Watts v. Ballard

• Decision Date: 07 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-0568,15-0568
• Citation: 798 S.E.2d 856
• Parties: Jack R. WATTS, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. David BALLARD, Warden, Respondent Below, Respondent
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

798 S.E.2d 856

Jack R. WATTS, Petitioner Below, Petitioner

v.David BALLARD, Warden, Respondent Below, Respondent

No. 15-0568

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: March 7, 2017

Filed: April 7, 2017

Scott E. Johnson, Esq., Appellate Counsel, Public Defender Services, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Nic Dalton, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Katlyn Miller, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Respondent

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioner, Jack R. Watts, appeals a May 21, 2015, final order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, argues, inter alia, that the circuit court's order is insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Having considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, the submitted appendix record, and pertinent authorities, we find merit to the petitioner's argument and, therefore, remand this case for the circuit court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its ruling.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was sentenced on October 28, 2011, to an aggregate term of incarceration of 215 to 705 years and fifty years of supervised release upon his conviction of four counts of first degree sexual assault, five counts of first degree sexual abuse, and nine counts of sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust to a child. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a direct appeal of his convictions with this Court. By memorandum decision entered on April 16, 2013, this Court affirmed the petitioner's convictions.¹

On July 17, 2013, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Ohio County asserting twenty-three grounds for relief. The petitioner also requested the appointment of habeas counsel. By order entered on August 16, 2013, the circuit court appointed attorney Mark Panepinto to serve as the petitioner's habeas counsel and afforded him ninety days to submit a revised habeas petition on behalf of the petitioner setting forth any and all grounds for post-conviction relief.²

On February 13, 2015, Mr. Panepinto filed a document with the circuit court that he styled as a "Certificate of No Merit." Mr. Panepinto indicated in his "Certificate of No Merit" that he had thoroughly reviewed approximately 3,000 pages of transcripts, evidence, discovery, and related matters pertaining to the petitioner's case. Mr. Panepinto then stated:

This counsel certifies that based upon the review of the totality of the documents and information obtained and after discussions with both former court-appointed counsel of the Petitioner, that this counsel cannot ethically, and within the applicable rules, argue any of the issues asserted in the pending Habeas Corpus Petition. Additionally, counsel certifies that it is his opinion and belief that there exists no other viable grounds for Habeas Corpus relief by virtue of an Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus as a Habeas Corpus action would have no merit.

In response to Mr. Panepinto's "Certificate of No Merit," the petitioner filed a motion for a change of court-appointed counsel.

By order entered on May 21, 2015, the circuit court denied the petitioner's motion for a change of court-appointed counsel.³ In the same order, the court also denied the petitioner's habeas petition, finding it to be "without merit." This appeal followed.⁴

II. Standard of Review

Our standard of review is set forth in syllabus point one of Mathena v. Haines , 219 W.Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006), which provides as follows:

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

III. Discussion

The petitioner contends that the circuit court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law justifying its denial of relief on the grounds asserted in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as required by the West Virginia Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act, West Virginia Code §§ 53-4A-1 through -11 (2016) (hereinafter the "Act"). We agree. "West Virginia's post-conviction habeas corpus statute[s] ... and the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings in West Virginia [1999] ensure that a petitioner's due process rights are protected." Markley v. Coleman , 215 W.Va. 729, 732, 601 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2004). To that end, West Virginia Code § 53-4A-7c provides, in pertinent part:

When the court [in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding] determines to deny or grant relief, as the case may be, the court shall enter an appropriate order.... In any order entered in accordance with the provisions of this section, the court shall make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to each contention or contentions and grounds (in fact or law) advanced, shall clearly state the grounds upon which the matter was determined, and shall state whether a federal and/or state right was presented and decided.

In addition, Rule 4(c) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings in West Virginia requires that a "summary dismissal order shall contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the manner in which each ground raised in the petition has been previously and finally adjudicated and/or waived."

In accordance with the Act and governing rules, this Court has held: " West Virginia Code section 53-4A-7(c) (1994) requires a circuit court denying or granting relief in a habeas corpus proceeding to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to each contention advanced by the petitioner, and to state the grounds upon which the matter was determined." Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Watson v. Hill , 200 W.Va. 201, 488 S.E.2d 476 (1997) ; see also Markley , 215 W.Va. at 734, 601 S.E.2d at 54 ("In deciding to grant or deny relief, circuit courts must make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the petitioner's habeas corpus allegations."). In this case, the circuit court disposed of the petitioner's habeas petition through a single paragraph in its order, which reads as follows:

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on or about July 17, 2013. On or about August 16, 201[3], the Court entered an order converting Petitioner's Habeas Corpus Petition into an Omnibus Habeas Petition, and appointing Mark Panepinto, Esq. Mr. Panepinto is an active lawyer with numerous years of criminal defense experience. After a thorough review of [Petitioner's] Petition and the evidence in support thereof, Mr. Panepinto opined to the Court that there was no viable claim upon which to prosecute Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Based upon his vast criminal experience and good-standing with the Court, the Court has accepted Mr. Panepinto's assessment of Petitioner's Habeas Corpus Petition. As a result, the Court FINDS that it would be a waste of judicial time and resources to appoint another attorney to prosecute the instant Habeas Corpus Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner's Motion for Change [of] Court-Appointed Counsel is hereby DENIED . Moreover, and based upon the strength of Mr. Panepinto's representations to the Court, the Court does hereby DENY Petitioner's Habeas Corpus Petition.

(Footnote omitted). Clearly, the circuit court's order fails to comply with West Virginia Code § 53-4A-7(c) as it is devoid of any findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the grounds for habeas relief asserted by the petitioner and, instead, merely relies upon the representations made by the petitioner's habeas counsel.

"We previously have recognized that 'in most circumstances the failure to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding an issue raised in habeas proceedings ... necessitate[s] a remand[.]' " Dennis v. State, Div. of Corrections , 223 W.Va. 590, 593, 678 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2009) (quoting State v. Warden, W. Va. Penitentiary , 207 W.Va. 11, 19, 528 S.E.2d 207, 215 (1999) ). As we explained in Dennis , when the circuit court's order lacks the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law,

[w]e only can speculate from the [petitioner's] brief and the State's response the possible bases for the circuit court's decision. However, "[t]he mission of the appellate judiciary is neither to mull theoretical abstractions nor to practice clairvoyance." State v. Miller , 194 W.Va. 3, 14, 459 S.E.2d 114, 125 (1995), quoting Moore v. Murphy , 47 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1995).

Dennis , 223 W.Va. at 593, 678 S.E.2d at 473 ; see also Ballard v. Hurt , 230 W.Va. 374, 380, 738 S.E.2d 538, 544 (2012) (reversing order granting habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel because "[t]his Court is unable to conduct a meaningful review" due to absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law); Banks v. Trent , 206 W.Va. 255, 257, 523 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1999) (reversing denial of habeas relief and remanding matter because "circuit court failed to make the legally mandated findings of fact and conclusions of law").

Given that the circuit court has not complied with the statutory obligation to articulate its reasons for denying the petitioner relief on each of the grounds asserted in his habeas petition, we must remand this matter to the circuit court for entry of an order setting forth the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law. In reversing the circuit court's decision, we would be remiss if we did not also point out that the circuit court has a duty to make a determination regarding the merits of the petitioner's claims independent of the assessment of petitioner's court-appointed counsel. In that regard, this Court has held: "The obligation of a court-appointed attorney...