Watson v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 May 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. A-5884.,A-5884. |
| Citation | 90 F. Supp. 900 |
| Parties | WATSON v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Bailey E. Bell, Anchorage, Alaska, for plaintiff.
J. Earl Cooper, United States Attorney, Ralph E. Moody, Assistant United States Attorney, Anchorage, Alaska, Gerald F. McLaughlin, Assistant United States Attorney, Davis & Renfrew, Anchorage, Alaska, for defendant.
This action was brought by the plaintiff under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Title 28, U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), for injuries the plaintiff claims to have received when struck by a bus on the Fort Richardson Military Reservation near Anchorage, Alaska.
The Act provides in part as follows: "(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
The proof shows that the plaintiff on the day of the injury was employed by the United States Government, and was working in a laundry of the Military Hospital. From her living quarters, provided by the Army on the Fort Richardson Military Reservation, she was transported to her place of work and return by Army buses driven by soldiers.
On the day in question, September 29, 1949, the plaintiff proceeded from her quarters to the regular bus stop at the Civilian Cafeteria, in accordance with the usual custom and practice, in order there to secure a bus on which to ride to the hospital. While waiting for the bus, another bus, in size, shape, color and every detail of appearance corresponding with the Army buses in which civilians were carried from place to place on the Post, and driven by a man in some type of Army uniform, backed into her, throwing her violently to the ground and causing, as plaintiff avers, the injuries of which she complains. Neither the plaintiff, nor any of the bystanders, so far as known, recognized the driver of the bus which struck the plaintiff, nor was the number of the vehicle noted, or recorded. A witness for the plaintiff testified at the trial that after the plaintiff had been struck and knocked to the ground the driver of the bus stated that he would report the accident to the Motor Pool, that being the place from which Post buses were routed and assigned to certain work. No report was made to the Motor Pool, and the witness so testifying for the plaintiff said he saw the driver only once thereafter, and that the driver then inquired as to the injuries of the plaintiff. Neither the plaintiff, nor the defendant produced any evidence as to the identity of the driver, or as to the identity of the bus, except generally as herein recited.
Fort Richardson Military Reservation is an area of considerable extent. It houses hundreds, if not thousands, of troops and many civilians are employed there from time to time for construction work and for the housekeeping work of the Post. The entire Post area is under the usual military discipline and direction, and it is difficult to conceive of any activities being carried on within the boundaries of the Post except by the order and with the knowledge of the officers in charge, or their subordinates. By circumstantial evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that the bus which struck and injured the plaintiff was a United States Government Bus and was driven by a soldier at the time of the collision.
Recently in the case of Ruth Radomsky v. United States of America, 180 F.2d 780, 783, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had occasion to restate the elements of circumstantial evidence in the following language: "Circumstantial evidence is that which establishes the fact to be proved only through inference based on human experience that a certain circumstance is usually present when another certain circumstance or set of circumstances is present." Considering all the circumstances of this case, the nature of the Military Reservation, the customary strict and rigid military control of all the activities carried on on the Reservation, the fact that the bus which did the damage was, in all appearances, a Government bus and the man who drove it was dressed in the uniform of a soldier, even though a fatigue uniform, leads inescapably to the other "set of circumstances" namely, that the bus was a government bus and was driven by a soldier. In any event, the conclusion is virtually unavoidable that the bus was owned and operated by the United States Government, and was then driven by an employee of that government.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, to fix liability upon the United States, it is also necessary that the employee be acting within the scope of his employment at the time the injury occurs. The plaintiff asserts that she did not know the name of the driver of the bus, where it had come from, where it was going, or on what mission. Nor was any proof on these points offered by the government. The government disclaimed all knowledge of the bus and of the identity of its driver and of the work, if any,...
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