Watts v. Berryhill, 5-17-CV-00192-RBF
| Decision Date | 26 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | 5-17-CV-00192-RBF |
| Parties | DEBRA ANN WATTS, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY; Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
This Order concerns Plaintiff Debra Ann Watts's request for judicial review of the administrative denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). This action comes to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), following the parties' consent. See Dkt. Nos. 7, 9, & 11. This Court has jurisdiction to review a final decision of the Social Security Administration. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
After considering Watts's Brief, Dkt. No. 12, the Brief in Support of the Commissioner's Decision, Dkt. No. 13, the transcript of the administrative proceedings ("Tr."), Dkt. No. 8, the other pleadings on file, the applicable authority, and the entire record in this matter, the Court will REVERSE the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision and REMAND this matter to the Commissioner for further consideration, as discussed below. Although portions of the ALJ's decision are supported by substantial evidence and, indeed, are not challenged by Watts in this proceeding, substantial evidence does not support the portion of the ALJ's finding at step two of the sequential disability analysis in which the ALJ determined Watts's affective disorder is not a severe mental impairment. Moreover, this error is not harmless, as it affects the remainder of the ALJ's sequential analysis. Remand is therefore required on this record.
Plaintiff Debra Ann Watts filed her application for disability insurance benefits and for supplemental security income in August 2013, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2011. Tr. 191-210. Watts was 47 years old on her alleged disability onset date and 52 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. Watts has a 9th-grade education. She also has a certified nursing assistant license. Id. 273
Watts alleged the following impairments render her disabled: migraines, depression, back pain, leg pain, feet pain, and high blood pressure. Tr. 198. Watts's claims were initially denied on October 29, 2013, id. 86-88, and once again on January 7, 2014 following her request for reconsideration, id. 113-16. Watts then requested and received an administrative hearing. Id. 138-39. She and her attorney attended the hearing on July 21, 2015, at which Watts and vocational expert Judith Harper testified. Id. 30-61.
After conducting a hearing, the ALJ denied Watts's claim for disability benefits. Id. 12-22. In her analysis, the ALJ first found that Watts met the insured-status requirements of the Social Security Act, and then the ALJ applied the five-step sequential analysis required by the regulations. At step one of the analysis, the ALJ found Watts had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of January 1, 2011. Id. 14. At step two, the ALJ found Watts has the following severe impairments: migraines, osteoarthritis and allied disorders, and degenerative disc disease. Id. 14. The ALJ, however, found that Watts's medically determinable impairments of hypertension and affective disorder were not severe. Id. 15. It bears mentioning that the ALJ addressed Watts's affective disorder, indeed the disorder is reflected inthe record, but at the same time Watts did not premise her claim for benefits on an impairment stemming from her affective disorder. In any event, the ALJ at step three found that none of Watts's impairments met or medically equaled the impairments of one of the listed impairments in the applicable Social Security regulations. Id. 16-17.
Before reaching step four of the analysis, the ALJ found that Watts had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), subject to the following limitations: stand or walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. 17-20. With respect to Watts's mental capacity, the ALJ afforded "little weight" to the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants on the grounds that they were "internally inconsistent as well as inconsistent with each other and the examining consultative examiner." Id. 19. Accordingly, she assessed no mental residual functional capacity.
At step four, after considering the residual functional capacity and the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Watts was unable to perform her past relevant work as a home health provider. Id. At step five, however, the ALJ found that considering Watts's age, educational factors, prior work experience, and residual functional capacity, as well as the testimony of the vocational expert, Watts had acquired work skills from her past relevant work that were transferrable to other occupations, with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Watts was not disabled for purposes of the Act, and therefore was not entitled to receive benefits. Id.
Watts's subsequent request for review of the ALJ's finding was denied by the Appeals Council. Id. 1-6. Accordingly, on March 13, 2017, after exhausting all available administrative remedies, Watts filed suit for judicial review. Dkt. No. 1.
Standard of Review. To review the denial of benefits, a court determines only whether the Commissioner's decision applied the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence. Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)).
A reviewing court will "weigh four elements of proof when determining whether there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) [the claimant's] age, education, and work history." Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174. "'[N]o substantial evidence' will be found only where there is a 'conspicuous absence of credible choices' or 'no contrary medical evidence.'" Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hames, 707 F.2d at 164).
A reviewing court does not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). Conflicts in the evidence and credibility assessments are for the Commissioner, not a court, to resolve. Id. Fact findings supported by substantial evidence are conclusive; legal conclusions and claims of procedural error are reviewed de novo. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1994); Carr v. Apfel, 133 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479-80 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
General Entitlement to Benefits. The term "disability" means the inability to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mentalimpairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant like Watts is disabled only if her physical or mental impairment or impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work and cannot—considering her age, education, and work history—participate in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy and regardless of whether such work exists in the area in which she lives, a specific job vacancy exists, or she would be hired if she applied for work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Overview of the Evaluation Process and Burden of Proof. "To prevail on a claim for disability benefits, a claimant must establish a physical or mental impairment lasting at least twelve months that prevents [her] from engaging in any substantial gainful activity." Carr, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 479. To determine whether substantial gainful activity is possible, the pertinent regulations require a five-step sequential inquiry. See id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
At the first step, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). "Substantial gainful activity" means "the performance of work activity involving significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit." Newton, 209 F.3d at 452-53 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)-(b)). An individual working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled, regardless of medical condition or age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
Step two addresses whether the claimant has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is severe, or a combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). "[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality having such minimal effect onthe individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." Stone, 752 F.2d at 1101 (quotation marks omitted). An individual without a "severe impairment" will not be considered disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). This is the step of the sequential analysis upon which the Court focuses here because it is the ALJ's determination that Watts's affective disorder is not a severe impairment that is the focus of Watts's arguments before the Court,...
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