Watt v. Stanfield

• Decision Date: 04 December 1922
• Parties: WILLIAM WATT, Respondent, v. R. N. STANFIELD and JAMES D. LANE, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

210 P. 998

36 Idaho 366

WILLIAM WATT, Respondent, v. R. N. STANFIELD and JAMES D. LANE, Appellants

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 4, 1922

REOPENING CASE FOR FURTHER EVIDENCE-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

1. It is within the sound discretion of a trial judge to permit the introduction of evidence after a case is closed and given to the jury, and before they have delivered their verdict to the court, and where good cause appears therefor and the judge refuses to reopen such case for the purpose of receiving additional evidence solely by reason of a mistaken belief that he was without authority to do so, such abuse of discretion is ground for granting a new trial.

2. Held, that the court erred in overruling appellants' motion for new trial in this case.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, for Bannock County. Hon. O. R. Baum, Judge.

Action upon contract. Judgment for plaintiff. Motion for new trial overruled. Reversed.

Order reversed and a new trial granted. Costs awarded to appellants.

Ed. R Coulter, for Appellants.

"It is well settled that a trial court, for the purpose of receiving further evidence, may reopen a case after the parties have rested, though it should never do so except for good reasons and on a proper showing, and this power continues after the case has been given to the jury and before they have delivered their verdict." (Haines v. Young, 132 Cal. 512, 64 P. 1079; In re Walker's Estate, 148 Cal. 162, 82 P. 770; Garner v State, 97 Ark. 63, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1059, 132 S.W. 1010.)

Discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. (Goodwin v. Prime, 92 Me. 355, 42 A. 785; Harris v. Harris, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 13; Sea Isle City Imp. Co. v. Assessors of Taxes, 61 N.J.L. 476, 39 A. 1063; Lovinier v. Pearce, 70 N.C. 167; Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479, 2 Am. St. 322; Abbott v. L'Hommedieu, 10 W.Va. 677; Rose v. Brown, 11 W.Va. 122; Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1, 16 P. 345; Marray v. Buell, 74 Wis. 14, 41 N.W. 1010.)

The facts stated constitute such accident and surprise as would give to appellants a right to ask for a new trial under paragraph 3, sec. 6888, C. S. (First Nat. Bank of Storm Lake v. Harwick, 74 Iowa 227, 37 N.W. 171; Fretwell v. Laffoon, 77 Mo. 26; Skinner v. Terry, 107 N.C. 103, 12 S.E. 118.)

Peterson & Coffin and C. H. Darling, for Respondent.

There was not such accident or surprise as the appellant by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have guarded against. (McGuire v. Drew, 83 Cal. 225, 23 P. 312; Clifford v. Mason, 6 Colo. 603; Brevard v. Graham, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 177; Brooks v. Johnson, 122 Cal. 569, 55 P. 423; Schellhous v. Ball, 29 Cal. 605.)

The action of the trial judge in denying appellants' motion made in the court below to set aside the proceedings and to reopen the case is not a basis for a new trial. (In re Kingsley's Estate, 93 Cal. 576, 29 P. 244; Davey v. Southern P. Co., 116 Cal. 325, 48 P. 117; People v. Crowley, 56 Cal. 39; Shanklin v. Hall, 100 Cal. 26, 34 P. 636; Bailey v. Brown, 4 Cal.App. 515, 88 P. 518; Valentine v. Rosenhaupt, 19 Idaho 130, 112 P. 685; Denman v. Brennamen, 48 Okla. 566, 149 P. 1105, L. R. A. 1915E, 1047; United Hardware-Furniture Co. v. Blue, 59 Fla. 419, 52 So. 364, 35 L. R. A., N. S., 1038; Hedstrom v. Union Trust Co., 7 Cal.App. 278, 94 P. 386.)

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. (Union Brewing Co. v. Cooper, 15 Colo. App. 65, 60 P. 946; Phillips County Court v. People, 55 Colo. 258, 133 P. 752; Blake v. Howe, 1 Aikens (Vt.) 306, 15 Am. Dec. 681; Brooks v. Douglas, 32 Cal. 208; Cook v. De la Guerra, 24 Cal. 237; Haight v. Green, 19 Cal. 113; Ekel v. Swift, 47 Cal. 619; McGurie v. Drew, 83 Cal. 225, 23 P. 312; Ross v. McDuffie, 91 Ga. 120, 16 S.E. 648.)

BUDGE, J. Rice, C. J., and McCarthy, Dunn and Lee, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a motion for a new trial.

The facts, briefly stated, are as follows: Respondent brought an action against appellants to recover upon two causes of action. The cause was set down for trial at 9 o'clock on the 30th day of September, 1920. One of the appellants, together with his attorney, left Weiser by train on the evening of September 29, 1920, and reached Pocatello at 3 o'clock on the following morning. After arriving at the latter place, they went to a hotel. On the morning of September 30, 1920, at 9 o'clock, according to their watches, which carried Pacific Coast time, they were in the courtroom prepared to proceed with the trial of the cause.

At Pocatello there is a division of the zone of Mountain and Pacific Coast time. It would seem that the territory north and west of Pocatello, as far as and beyond Weiser, is within the zone in which Pacific time is fixed as the correct time by act of Congress, and the territory south and east of Pocatello is within a zone controlled by Mountain time.

In other words, appellants' counsel's watch carried Pacific Coast time, and the court was conducting business according to Mountain time, so when appellant reached the courtroom it was 9 o'clock by Pacific Coast time and 10 o'clock by Mountain time. According to the time under which the court was proceeding, appellants' counsel was one hour late. On arrival in court, appellants' counsel ascertained that the cause had been called, the jury impaneled, evidence of the respondent introduced, the jury instructed, and they had retired for deliberation.

Prior to the rendition of the verdict, the attention of the court being called to the fact of the difference in time as above recited, which occasioned the delay of counsel, in not being present at 9 o'clock, Mountain time, counsel for appellants made an oral motion, in which among other things he expressed a willingness to accept the jury as impaneled and moved the court to reopen the case and permit him to cross-examine the respondent and introduce appellants' evidence in support of their answer. In refusing to grant this motion, the trial judge assigned the following reasons:

"The court realizes that the proceedings are unusual in this, that only one party was heard, also that the plaintiff's attorney is powerless in the matter, and if the court thought it was a matter in the discretion of the court, the motion, of course, would be allowed, but the court knows of no statute, Mr. Coulter, under which the proceedings heretofore had, in view of the fact that the jury is now waiting with its verdict, and the motion is made in the presence of the jury, who have returned with a verdict, which has not yet been received, under which it could act. If you can show the court any statute by which it might act, the court would be glad to accommodate you. I take it, it is the desire of counsel for the plaintiff that the matter be tried on its merits, and it is the desire of the court that both parties be heard, but the court believes, Mr. Coulter, that if your motion was granted it would be error, and it would be such error on behalf of the court that it would be reversible, so in view of that your motion will be denied."

Whereupon the court directed the jury to submit their verdict, and the same was received and filed by the clerk, upon which verdict judgment was entered in favor of respondent for the amount prayed for in his complaint, together with interest. Thereupon a notice and motion for new trial, supported by affidavit, was duly submitted, and by the court overruled.

This cause may be disposed of upon one of the errors assigned, which involves the question whether the court abused its discretion in denying appellants' motion for a new trial.

It might be here observed, however, that in our opinion the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case before receiving the verdict of the jury, and in denying to appellants' counsel the right to cross-examine the respondent and to introduce evidence on appellants' behalf. The court should have followed the course which it seemed desirous of doing, made plain by the use of the following language, viz., that: "If the court thought it was a matter in the discretion of the court, the motion, of course, would be allowed."

The court's action in this regard was not circumscribed by any statute, but rested solely within its discretion, to the end that justice be done and that litigants who were wholly without fault be permitted to submit to the court evidence in support of...