Watts v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 12 May 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:14-cv-558-J-39MCR
• Parties: MARION E. WATTS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

MARION E. WATTS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:14-cv-558-J-39MCR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

May 12, 2017

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Marion E. Watts, an inmate of the Florida penal system proceeding pro se, challenges his 2009 state court (Duval County) conviction for aggravated battery (no weapon). See Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1). Watts also filed an Appendix (Pet. App.) (Doc. 2) and a Memorandum of Law (Pet. Memo.) (Doc. 3). Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. 16), with exhibits in support thereof (Resp. Ex.)¹. Watts filed a Reply to Respondent's Response (Reply) (Doc. 22).

II. Procedural History

By amended information, the State charged Watts in count one with aggravated battery upon Kevin Miller with a firearm and in count two with possession of a firearm by a juvenile delinquent found to have committed a felony act. Resp. Ex. 2. Trial proceedingson count one commenced and concluded on April 28, 2009. Resp. Ex. 4. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of aggravated battery with a finding that Watts did not actually possess a firearm during the commission of the offense. Resp. Ex. 6.² Watts filed a motion for new trial which was denied at sentencing on June 3, 2009. Resp. Exs. 7, 8. The court sentenced Watts to fifteen years incarceration with credit for 621 days time served. Resp. Ex. 9.

Watts appealed to the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA). Resp. Ex. 10. Through counsel, Watts filed an initial brief in the appellate court (Resp. Ex. 11), the State filed an answer brief (Resp. Ex. 12), and Watts filed a reply brief (Resp. Ex. 13). Without written opinion, the First DCA per curiam affirmed Watts' judgment of conviction and sentence on August 11, 2010. Resp. Ex. 14. Watts v. State, 41 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (table).

Watts filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Resp. Ex. 17. The State filed a response thereto. Resp. Ex. 18. Attaching the State's response, the circuit court summarily denied Watts' Rule 3.850 motion without evidentiary hearing, noting that "the record conclusively establishes that the Defendant is not entitled to the relief requested." Resp. Ex. 19.

Watts appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion to the First DCA (Resp. Ex. 20), and filed a pro se initial brief. Resp. Ex. 21. The State filed notice that it would not file an answer brief. Resp. Ex. 22. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the summary denialof postconviction relief (Resp. Ex. 23), and denied Watts' pro se motion for rehearing without comment. Resp. Ex. 24.

Watts filed a pro se state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First DCA alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal of his judgment of conviction and sentence. Resp. Ex. 15. The First DCA denied per curiam Watts' petition "on the merits" but without discussion. Resp. Ex. 16; Watts v. State, 51 So. 3d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Watts filed a pro se postconviction motion in the state circuit court pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) (Resp. Ex. 25), which the court summarily denied (Resp. Ex. 26). Watts appealed (Resp. Ex. 27), and filed a pro se initial brief (Resp. Ex. 28). The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of postconviction relief without opinion. Resp. Ex. 29; Watts v. State, 132 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (table).

III. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

IV. Cognizability, Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A. Cognizability

Federal habeas review "is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (citations omitted). As such, federal habeas "does not lie for errors of state law." Id. at 67 (quotations omitted). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Id. at 67-68. As such, federal courts may not review claims based exclusively on state law issues even if the claims are "couched in terms of equal protection and due process." Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).

B. Exhaustion

Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[ ]" every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). As the United States Supreme Court has explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'"opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at365-366, 115 S.Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) ("[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.")

The petitioner must present the claim to the state courts as a federal, constitutional claim rather than as a matter of state law. See Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; French v. Warden, Wilcox State Prison, 790 F.3d 1259, 1270-71 (11^th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 815 (2016); Preston v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 456-59 (11^th Cir. 2015); Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2012); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005). To do so, a petitioner could include "the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or [ ] simply label[ ] the claim 'federal.'" Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32. But raising a state law claim that "is merely similar to the federal habeas claim is insufficient to satisfy the fairly presented requirement." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. Likewise, merely citing to the federal constitution is insufficient to exhaust a claim in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1983); see also McNair, 416 F.3d at 1302 ("'The exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.'") (quoting Kelley v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)). As explained by the Eleventh Circuit:

To "fairly present" a claim, the petitioner is not required to cite "book and verse on the federal constitution." Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, a petitioner does not "fairly present" a claim to the state court "if that court mustread beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347. In other words, "to exhaust state remedies fully the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims asserted present federal constitutional issues." Jimenez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir.1998)) (concluding that the petitioner's claims were raised where the petitioner had provided enough information about the claims (and citations to Supreme Court cases) to notify the state court that the challenges were being made on both state and federal grounds).

Lucas, 682 F.3d at 1352. "The crux of the exhaustion requirement is simply that the petitioner must have put the state court on notice that he intended to raise a federal claim." Preston, 785 F.3d at 457 (11th Cir. 2015); see also French, 790 F.3d at 1270-71. To do so, petitioners must "present their claims to the state courts such that the reasonable reader would understand each claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation." Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1344-45 (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 277).

It is not sufficient merely that the federal habeas petitioner has been through the state courts, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2 438 (1971), nor is it sufficient that all the facts necessary to support the claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made, Anderson v.

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