Watt v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of Franklin

• Decision Date: 26 March 1956
• Docket Number: No. A--111,A--111
• Citation: 121 A.2d 499,21 N.J. 274
• Parties: Harry E. WATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF FRANKLIN, in the County of Sussex, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 274

21 N.J. 274

121 A.2d 499

Harry E. WATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF FRANKLIN, in the County of Sussex, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--111.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 12, 1956.

Decided March 26, 1956.

Emanuel A. Honig, Franklin, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lewis P. Dolan, Newton, for defendant-respondent (Robert H. Lee, Newton, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

VANDERBILT, C.J.

This action in lieu of prerogative writ was brought by the plaintiff, Harry E. Watt, to compel the Borough of Franklin to pay him a pension pursuant to the direction of the Veterans' Pension Act, R.S. 43:4--1 et seq., N.J.S.A., based on an aggregate of more than 20 years of public service. From a judgment in favor of the defendant entered in the Law Division of the Superior Court, the plaintiff appealed, and we certified the matter on our own motion while it was pending in the Appellate Division.

The plaintiff retired from the office of collector of taxes for the Borough of Franklin on December 31, 1954, and applied to the borough for a pension pursuant to the Veterans' Pension Act, supra. At the time of his retirement the plaintiff was 64 years of age. He had served in World War I and was honorably discharged from the United States Army. The 20 years' service upon which the claim for pension is based is made up of six years' service as a member of the common council of the Borough of Franklin, a position for which he received no salary or other remuneration, one year as a member of the General Assembly of the Legislature, for which service he received a salary of $500, and 16 years as tax collector of the Borough of Franklin, during all of which time he received a salary for his services. At the time of his retirement he was paid at the rate of $1,200 per year.

The services rendered by him, through continuous in each office, were not so in point of total service. There was a period of two years between service as a member of the common council and service as a member of the General Assembly, and a period of one year between service as a member of the General Assembly and election to the office of tax collector.

The pertinent portions of the Veterans' Pension Act are as follows:

'This chapter shall apply to and include persons serving in and honorably discharged from the military or naval service of the United States, * * * in any war in which the United States is or has been engaged * * * provided, such designated persons shall have attained the age of sixty-two years or become incapacitated after twenty years of continuous or aggregate service for the duties of their office or position or employment.' (R.S. 43:4--1, N.J.S.A.)

'When an honorably discharged soldier, sailor or marine has or shall have been for twenty years continuously or in the aggregate in office, position or employment of this State or of a county, municipality or school district or board of education, the body, board or officer having power to appoint his successor in case of vacancy may, with his assent, order his retirement from such service, or he shall be retired on his own request. * * *' (R.S. 43:4--2, N.J.S.A.)

'A person so retired shall be entitled, for and during his natural life, to receive by way of pension, one-half of the compensation then being received by him for his service, which shall be paid in the same way and in the same installments as his compensation has been payable. No pension paid under this article shall be less than fifty dollars per month, unless the person so retired shall at the time of his retirement be receiving compensation of less than fifty dollars per month, in which case he shall be paid on retirement the full amount then being received by him for his service.

'In case of retirement with pension from office or position under any other law of this state, the person retiring shall waive either his pension under that law or his pension under this article.' (R.S. 43:4--3, N.J.S.A.)

'Provisions for all pensions arising under this article shall be made in the appropriation or tax levy for the department of the public service from which the person shall be retired. No pension shall cease or become invalid by reason of the abolition of the department or office in which he served, or any change in its title.' (R.S. 43:4--4, N.J.S.A.)

In every case involving the application of a statute, it is the function of the court to ascertain the intention of the Legislature from the plain meaning of the statute and to apply it to the facts as it finds them. Carley v. Liberty Hat Mfg. Co., 81 N.J.L. 502, 507, 79 A. 447, 33 L.R.A., N.S., 545 (E. & A.1910). A clear and unambiguous statute is not open to construction or interpretation, and to do so in a case where not required is to do violence to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Such a statute is clear in its meaning and no one need look beyond the literal dictates of the words and phrases used for the true intent and purpose in its creation. But few statutes can boast of such clarity or stand that test through every inquiry, and the court must take the responsibility of determining in each case presented whether the particular statute, in its application to it, is clear and unambiguous.

The need for construction arises in two instances. As we move away from the ideal of a clear and unambiguous statute we find statutes that on their face are clear and unequivocal but in light of related legislation and of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case in which it is applicable, the true meaning becomes indefinite or obscure. In these instances it may be the plain meaning of the words themselves that casts doubt as to the true intention of the Legislature, or often it is the absurdity of the result flowing from a literal application of that plain meaning that causes wonder as to the true purpose of the enactment. Then, too, there are those less difficult instances in which the meaning of a statute is obviously obscure or doubtful, where the language used is Per se capable of dual interpretation. When these circumstances appear the court is not only at liberty to interpret the statute but it is its solemn duty to seek out and give effect to the legislative intent evident from the aids available to it; cf. Murphy v. Zink, 136 N.J.L. 235, 54 A.2d 250 (Sup.Ct.1947), affirmed 136 N.J.L. 635, 57 A.2d 388 (E. & A.1947); Kessler v. Zink, 136 N.J.L. 479, 57 A.2d 10 (E. & A.1947...