Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist.

Decision Date26 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 112 MAP 2014,112 MAP 2014
Citation121 A.3d 964
PartiesTimothy L. WATTS, Appellee v. MANHEIM TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Robert M. Frankhouser, Jr., Esq., Hartman Underhill & Brubaker, L.L.P., Lancaster, David Michael Walker, Esq., for Manheim Township School District.

Katherine Marie Fitz Patrick, Esq., Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc., for Pennsylvania School Boards Association.

Timothy J. Reese, Esq., Lancaster, Reese, Samley, Wagenseller, Mecum & Longer, PC, for Timothy L. Watts.

SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice BAER.

We granted review to consider whether the Public School Code of 19491 mandates that a school district provide free transportation to a student from two different residences where the student's parents share physical custody of the student and both parents reside within the school district. The Commonwealth Court held that the Manheim Township School District (“the School District) must provide transportation to both parents' residences. For the reasons set forth herein, we agree that the School District is required to provide free transportation to and from both parents' residences in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. Timothy L. Watts (Father) shares legal and physical custody of his child, C.W., with C.W.'s mother (Mother) on an alternating week basis pursuant to a court order. Both Father and Mother reside within the School District where C.W. attends public middle school. Father's residence is approximately 4 ½ miles from C.W.'s school and Mother's residence is approximately 5 ½ miles from the school. C.W.'s bus stop at Mother's home is approximately 1.9 miles from Father's residence.

Before 2010, the School District provided transportation services for its students to multiple locations, including residences, daycare facilities, and after school activities. The School District estimated that 400 students benefitted from transportation to multiple locations, with somewhere between 50 and 75 of these students being transported to multiple parents' residences as a result of custody arrangements. The School District stated that it did not have information on how many students were subject to an alternating week custody arrangement like C.W.

At the beginning of the 20102011 school year, however, the School District instituted changes in its transportation policy which included eliminating transportation to and from more than one location per student, expanding the number of students required to walk to school, and increasing the route efficiency of its busses. The combined effect of these changes reduced the bus fleet by four busses, saving the School District approximately $200,000 per year. The School District does not indicate what portion of its savings was attributable to limiting students in shared physical custody arrangements to only one residence. Initially, the School District did not strictly enforce the “one seat per student” policy and instead provided bussing for C.W. to and from both parents' residences during the 2010–11 and 2011–12 school years.

In the summer of 2012, the School District notified Father that it intended to enforce the new transportation policy, and although there was an available seat on an existing bus route with an established stop servicing Father's home, the School District would only transport C.W. to and from Mother's residence, as her address was listed as the default address on C.W.'s school paperwork. Because of Father's work schedule, he had to hire a nanny to drive C.W. to Mother's house so that C.W., a seventh-grader, did not have to walk over 1.9 miles to his bus stop. Father sent several letters to the School District and attended a school board meeting voicing his objection to the transportation policy, all to no avail. Subsequently, Father instituted the instant action seeking, inter alia, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to require the School District to provide transportation to and from both residences.

Father rested his complaint on Section 1361(1) of the School Code, which states, in relevant part:

The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds of the district, provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school in which he is lawfully enrolled....

24 P.S. § 13–1361(1) (Provide free transportation).2 Father argued that Section 1361(1) sets forth a statutory mandate which generally provides students with transportation to and from school to a pupil's residence, and where, as here, C.W. is a “resident pupil” of two residences, transportation to both must be provided.

In response, the School District argued that a student may have only one residence for purposes of the School Code and therefore Section 1361(1) required only that the School District provide transportation to that one residence. Alternatively, the School District asserted that it had discretion to limit C.W.'s transportation to and from one residence.

The trial court found for Father, determining that because C.W. resided with both parents equally, the School District is statutorily required to provide transportation for C.W. to and from both parents' homes, pursuant to Section 1361(1). The court garnered support for its position from the Commonwealth Court's decision in Wyland v. West Shore Sch. Dist., 52 A.3d 572 (Pa.Cmwlth.2012), which found that a student who is subject to a shared physical custody arrangement can be a resident pupil of two different school districts when each parent resides in one.

The trial court granted Father's request for a preliminary injunction and ordered the School District to resume transportation from Father's residence. Shortly thereafter, the trial court amended its order by granting a permanent injunction. The trial court limited its decision to the facts of this case, rendering it applicable only where: 1) both parents live in the same school district; 2) the student is subject to an equally-split, shared legal and physical custody agreement; and 3) a school bus already serves each residence and could accommodate the student without any further cost or adding an extra stop. The School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's grant of a permanent injunction. Watts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 84 A.3d 378 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). Acknowledging that Section 1361(1) does not expressly state that a school district must provide transportation to and from a student's residence, the court determined that the General Assembly's use of the term “resident pupil” embodies the intention that transportation services be provided between the student's residence and school.

To determine whether a student may have more than one residence for transportation purposes, the Commonwealth Court initially found this Court's decision in In re Residence Hearing Before Bd. of Sch. Dir., Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 560 Pa. 366, 744 A.2d 1272 (2000) (Cumberland Valley ), to be instructive. In Cumberland Valley, the Cumberland Valley School District argued that students who moved with their mother into a townhouse in the district to be closer to their private school, while father maintained a residence outside of the district, were not residents of the Cumberland Valley School District as contemplated by the School Code, citing 24 P.S. § 13–1301 (“Every child, being a resident of any school district, [between specific ages], may attend the public schools in his district ....”) and 24 P.S. § 13–1302(a) (“A child shall be considered a resident of the school district in which his parents or the guardian of his person resides.”). We rejected that argument and held that the term “resides” contained within Section 1302(a) “refers to a place where the custodial parent maintains a residence, and, contrary to the [school district's] view, it need not be a primary residence or domicile.” Cumberland Valley, 744 A.2d at 1274.

The Commonwealth Court found additional guidance from its decision in Wyland, supra, which held that a student of separated parents who lived in two different school districts was a “resident pupil” of both school districts and entitled to transportation services from both school districts. Although recognizing that Cumberland Valley and Wyland did not address whether school districts must provide transportation to more than one residence within the same school district, the Commonwealth Court interpreted these cases as holding that “a child can have more than one residence for purposes of the School Code.” Watts, 84 A.3d at 385. The Court reasoned that [i]t therefore follows that where ... a child has two residences within a school district, the school district must provide transportation services accommodating both residences.” Id. at 386.

As the School District conceded that C.W. is a “resident pupil” to whom the School District owes a duty of transportation and the court determined that C.W. has two residences within the district, the Commonwealth Court found that the School District must provide transportation accommodating both residences, and that, pursuant to the School Code, accommodating Mother's and Father's residences requires a bus stop no further than 1 ½ miles from each house. See 24 P.S. § 13–1362 (Distance to bus stop).3 Because the bus stop within 1 ½ miles of Mother's residence is more than 1 ½ miles from Father's residence, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the School District violated its mandate to provide transportation to and from school to C.W.'s residences.

Lastly, the Commonwealth Court rejected the School District's argument that it had the discretion to limit C.W.'s transportation to and from Mother's residence only. In the Commonwealth Court's view, the School District has discretion to determine the...

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    ...of a statute in conjunction with other sections, construing them always with reference to the entire statute. SeeWatts v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 121 A.3d 964, 972 (Pa.2015). By the same token, we cannot arrive at the meaning of a word, even the “ordinary” meaning, without considering the ......
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