Watson v. Watson

• Decision Date: 21 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14363,14363
• Citation: 607 A.2d 383,221 Conn. 698
• Parties: Loretta B. WATSON v. David P. WATSON.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 383

607 A.2d 383

221 Conn. 698

Loretta B. WATSON v. David P. WATSON.

No. 14363.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 1991.

Decided April 21, 1992.

Francis J. Foley III, with whom, on the brief, was Kathleen R. Gravalec, Norwich, for appellant (plaintiff).

Timothy D. Bates, with whom was Robert J. Cary, Jr., Groton, for appellee (defendant).

Before SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

GLASS, Justice.

This is an action for dissolution of marriage and for other relief brought by the plaintiff, Loretta B. Watson, against the defendant, David P. Watson. The action was commenced on November 10, 1987, and a hearing was held and a judgment rendered on December 27, 1988, by a state trial referee, Hon. Eli Cramer, acting as the trial court. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which set aside the judgment solely as to the financial issues and remanded the case for a full hearing on those issues only. Watson v. Watson, 20 Conn.App. 551, 560, 568 A.2d 1044 (1990). Pursuant to the remand order, the trial court, Axelrod, J., conducted a hearing and, thereafter, rendered judgment. The plaintiff again appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the case to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court: (1) improperly concluded that the defendant's conveyance of his interest in the marital home to two children of the marriage was not fraudulent as to the plaintiff; (2) abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff any money or property to represent her interest in the real property owned by the defendant; (3) abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff sufficient alimony and support in light of her health problems and limited earning capacity; and (4) abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff adequate counsel fees with respect to the first trial, the appeal of the first decision and the trial of the case on remand. We reverse and remand the case for a new hearing.

The facts that provided the basis for the prior remand of this case are set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion, Watson v. Watson, supra. On remand, the trial court found that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant had been dissolved by the previous trial court judgment and that each party was equally at fault for the breakdown of the marriage. In addition, the court found the following facts, which are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Cranston, Rhode Island, on June 26, 1971. Three children were born of the marriage: Leslie Anne Watson, born March 11, 1972; Heidi Lynn Watson, born July 13, 1973; and Amy Beth Watson, born October 29, 1975. The plaintiff graduated from college in June, 1970, and was employed thereafter as a school teacher in Rhode Island. She continued to work as a school teacher until the birth of the parties' oldest child. The plaintiff is not licensed to teach in Connecticut.

In March, 1973, the defendant's parents conveyed to him title to one acre of land, upon which the parties built their home. The plaintiff and the defendant lived with their children in a mobile home near the site for approximately three years while the house was being constructed. The plaintiff cashed in the pension plan from her teaching job and used the funds to purchase exterior shingles for the house. The plaintiff saved $14,000 from other sources, which she also contributed toward the construction of the house. The plaintiff assisted in the physical construction of the house as well, staining floors, papering walls and painting subflooring. The defendant, his father and the defendant's uncle did most of the construction work. The defendant's father donated much of the material used to construct the house.

The parties' youngest child, Amy, has been diagnosed as autistic and requires constant care. When Amy was approximately two and one-half years old, the town of Preston started paying the plaintiff $35 per day to transport Amy to Manchester for care and treatment. The plaintiff cleaned homes in Manchester during the day until it was time to pick up Amy. This pattern continued for approximately seven years until 1985, when Amy was placed in Benhaven, a private institution.

At the time of the dissolution hearing in December, 1988, the plaintiff had a net weekly income of $157.50. She had assets of $1760.38 and liabilities of $1135. The plaintiff was also the beneficiary of a trust fund established in 1984. ¹ The plaintiff has osteoarthritis of the knees, and as a result, in 1986, she had a total knee replacement and now has an artificial joint in her left knee.

The defendant attended Mitchell College in New London, where he received a two year pre-engineering degree. During the entire period of the marriage, the defendant was the only full-time employee on his parents' dairy farm. He worked from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day except Sunday, when he spent approximately four hours at home in the afternoon. The plaintiff and the defendant never took a vacation, and the defendant took only four or five days off from work during seventeen years of marriage. After the plaintiff and the defendant were married, the defendant received $30 net weekly pay for approximately one year. The defendant's net pay increased to $60 per week for two years, and then to $80 per week for approximately one and one-half years. His net pay then increased to $200 per week for approximately two years and then to $250 per week from approximately 1982 through 1985. The defendant's net weekly pay finally increased to $362.17, the amount he was earning at the time of the dissolution hearing. For a period of five or six years between 1972 and 1981 or 1982, the parties received food stamps.

In December, 1988, the defendant had personal property valued at $5000, stocks valued at $1062.50, and fractional interests in the following real properties other than the marital home: (1) the Woolworth Farm; (2) the Frink Farm; and (3) the South Long Pond, Ledyard property. The trial court made the following findings of value as to these real estate interests. ² The Woolworth Farm, which consists of approximately 208 acres, was valued at $349,000 by agreement of the parties. The property was acquired by the defendant's parents in January, 1987, and placed in their names and the names of the defendant and his two sisters. The defendant's one-fifth interest in this property was valued at $69,800. The 120 acre Frink Farm was valued, also by agreement of the parties, at $269,000. This property was purchased by the defendant's parents in 1978 and title was put in the names of the defendant and his sister, Lucille. The defendant's one-half interest in this property was valued at $134,500. The South Long Pond property was given to the defendant and Lucille by an aunt in 1946. The trial court valued this property at $156,000. The defendant's one-half interest in this property was valued at $78,000. The South Long Pond property is subject to a lease of $60 per year that will expire in approximately 1996.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant's conveyance of his interest in the marital home to the couple's two oldest daughters was not fraudulent as to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues that the trial court exceeded the scope of the Appellate Court's remand order by reconsidering the state trial referee's conclusion that the conveyance was fraudulent. The plaintiff further contends that even if this court concludes that the trial court did not exceed its authority on remand, it nevertheless erred in concluding that the conveyance was not fraudulent as to the plaintiff.

In the previous judgment rendered by the state trial referee, the defendant had been ordered to pay periodic, nonmodifiable alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $35 per week, terminable after three years. The state trial referee ordered that the deed transferring the marital home to the defendant's daughters be set aside and that the house revert to the defendant. The plaintiff was given exclusive use of the house until July 13, 1991, when Heidi would reach 18 years of age, at which time the plaintiff would have to relinquish possession to the defendant. The state trial referee also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $80,000 in two installments of $40,000 each, the first installment to be made within three months of the date that the plaintiff vacated the house, and the second installment to be made within two years thereafter.

The plaintiff appealed the state trial referee's financial orders to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff that "[n]otwithstanding the great latitude accorded to the trial court in awarding alimony and assigning property ... the trial court could not reasonably have concluded as it did with respect to the alimony award." Watson v. Watson, supra, 20 Conn.App. at 554, 568 A.2d 1044. The Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new hearing on all financial issues. ³

On remand, the trial court found that on November 3, 1987, the defendant had quitclaimed his interest in the marital home to his two oldest daughters, reserving a life estate for himself and the plaintiff. ⁴ The trial court found further that there was no consideration for this transfer. At the remand hearing, the defendant claimed that he had made the transfer to benefit and protect his children and to give the plaintiff an interest in the property. The plaintiff testified that the defendant had conveyed the property because he had become aware that she intended to file for divorce.

The trial court ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff periodic alimony of $75 per week. The trial court also ordered that the defendant convey to the plaintiff his life interest in the marital home, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, subject only to the title in his...