Watson v. Watson
| Decision Date | 05 January 1883 |
| Citation | 49 Mich. 540,14 N.W. 489 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | WATSON v. WATSON. |
A declaration in an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for alleged seduction of the plaintiff, charging the defendant with debauching her, and also with enticing her away to make her his mistress or concubine, and with an assault, and getting her with child by force and arms, is not demurrable on the ground of duplicity, as the enticing away and assault is mere matter of aggravation.
A single woman who has been taken to the house of a defendant to be by him adopted, and who has taken his name, may maintain a suit in such name, although she has not been legally adopted.
An unmarried woman, in this state, can bring and maintain an action for her seduction in her own name.
Case made from Kent.
Godwin & Earle, for plaintiff.
Holmes & Hine, for defendant.
The plaintiff brought an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for her alleged seduction by the defendant while she was living in his house as his adopted daughter although not in fact formally adopted. There was a demurrer interposed to the declaration, and the objections pointed out thereby were--First, duplicity second, the action was not brought in plaintiff's real name; and, third, that plaintiff being an unmarried woman could not bring and maintain this action in her own name. The demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered for the defendant.
1. The duplicity alleged is, that defendant is charged with debauching the plaintiff, and also with an assault and getting her with child by force and arms; and that the first and fourth counts charge defendant with enticing away the plaintiff to make her his mistress or concubine.
The plaintiff had the right to set forth in the declaration the circumstances under which she was induced to become a resident in the house and family of the defendant. In doing this she might allege that the defendant purposed and intended to bring her within his power that he might debauch her and keep her for the purposes of concubinage and make her his mistress. This was not alleged as a separate or substantive cause of action, but as matter of aggravation of the offense charged. It may be that no such recitals were necessary in order to enable the plaintiff to introduce evidence of such facts and circumstances, but the mere fact that the plaintiff did allege the same by way of inducement would not subject the declaration to the objection urged.
The further objection urged that each count in the declaration states a cause of action in case and also in trespass, is not we think true in point of fact. It is true that there are some words made use of that seem to give color to the position taken, but we think no such effect can fairly be given them, when used in the connection in which they are.
2. That the action was not brought in the plaintiff's real name. Even if this objection could be raised by demurrer, still there is no merit in it. The declaration alleges that after the plaintiff entered the home and family of the defendant and in pursuance of the understanding that she should be in all things as his daughter, her name was changed to Elizabeth E. Watson, by which name she was thereafter always called and known. There can be no question under such circumstances as to her right to bring this action in the name she did.
The third objection raises what both parties concede to be and treat as the material and important one in the case. At common law the plaintiff could not have maintained the present action to recover damages for the seduction. The action could only be maintained by the parent or master, and the foundation thereof was that the plaintiff was deprived of the child or servant's services and could recover damages by reason thereof--and this relation of servant, in theory at least, was indispensable to the maintenance of this action. The value of the services was not important; if the parent sued, he could recover substantial damages based upon the injury to his parental feelings and the shame and mortification which would necessarily follow from such a wrong or in any case for all that the plaintiff could feel from the nature of the injury. There were also cases where no action could be maintained because the relation referred to did not exist.
This condition of the law was justly considered a...
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