Watts v. City of Hollywood

• Decision Date: 17 November 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 15–61123–CIV–ALTONAGA/O'Sullivan
• Citation: 146 F.Supp.3d 1254
• Parties: Donna Jane Watts, Plaintiff, v. City of Hollywood, Florida; and Keith Wadsworth, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

146 F.Supp.3d 1254

Donna Jane Watts, Plaintiff,

v.City of Hollywood, Florida; and Keith Wadsworth, Defendants.

CASE NO. 15–61123–CIV–ALTONAGA/O'Sullivan

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed November 17, 2015

Mark E. Tietig, Tietig & Tietig, P.A., Merritt Island, FL, for Plaintiff.

Daniel L. Abbott, Kelly Rains Jesson, Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant, City of Hollywood, FL.

ORDER

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA

, DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant, City of Hollywood's (the “City['s]”) Motion to Dismiss ... (“Motion”) [ECF No. 13], filed August 18, 2015. On September 9, 2015, Plaintiff, Donna Jane Watts (“Plaintiff” or “Watts”) filed a Response ... (“Response”) [ECF No. 31], to which the City filed a Reply ... (“Reply”) [ECF No. 36] on September 18, 2015. The Court has carefully considered the parties' written submissions, the Complaint [ECF No. 1], and applicable law.

I. BACKGROUND¹

This case stems from an incident that took place on October 11, 2011, during which Plaintiff, a Trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol (“FHP”), pulled over and cited an off-duty City of Miami police officer, Officer Fausto Lopez (“Lopez”), for reckless driving. (See Compl. ¶ 9). Plaintiff had observed Lopez driving erratically and at a speed of 120 miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone. (See id. ). For more than seven minutes, “Lopez failed or refused to pull over in compliance with the siren and flashing lights” on Plaintiff's patrol car. (Id. ).

Plaintiff's citation of Lopez was highly publicized throughout the State, “and many law enforcement officials publicly and personally took umbrage for Trooper Watts's law enforcement action against Officer Lopez.” (Id. ¶ 10). Within a month of Plaintiff's citation of Lopez, “numerous threats were posted online, purportedly by law enforcement officers,” directed at both Trooper Watts and other members of the FHP; FHP officers “began being pulled over without cause by other law enforcement officers;” and Plaintiff was threatened if a situation occurred where back-up was needed by her or other FHP officers, law enforcement back-up would not be provided, “thereby putting her health, safety, and life at much greater risk than otherwise.” (Id. ¶ 11). In addition, Plaintiff received hang-up telephone calls on her unlisted home and cellular phones, as well as pizza deliveries she never ordered (see id. ¶ 12); was subjected to abuse and threats on law enforcement websites (see id. ); and “observed numerous marked police and suspicious vehicles stopped at or very near her house for no apparent legitimate reason” (id. ).

Plaintiff owned one or more vehicles registered with the State of Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”) and held a Florida driver's license issued by the DHSMV. (See id. ¶ 6). To obtain her driver's license and register her vehicles, Plaintiff was required to, and did, provide the DHSMV with personal information. (See id. ¶ 7). Plaintiff's personal information was entered into a computer database of motor vehicle records maintained and administered by the DHSMV, which includes records pertaining to motor vehicle operators' permits; motor vehicle titles and registrations; color photographs; social security numbers; places and dates of birth; and prior and current home and mailing addresses. (See id. ¶ 8). The DHSMV and Florida Department of Law Enforcement made Plaintiff's personal information available to law enforcement personnel throughout Florida through the Driver and Vehicle Information Database (“DAVID”) system. (See id. ).

On January 19, 2012, in response to the threats and harassment, Plaintiff contacted the DHSMV inquiring whether law enforcement officers were viewing her private information. (See id. ¶ 14). On April 3, 2012, after counsel for Plaintiff contacted the DHSMV to inquire about the delay in providing the requested information, the DHSMV gave Plaintiff some of the reports from the DAVID system. (See id. ). Plaintiff learned “between October 2011 and January 19, 2012, well over 88 law enforcement officers from 25 different agencies had viewed her private driver's license information more than 200 times.” (Id. ¶ 15).

Plaintiff alleges the City “(actually or constructively) knowingly allowed and facilitated at least four instances of obtaining, disclosing, and/or using Trooper Watts's personal information from a motor vehicle record on the DAVID system, for a purpose not permitted under the DPPA [Driver's Privacy Protection Act].” (Id. ¶ 16 (alterations added)). “On at least one occasion, Defendant Keith Wadsworth,” an employee with the City, “knowingly obtained, disclosed, and/or used Trooper Watts's personal information from a motor vehicle record on the DAVID system, for a purpose not permitted under the DPPA.” (Id. ¶ 17; see also id. ¶ 5). At no time did Plaintiff “provide her consent for anyone to obtain, disclose, or use ... her private information for anything but legitimate law enforcement business.” (Id. ¶ 20 (alteration added)).

In December 2012, Plaintiff originally filed a single case against over 100 defendants, including the City and Wadsworth. See Watts v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, et al., Case No. 12–cv–81406–DMM. In May 2014, the court dismissed the action without prejudice as to all defendants except for the Town of Juno Beach. (See id. Order on Mots. to Dismiss [ECF No. 658] ). Plaintiff thereafter filed separate actions against the remaining defendants, several of which are concurrently proceeding in this District. See Watts v. City of Miami, et al., Case No. 15–cv–21271–RNS; Watts v. Village of Biscayne Park, et al., Case No. 15–cv–21291–KMW; Watts v. City of Miami Beach, et al., Case No. 15–cv–21292–RNS; Watts v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff, et al., Case No. 15–cv–61112–WJZ; and Watts v. City of Port St. Lucie, et al., Case No. 15–cv–14192–RLR.

On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against the City and Wadsworth in his individual capacity (see Compl. ¶ 5), pursuing the following causes of action: Count I against the City and Wadsworth for violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), 18 U.S.C. sections 2721 et seq.

(see

id. 1); Counts II and III against the City and Wadsworth, respectively, for unlawful searches and breaches of privacy, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (see

id. 5, 7); Count IV against the City and Wadsworth for common law invasion of privacy (see

id. 8); Count V against the City for common law negligent supervision (see

id. 9); and Count VI against the City for negligent training (see

id. 10).²

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Although this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (alteration added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). Indeed, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). To meet this “plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration added) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. ANALYSIS

The City argues Watts's claims against it should be dismissed for several reasons. The City first argues the DPPA, invasion of privacy, and negligent supervision claims should be dismissed because Watts does not adequately allege Wadsworth acted within the scope of his employment, and therefore the City cannot be held vicariously liable. (See Mot. 4–9). The City also contends the invasion of privacy claim should be dismissed for three additional reasons: (1) drivers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their driver's license records; (2) Watts does not allege an intrusion into her “private quarters;” and (3) she does not sufficiently allege the claimed intrusions on her privacy were highly offensive. (See id. 13–16). Next, the City avers the negligent supervision claim should be dismissed for the additional reason the Complaint contains no allegations the City was on notice of Wadsworth's unfitness. (See id. 16–17). The City argues the negligent training claim fails because the Complaint does not identify any relevant training program or policy. (See id. 17). Finally, the City contends Watts fails to plead a claim for municipal liability under section 1983

due to pleading deficiencies and fatal misapprehensions of the law. (See

id. 9–13).

A. Scope of Employment

Watts seeks to hold the City vicariously liable for violation of the DPPA, invasion of privacy, and negligent supervision based on the allegedly harmful acts of its employees, including Wadsworth. (See Compl. Counts I, IV, V). According to the City, however, she does not adequately allege the employees committed the wrongful acts within the scope or course of their employment. (See Mot. 4–9).

1. Vicarious Liability Standards

The DPPA “regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle departments.” Thomas v. George, 525 F.3d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir.2008)

(quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143, 120 S.Ct. 666, 145 L.Ed.2d 587 (2000) ). “One section of the DPPA prohibits disclosures of personal information by a state's department of motor...