Watson v. State, CR–13–668.

• Citation: 2014 Ark. 203,444 S.W.3d 835
• Decision Date: 08 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. CR–13–668.,CR–13–668.
• Parties: Alonzo WATSON, Appellant. v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

2014 Ark. 203

444 S.W.3d 835

Alonzo WATSON, Appellant.

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR–13–668.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 8, 2014.

Craig Lambert, Little Rock, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

Opinion

COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Justice.

Appellant Alonzo Watson appeals the order entered by the Pulaski County Circuit Court denying his petition for postconviction relief that he brought pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. For reversal, Watson contends that the circuit court erred in ruling that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. We affirm the circuit court's decision.

The record reflects that the prosecuting attorney in Pulaski County charged Watson with capital murder in connection with the death of Daniel Harris, whose body was found in a deserted area near a warehouse in Jacksonville on the morning of September 3, 2010. The evidence at trial disclosed that Harris died of blunt-force trauma to the head

after having been struck multiple times with a piece of concrete. Watson was the last known person seen with Harris prior to his demise. In the early-morning hours of September 3, Watson encountered a number of persons and confessed to four of them that he had killed someone. One of those persons was Sara Whipple, Watson's girlfriend, who testified that Watson appeared at her home at approximately 3:00 a.m. and that Watson had scratches on his body and blood on his clothing. Another was Marcus Hildreth who, in addition to seeing Watson on the morning of the murder, was later incarcerated with Watson after Watson's arrest for Harris's murder. Hildreth testified that Watson told him during their incarceration that “there had been a fight” and that he had struck Harris with a rock. A jury in Pulaski County found Watson guilty of capital murder. The prosecutor had waived the death penalty; therefore, the conviction resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Watson appealed his conviction and sentence, and this court affirmed on the sole issue that the circuit court did not err in denying Watson's motion to suppress a statement that he had given to the police. Watson v. State, 2012 Ark. 430, 2012 WL 5586015.

On January 16, 2013, Watson filed a timely petition for postconviction relief in which he asserted that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. By an order dated April 22, 2013, the circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. This appeal followed.

At the outset, we note that this court does not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court's findings are clearly erroneous. Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, 433 S.W.3d 234. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, after reviewing the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Sartin v. State, 2012 Ark. 155, 400 S.W.3d 694. In making a determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court considers the totality of the evidence. State v. Harrison, 2012 Ark. 198, 404 S.W.3d 830.

Our standard of review also requires that we assess the effectiveness of counsel under the two-prong standard set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Springs v. State, 2012 Ark. 87, 387 S.W.3d 143. In asserting ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the petitioner first must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient. Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. 489, 385 S.W.3d 228. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Adams v. State, 2013 Ark. 174, 427 S.W.3d 63. The reviewing court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Scott v. State, 2012 Ark. 199, 406 S.W.3d 1. The defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of overcoming that presumption by identifying the acts and omissions of counsel which, when viewed from counsel's perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55.

Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a demonstration that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Myers v. State, 2012 Ark. 143, 400 S.W.3d 231. This requires the petitioner to show that there is a reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent counsel's errors. White v. State, 2013 Ark. 171, 426 S.W.3d 911. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Golden v. State, 2013 Ark. 144, 427 S.W.3d 11.

Unless a petitioner makes both Strickland showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Taylor v. State, 2013 Ark. 146, 427 S.W.3d 29. We also recognize that “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, at 3–4, 385 S.W.3d 783, 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).

On appeal, Watson argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in a number of respects. First, Watson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating the possibility that another individual, Allen Boyd, may have committed the murder. In his petition, Watson alleged that Boyd had given a statement to the police advising that Harris had raped Whipple three weeks prior to the murder. Watson argued that the rape provided a motive for Boyd to kill Harris because it was “common knowledge in the community” that Boyd, Whipple's former boyfriend “was very distraught over her ending their relationship” and that Boyd was an “extremely jealous and a very violent man.” Watson continues to argue on appeal that his counsel had a duty to investigate all possible defense strategies and that, had counsel investigated this matter, it is likely that the jury's attention would have been drawn to Boyd because of Boyd's motive to kill Harris.

In its order, the circuit court dismissed this claim on the ground that the allegation lacked factual substantiation, as there was no evidence connecting Boyd to the murder. We cannot say that the circuit court's finding is clearly erroneous. Although it is true that counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary, a petitioner under Rule 37.1 who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to perform adequate investigation must delineate the actual prejudice that arose from the failure to investigate and demonstrate a reasonable probability that the specific materials that would have been uncovered with further investigation could have changed the outcome of trial. See Breeden v. State, 2014 Ark. 159, 432 S.W.3d 618 (per curiam). The burden is entirely on the claimant to provide facts that affirmatively support his claims of prejudice, as neither conclusory statements nor allegations without factual substantiation are sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective, and such statements and allegations will not warrant granting postconviction relief. Bryant v. State, 2013 Ark. 305, 429 S.W.3d 193 (per curiam). A petitioner who asserts ineffective assistance for failure to investigate must show that further investigation would have been fruitful, and that the specific materials identified that counsel could have uncovered would have been sufficiently significant to raise a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Watson v. State, 2012 Ark. 27, 2012 WL 234634 (per curiam). Thus, to prevail under Strickland, Watson was required to establish with facts that counsel made an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment. Thornton v. State, 2014 Ark. 113, 2014 WL 1096263 (per curiam). In this case, aside from alleging that Boyd had a potential motive for killing Harris, Watson does not present any facts beyond speculation that Boyd had anything to do with Harris's murder. As such, this allegation is conclusory and does not provide a basis for postconviction relief.

Under this point, Watson also contends that the circuit court should have allowed an evidentiary hearing to develop further facts on this issue. However, the strong presumption in favor of counsel's effectiveness cannot be overcome by a mere possibility that an evidentiary hearing might produce evidence to bolster an allegation contained in a petition for postconviction relief. Hickey v. State, 2013 Ark. 237, 428 S.W.3d 446 ; Nance v. State, 339 Ark. 192, 4 S.W.3d 501 (1999). The supporting facts must appear in the petition, and the petitioner cannot rely on the possibility that facts will be elicited from witnesses if a hearing is held. Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark. 55, 771 S.W.2d 266 (1989). Conclusory allegations that are unsupported by facts do not provide a basis for either an evidentiary hearing or postconviction relief. Nance, supra. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the circuit court erred by not conducting a hearing on this matter.

Watson also submits that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, uncover, and utilize State's witness Sara Whipple's mental-health history to good advantage at trial. Again, relying on Boyd's statement to the police, Watson alleges that Boyd had told the police that Whipple suffered from bipolar...