Watts v. Butte School Dist. No. 5

• Decision Date: 17 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 7:CV95-3117.,7:CV95-3117.
• Citation: Watts v. Butte School Dist. No. 5, 939 F.Supp. 1418 (D. Neb. 1996)
• Parties: Lela K. WATTS, Plaintiff, v. BUTTE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, Jim Mellor, Ronnie Atkinson, Kathryn S. Reiman, Jack E. Moore, and Carol Liewer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

939 F. Supp. 1418

Lela K. WATTS, Plaintiff, v. BUTTE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, Jim Mellor, Ronnie Atkinson, Kathryn S. Reiman, Jack E. Moore, and Carol Liewer, Defendants.

No. 7:CV95-3117.

United States District Court, District of Nebraska.

January 17, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Elaine A. Waggoner, Waggoner Law Firm, Lincoln, NE, for plaintiff.

William T. Wright, Jacobsen, Orr Law Firm, Kearney, NE, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CAMBRIDGE, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation (filing 44) and the plaintiff's objections to that report and recommendation filed as allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and NELR 72.4. (filing 45). In the report and recommendation, Magistrate Judge Piester recommends that the Court grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment (filing 30).

In her amended complaint (filing 29), the plaintiff alleged four causes of action: (1) violation of the plaintiff's Due Process rights; (2) violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights; (3) violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681; and (4) breach of contract.¹ In the report and recommendation, Magistrate Judge Piester concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's first, second, and third causes of action because the plaintiff had executed a valid and binding release of those causes of action. Furthermore, Magistrate Judge Piester concluded that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's fourth cause of action because, by dismissing the first three causes of action, the Court would be dismissing all claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction ...").

The Court has conducted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and NELR 72.4, a de novo review of the portions of the report and recommendation to which objections have been made and finds as follows:

1. the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's first, second, and third causes of action because (a) the plaintiff executed a valid release of those causes of action and (b) any breach by the defendants of that release or the contract within which that release was contained was not so substantial or fundamental as to defeat the objectives of the plaintiff and the defendants in entering into that release or that contract. See, Eliker v. Chief Industries, Inc., 243 Neb. 275, 498 N.W.2d 564, 570 (1993) (stating that "rescission is the proper remedy where a breach of contract is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement").

2. the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's fourth cause of action because all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction must be dismissed 3. the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation should be adopted;

4. the plaintiff's objections to that report and recommendation should be overruled;

5. the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted; and

6. this action should be dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, it is ordered that

1. the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation (filing 44) is adopted;

2. the plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation (contained in filing 45) are overruled;

3. the defendants' motion for summary judgment (filing 30) is granted; and

4. this action is dismissed with prejudice.

JUDGEMENT

In accordance with the memorandum opinion and order entered herein on this date, it is ordered that this action is dismissed with prejudice.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PIESTER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Filing 30.)¹ For reasons discussed more fully below, I shall recommend that the motion be granted.

BACKGROUND

In July 1992 the Board of Education ("Board") for defendant Butte School District # 5 ("District") hired plaintiff Lela K. Watts ("plaintiff") as the district superintendent pursuant to a two-year employment contract. (Filing 29, Amended Complaint, at ¶ 11; Filing 12, Mellor Affidavit, at ¶ 3.) Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights asked plaintiff to provide information concerning an "on-going Title IX complaint" filed against the District. (Amended Complaint, at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that she relayed the request for information to the Board, which consisted of defendants Mellor, Atkinson, Reiman, Moore, Reiser, and Liewer. (Id. at ¶ 13.) She alleges that the Board "withheld information" concerning the Title IX complaint and "instructed her to not participate in the investigation." (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also alleges that, after notifying the Board of the Title IX investigation, she began receiving "harassing phone calls and death threats." (Id. at ¶ 15.) She notified the news media, which published accounts of the calls and threats. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that shortly thereafter, the Board "met in secret session" and terminated her from her position. (Id. at ¶ 17.) She alleges that the Board subsequently met in public session, reinstated her to her position, and began negotiations for termination of her employment contract. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

On March 30, 1993 plaintiff and the defendants executed an "Agreement for Settlement and Release of All Claims" ("the agreement"). (Amended Complaint, at ¶ 19; Mellor Affidavit, Exhibit A.) The agreement had been jointly drafted by plaintiff's counsel, Beverly Grenier, and counsel for the District, John Recknor. (Filing 12, Recknor affidavit, at ¶¶ 5-6.) Pursuant to the agreement, the defendants paid plaintiff $7,629 in cash in exchange for plaintiff's resignation from her position as superintendent. (Mellor Affidavit, Exhibit A, at ¶¶ 1-2.) Additionally, the agreement provided:

Subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein, the parties to this Agreement hereby mutually release, acquit and forever discharge each other, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, of and from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, grievances, petitions, damages, costs, expenses and compensation or any other type of action, however framed, whether filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, tribunal of competent jurisdiction, a commission, bureau, or any body of whatsoever nature or however styled, on account of, or in any way resulting from the employment relationship or any other dealings between the parties hereto which existed or may have existed as of the date of execution of this Agreement for settlement and release of all claims. This release specifically includes the agreement of the members of the Board of Education, either officially or individually, not to file, or participate in, except as required by law, any complaint against Lela Watts, or act in any other manner against Lela Watts before the Professional Practices Commission or other administrative body with the Nebraska Department of Education.

(Id. at ¶ 8.)

In May 1993 defendants Mellor and Liewer were contacted by a Brian Halstead, counsel for the state Professional Practices Commission ("PPC"),² regarding an ongoing investigation into several complaints previously filed against plaintiff by certain third parties. (Filing 14, Halstead Affidavit, at ¶¶ 3-7.) Halstead asked Mellor and Liewer for information concerning incidents identified in those complaints. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.) Mellor then contacted John Recknor and inquired as to whether the agreement with plaintiff precluded him from answering Halstead's questions. (Mellor Affidavit, at ¶ 13.) Recknor advised Mellor that such conduct was not prohibited under the agreement because it would not involve the filing of a new complaint and because Halstead could simply issue a subpoena if Mellor refused to cooperate. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Thereafter, Mellor contacted Halstead and agreed to answer his questions. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Defendant Liewer also voluntarily cooperated with the PPC investigation. (Halstead Affidavit, at ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that the defendants violated her rights under the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, and 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 26-35.) Also, pursuant to this court's supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, plaintiff asserts state law claims arising from the execution and alleged breach of the agreement between the parties. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-40.)

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates entry of summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether a "genuine issue of material fact" exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "material fact" is a fact "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A "genuine issue" regarding a material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for a nonmoving party." Id.

Summary judgment is properly granted when, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it is clear no genuine issue of material fact remains and the case may be decided as a matter of law. Greeno v. Little Blue Valley Sewer Dist., 995 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir.1993). If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue, the burden then shifts to...