Watters v. Harsco Metals
| Decision Date | 30 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-cv-00483-TMP |
| Parties | FONTANO WATTERS, Plaintiff, v. HARSCO METALS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed April 20, 2015, by the defendant, Harsco Metals ("Harsco"). (Doc. 36). The motion was supported by a brief and evidentiary submission. (Docs. 36, 37). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, supported by evidence, on May 27, 2015. (Doc. 45). The defendant filed a reply brief on June 8, 2015. (Doc. 51). Plaintiff Fontano Watters, an African American male, alleges that his employer, defendant Harsco Metals, discriminated against him on the basis of his race. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 22).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no requirement, however, "that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 323.
Once the moving party has met his burden, Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file,' designate 'specific factsshowing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322.
After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party mustprevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988).
Applying these standards to the evidence before the court, the following facts are either undisputed or taken in a light most favorably to the non-moving plaintiff.
At all relevant times the plaintiff, Fontano Watters ("Watters"), was employed by the defendant, Harsco Metals ("Harsco"). Harsco operated a mill service business located in Birmingham, Alabama. The mill was owned by another entity, CMC Steel ("CMC").1 The plant was referred to as Plant 61 and/or CMC Birmingham ("Plant 61"). Watters began working as a welder at Plant 61 in November of 2011. He was later promoted to the position of lube technician and then to a position on the rail crew. All of Watters' positions were in the maintenance department, which consisted of about ten workers. The plaintiff's direct supervisor at the relevant time was Roger Boswell ("Boswell"). At the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Watters was working as a lube technician.
On January 29, 2013, Watters was transporting tanks and cylinders with a company forklift when he bumped into a storage building, causing damage to the building.2 He reported the incident to Boswell, his immediate supervisor, and metwith the production supervisor, Eddie Ishman ("Ishman"), and the site manager, Doug Mullins ("Mullins"), on the following day, January 30, 2013. Ishman and Mullins were the decision-makers with regard to discipline of all Plant 61 employees at that time. Because of the accident, Watters was given a three-day, unpaid suspension and was required to submit to a drug test. Harsco's policy for post-accident drug testing is set out in the Employee Handbook along with the general guidelines regarding workplace accidents. Workplace accidents involving the use of company equipment and resulting in damage to company property are considered to be violations of Harsco's Health, Safety and Security Policy, as it is set out in Harsco's Code of Conduct.
Watters already had received a three-day suspension for an earlier disciplinary infraction. Soon after plaintiff started work in 2011, he received a three-day suspension for "disabl[ing] a maintenance truck out of anger." (Watters Depo., Doc. 36-8, p. 53). After making several requests for the key to a maintenance truck, plaintiff got Id. at p. 56.
Watters is African American. Mullins and Boswell are Caucasian males, but Ishman is an African American male. Watters contends that Caucasian employees similarly situated to him, Donald Mauldin ("Mauldin"), C. Matthew Wood (" "), and Mason Wood (" "), were treated more favorably than Watters when involved in workplace accidents. In early 2011, before Watters was employed by Harsco (he started in November 2011), C. Wood was repairing a piece of machinery that malfunctioned during the repair, causing damage to the building in which it was housed. Ishman and Mullins were the decision-makers with regard to this incident, and they did not discipline C. Wood or require him to submit to a drug test, which Watters contends is contrary to Harsco's policy.
According to Watters, the incident involving Mauldin occurred in January 2013, although Watters admits he has no personal knowledge of the incident as he was not at work at the time. Watters claims that Mauldin damaged the door of the "yard truck" while operating a crane. No disciplinary action was taken against Mauldin, and he was not required to take a drug test. Ishman and Mullins deny that they were ever aware of the incident, and there is no evidence otherwise.
In early February 2013, shortly after Watters' accident, M. Wood was involved in a workplace accident causing damage to company property. It was determined that he failed to chock the wheels of a truck, even though he engagedthe parking break, which allowed the truck to roll backward into a building doing damage to the building. He was not disciplined or required to submit to a drug test, even though company policy requires drug testing and discipline in the case of any accident resulting in damage to company policy.
Early in 2013, after the plaintiff's workplace accident, the oversight of Plant 61 transferred from Mullins and Ishman to a department of Harsco known as "Harsco Future Fleet." One consequence of this shift in oversight was that Ishman and Mullins no longer were the decision-makers with regard to discipline for Plant 61. Harsco Future Fleet, and particularly Deric Zies, took over the administration of discipline. Although Mullins and Ishman recommended that M. Wood be given a three-day suspension, Zies overruled them. He concluded that because M. Wood had no similar infractions in his history and because he...
To continue reading
Request your trial