Watson v. Witmer

• Citation: 183 F.Supp.3d 607
• Decision Date: 25 April 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-1349
• Parties: Antonio Watson, Plaintiff v. Detective Todd Witmer, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

183 F.Supp.3d 607

Antonio Watson, Plaintiff

v.Detective Todd Witmer, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-1349

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed April 25, 2016

Royce L. Morris, S. Baker Kensinger, Goldberg Katzman, P.C., Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

Nigel A. Greene, Rawle & Henderson LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Diane B. Carvell, Rawle & Henderson, LLP, Jessica S. Davis, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge

Plaintiff Antonio Watson ("Watson") filed the above-captioned action alleging Fourth Amendment and equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a racial discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). Before the court is a motion (Doc. 22) to dismiss filed by defendants Corporal Todd Witmer ("Corporal Witmer"), David Johnson ("Johnson"), Lower Paxton Township Police Department, and Lower Paxton Township.¹ The motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Watson is an African-American male residing in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 17 ¶¶ 1, 85). Corporal Witmer is an employee of the Lower Paxton Township Police Department. (Id.¶ 2). At all times relevant to the amended complaint, Johnson was the Director of Public Safety for Lower Paxton Township. (Id.¶ 4).

On January 8, 2013, a robbery transpired at a Sunoco gas station located at 4220 Union Deposit Road in Lower Paxton Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. (Id.¶ 9). Store surveillance cameras recorded the perpetrator, and still photographs of him were released to the public to facilitate his identification. (Id.¶¶ 11-12; Doc. 17-2). After viewing these images, Watson's parole officer, George Baird ("Baird"), identified Watson as the offender. (Doc. 17 ¶¶ 6, 13-14). Thereafter, Corporal Witmer arrested Watson on January 10, 2013 and charged him with robbery. (Id.¶ 15). Watson remained in Dauphin County Prison during the pendency of the charge. (Id.¶ 26).

While confined, Watson maintained that he was innocent. He avers that he completed and passed a polygraph examination regarding the Sunoco robbery. (Id.¶ 19). On January 23, 2013, Watson's counsel met with Corporal Witmer and urged that Watson had been misidentified as the perpetrator. (Id.¶ 20). Counsel presented for Corporal Witmer's comparison the booking photograph of Watson and the still pictures from the robbery. (Id.¶ 21). The amended complaint alleges, however, that Corporal Witmer "declared that he did not need to, and would not, examine the photographs" because Baird had positively identified Watson. (Doc. 17-3; see also Doc. 17 ¶ 22).

On or about February 5, 2013, the charges against Watson were dismissed. (Doc. 17 ¶ 24). Watson was not immediately discharged. (Id.¶¶ 24-25). On February 6, 2013, Baird handcuffed Watson, transported him to a local shopping center, and released him. (Id.¶ 25).

Watson filed his original complaint in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. (See Doc. 6 at 25-47). Defendants timely removed the action to this court. (Doc. 1). On August 1, 2015, the present moving defendants filed a motion (Doc. 12) to dismiss the complaint. The court denied defendants' motion as moot upon Watson's filing of an amended complaint (Doc. 17) on August 17, 2015. (See Doc. 18).

In his amended complaint, Watson asserts Fourth Amendment and equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Corporal Witmer, Johnson, the Lower Paxton Township Police Department, and Lower Paxton Township. Watson also brings against Corporal Witmer a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and IIED. On September 3, 2015, defendants filed the instant motion (Doc. 22) to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. SeeSantiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130–31 (3d Cir.2010). In the first step, "the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’ " Id. at 130 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131 ; see alsoFowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir.2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level"). A claim "has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Courts should grant leave to amend before dismissing a curable pleading in civil rights actions. SeeFletcher – Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir.2007) ; Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.2002). Courts need not grant leave to amend sua sponte in dismissing non-civil rights claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fletcher – Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 251, but leave is broadly encouraged "when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).

III. Discussion

Defendants contend that Watson's factual averments are insufficient to establish his entitlement to relief under Section 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Section 1981, and state law governing false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and IIED. The court will address these issues seriatim .

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a cause of action to redress violations of federal law committed by state officials. See42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method for vindicating those rights otherwise protected by federal law. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) ; Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996). To establish a claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must show a deprivation of a "right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States...by a person acting under color of state law." Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.1995) ). Defendants do not dispute Watson's contention that Corporal Witmer acted under color of state law. (See Doc. 17 ¶¶ 55, 68, 83, 133).

In the case sub judice , Watson alleges that Corporal Witmer violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Watson further asserts that Johnson, the Lower Paxton Township Police Department, and Lower Paxton Township are subject to municipal liability for the aforementioned constitutional deprivations.

1. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims Against Corporal Witmer

a. Fourth Amendment False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution²

The sum and substance of defendants' challenge to the Section 1983 claims is their asseveration that Corporal Witmer had probable cause to arrest and detain Watson. (Doc. 23 at 8-11; Doc. 25 at 5). A false arrest claim requires plaintiff to show that he or she was arrested without probable cause. SeeGroman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1988) ); Dull v. W. Manchester Twp. Police Dep't, 604 F.Supp.2d 739, 750 (M.D.Pa.2009) (Conner, J.). A claim for false imprisonment may be grounded on a "detention pursuant to [an] arrest" made without probable cause. Groman, 47 F.3d at 636 ; see alsoStewart v. Moll, 717 F.Supp.2d 454, 463 (E.D.Pa.2010). The elements of a malicious prosecution claim are as follows: (1) defendant commenced a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor; (3) defendant "initiated the proceeding without probable cause;" (4) defendant acted maliciously or with a purpose apart from bringing plaintiff to justice; and (5) plaintiff "suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding." Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–82 (3d Cir.2007) ; see alsoHenderson v. City of Phila., 853 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (E.D.Pa.2012).

Probable cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge would convince a reasonable person that an individual has committed an offense. SeeBeck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) ; United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir.2002). Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether the individual actually committed the...