination questioned Watson relative to his alleged confession statements to a law officer while in custody which were transcribed by a reporter. The defense insisted Watson while in custory was coerced (ordered) by the officer to make the confession statements. In his examination, the judge asked the witness his name and when the witness gave it, the judge commented, 'Now, you answered that yourself. He (the law officer) didn't tell you to say that?' Then followed questions by the judge to Watson concerning whether answers allegedly given by Watson while in custody to the law officer and transcribed in a book by the reporter were given by Watson as ordered by the officer. The judge in this phase of his questioning made remarks to the witness of which the following are typical: 'You don't remember that. * * * Do you remember that question and that answer that he made you learn * * * But you did learn it if it's here (referring to the officer's book). * * * And this is not what happened, but this is what he ordered you to say. * * * This is not what happened. * * * You don't remember that he ordered you to reply that the girls were not struck by anyone? * * * Now these are the questions and the answers that you memorized while these officers were beating you. * * * Then if it's down here, either he ordered you to say it, or you put it your way then. Is that your testimony? * * * Our effort is simply to learn the truth. That's all we are interested in.'

The appellants contend these questions and remarks of the trial judge exceed the bounds of neutrality and impartiality, prejudiced the jury and rendered the trial unfair to the defendants, contrary to the principles of law announced in Williams v. State (Fla.) 143 So.2d 484; State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, 113 So.2d 218 (Fla.); Robinson v. State, 161 So.2d 578 (Fla.); Raulerson v. State, 102 So.2d 281 (Fla.); Carr v. State, 136 So.2d 28 (Fla.App.); Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232; and Gans v. State (Fla.App.) 134 So.2d 257.

We have carefully evaluated the questions and the remarks of the trial judge which are complained of by Appellants. We do not find that the trial judge exceeded his duty or passed beyond the pale of neutrality or impartiality. None of the questions or comments appear to us to contain the taint of bias or prejudice. His questions and statements comport with the presumption of the innocence of the accused. We agree that ordinarily a trial judge should not have participated so prominently in the questioning as was done in this case. Nevertheless, it is our understanding a trial judge, in order to ascertain the truth, may, if he deems it necessary, ask questions of witnesses and clear up uncertainties as to issues in cases that appear to require it. The technical difficulties present under existing laws and precedents in the trial of a capital case which must be surmounted in order to get at the truth, avoid error, and protect the rights of the accused and, at the same time, give the jury the benefit of all available and admissible evidence, may well make it incumbent upon the trial judge to ask questions of witnesses in addition to those asked by counsel for the state and the defense. This was an extremely difficult and involved case and the trial judge must have considered it appropriate and in the interest of justice and a fair trial to enter into the questioning of witnesses. Error is committed only when it appears that the judge departs from neutrality or expresses bias or prejudice in his comments in the presence of the jury. None of the comments made by the judge in the form of questions or in his rulings or in his statements at the trial clearly reflect partiality or bias.

It is next contended the trial judge erred in his decision to admit into evidence alleged oral admissions of the defendants because: (1) he denied defendants opportunity to proffer before him evidence refuting the voluntariness of the alleged admissions prior to testimony of same before the jury; and, (2) that he thereafter determined the admissibility of written confessions of the defendants not upon the freeness and voluntariness of the manner in which they were secured and not upon whether the defendants had been informed as to their right to counsel to advise them as to their rights prior to their making the alleged confessions or admissions but upon whether the defendants were being beaten at and during the immediate time the confessions were being given and upon whether the statements in the confessions were truthful.

To the contrary, it appears from the record the trial judge made a full and complete investigation of the circumstances preceding and during the taking of the defendants' written confessions outside the presence of the jury. The defendants were given ample opportunity to and did give testimony to the effect the written confessions were not voluntary but were coerced, that is to say they were beaten from them by the law officers.

The complaint that similar opportunity should have been given the defendants to proffer evidence to the trial...

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31 cases
  • Hurst v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • October 14, 2016
    ......This Court's opinion is firmly rooted in article I, section 22, of the Florida Constitution. As to the Eighth Amendment argument, the last time this Court actually considered an Eighth Amendment argument on its merits was decades ago. See Alvord, 322 So.2d at 533 ; Watson v. State, 190 So.2d 161 (Fla.1966). Subsequently, the Court has rejected the claim, providing virtually no analysis and seemingly relying on cases from this Court dating back to the reinstitution of the death penalty, and so it is unclear whether the claim was based on the Eighth Amendment or some ......
  • Butler v. State, SC95158.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • April 3, 2003
    ...Further, in rejecting the constitutional challenge to a nonunanimous advisory sentence in Alvord, this Court relied on Watson v. State, 190 So.2d 161 (Fla.1966), which construed a predecessor to section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), that required imposition of a death sentence for first......
  • Hamilton v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • October 12, 1978
    ...was only exercising reasonable control over the trial and did not pass beyond the bounds of neutrality or impartiality. See Watson v. State, 190 So.2d 161 (Fla.1966), cert. den. 389 U.S. 960, 88 S.Ct. 339, 19 L.Ed.2d Finally, we conclude that the court did not err in allowing the state's ex......
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    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • February 4, 1969
    ...made in either direct or cross-examination. Deeb v. State, 131 Fla. 362, 179 So. 894. There was no evidence of tampering. Watson v. State, Fla.1966, 190 So.2d 161. Therefore, for the reasons above stated, we find no error in the verdict, adjudication, and sentence here under review and Affi......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Deposition Objections
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    • March 31, 2021
    ...life without interpreters. Some courts have been reluctant to require use of interpreters in close cases. See, e.g., Watson v. State , 190 So.2d 161, 167 (Fla. 1966) (holding that use of interpreters is within the trial court’s discretion but that “it is far better that a witness in a trial......

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