Watson v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 11-0191

• Decision Date: 19 January 2012
• Docket Number: Kanawha County No. 10-AA-34,No. 11-0191,11-0191
• Parties: WILLIAM WATSON, JR., Respondent Below, Petitioner v. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, BUREAU FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND HEALTH FACILITIES, AND MILDRED MITCHELL-BATEMAN HOSPITAL, Petitioners Below, Respondents
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

WILLIAM WATSON, JR., Respondent Below, Petitioner

v.WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, BUREAU FOR

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND HEALTH FACILITIES, AND MILDRED MITCHELL-BATEMAN HOSPITAL, Petitioners Below, Respondents

No. 11-0191

Kanawha County No. 10-AA-34

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUED: January 19, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The petitioner herein and respondent below, William Watson, Jr. ("Mr. Watson"), appeals from an order entered December 30, 2010, by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. By that order, the circuit court reversed a final order of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board; denied Mr. Watson's grievance; and reinstated the discipline imposed upon Mr. Watson by his employer, Mildred Mitchell-Bateman Hospital, respondent herein and petitioner below ("Mitchell-Bateman"). Mitchell-Bateman disciplined Mr. Watson for insubordination and sleeping on the job by suspending Mr. Watson for five days and transferring him from the position of night-shift security guard to the position of day-shift food service worker. On appeal to this Court, Mr. Watson asserts that the circuit court erred by (1) ruling that Mitchell-Bateman's directive prohibiting him from speaking with his coworkers during the pendency of its investigation into his alleged theft of copper did not violate his constitutional rights to intimate association or privacy; (2) finding that his actions amounted to insubordination warranting discipline; and (3) concluding that the discipline imposed by Mitchell-Bateman was proportionate to his misconduct.

Upon our review of the briefs, oral arguments of the parties, and appendix record, we affirm the December 30, 2010, order of the Kanawha County Circuit Court. In summary, we conclude that Mitchell-Bateman did not violate Mr. Watson's constitutional rights; that Mr. Watson was insubordinate; and that Mitchell-Bateman imposed proportionate discipline. We further find this matter to be proper for disposition pursuant to Rule 21 of the West Virginia Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The facts giving rise to the instant controversy are not disputed by the parties. In the fall of 2008, copper was stolen from Mitchell-Bateman's facility, a state-supported psychiatric hospital located in Huntington, West Virginia. At that time, Mr. Watson had been employed by Mitchell-Bateman for approximately nine years and was working as a night-shift security guard. Following the copper theft, Mr. Watson disclosed to a fellow Mitchell-Bateman security guard that he knew who had stolen the copper and that he had participated in the crime. The fellow security guard alerted Mitchell-Bateman officials, and an investigation ensued. Because Mitchell-Bateman believed that Mr. Watson had been involved in the copper theft, it suspended him from work while it conducted its investigation. Mitchell-Bateman notified Mr. Watson of his suspension orally and by letter dated September 16, 2008, further directing Mr. Watson to temporarily refrain from speaking with his coworkers: "During the period of your suspension . . . . [y]ou are not to contact any staff member other than the Director of Human Resources, your union representative (if he or she is an employee), or [the Chief Executive Officer]." (Emphasis in original).

After he had learned of his suspension and Mitchell-Bateman's directive limiting his communications with coworkers during the investigation, Mr. Watson nevertheless contacted three different Mitchell-Bateman employees. Mr. Watson first spoke with the fellow security guard with whom he previously had discussed the copper theft. During this post-suspension conversation, Mr. Watson claimed that he really had not been involved in the copper theft and asked what, if anything, she had said to Mitchell-Bateman investigators.

Mr. Watson also spoke with a coworker from whom he had purchased an automobile. This conversation entailed Mr. Watson's explanation that, because of his suspension from work without pay, he would not be able to make timely payments for the automobile.

Finally, Mr. Watson spoke with a coworker who lives in his neighborhood. During this exchange, Mr. Watson asked him if he had been contacted with regard to the copper theft investigation.

On October 8, 2008, Mitchell-Bateman informed Mr. Watson that it had determined that he was not involved in the theft of copper from its facility. However, during the investigation, Mitchell-Bateman learned that Mr. Watson had spoken with numerous coworkers contrary to its directive that he refrain from doing so and that Mr. Watson had fallen asleep while working his night-shift security guard position. Consequently, Mitchell-Bateman concluded that Mr. Watson's insubordination and misconduct warranted discipline, which included a five-day suspension without pay and a job transfer from night-shift security guard to day-shift food service worker. Despite the change in his job title and position, Mr. Watson's job classification and pay grade remained the same so his salary did not change.

Mr. Watson accepted the transfer to day-shift food service worker but filed a grievance to contest the disciplinary actions. He did not prevail at either the Level I or Level II grievance proceedings. After the Level III grievance hearing, the ALJ ruled in favor of Mr. Watson by final decision issued December 31, 2009. In summary, the ALJ concluded that the restrictions that Mitchell-Bateman had placed upon Mr. Watson's ability to communicate with his coworkers improperly violated his constitutional rights to intimate association and privacy. Accordingly, the ALJ found further that Mr. Watson had not been insubordinate and that Mitchell-Bateman should not have disciplined him for his conduct. Therefore, the ALJ reinstated Mr. Watson to his former position of night-shift security guard.

Mitchell-Bateman then appealed the ALJ's decision to the circuit court. By order entered December 30, 2010, the circuit court reversed the ALJ's order, denied Mr. Watson's grievance, and reinstated the discipline imposed by Mitchell-Bateman. In rendering its ruling, the circuit court determined that Mr. Watson's constitutional rights had not been violated because Mitchell-Bateman issued its directive only to ensure the integrity of its investigation. The circuit court additionally found that Mr. Watson's defiance of said directive amounted to insubordination and that the resulting discipline imposed by Mitchell-Bateman was proportionate to his misconduct.

In his appeal to this Court, Mr. Watson challenges the circuit court's decision to reverse the ruling rendered by the Grievance Board. We previously have held that,

[o]n appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4 (a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

Syl. pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W. Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). Furthermore, "[i]n cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo." Syl. pt. 2, id. To the extent the circuit court's decision considered Mr. Watson's constitutional challenges, our review is plenary. See Syl. pt. 1, Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 199 W. Va. 400, 484 S.E.2d 909 (1996) ("A circuit court's interpretation of the West Virginia Constitution is reviewed de novo.").

Mr. Watson first assigns error to the circuit court's ruling that Mitchell-Bateman did not violate his constitutional rights to intimate association or privacy when it directed him to not contact his coworkers during the copper theft investigation. The right to intimateassociation is guaranteed by the First¹ and Fourteenth² Amendments to the United States Constitution and by article III, section 16³ of the West Virginia Constitution. In recognizing a right to intimate association, the United States Supreme Court has explained that, "because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3250, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1984) (citations omitted). Although other types of relationships also may exhibit certain of these characteristics, in the main the Court contemplated that relationships of the marital and familial varieties are the types of intimate associations meriting constitutional protection:

The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family—marriage; childbirth; the raising and education of children; and cohabitation with one's relatives. Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special

community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.

Id., 468 U.S. at...