Watts v. State

• Decision Date: 14 May 1912
• Parties: WATTS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

59 So. 270

177 Ala. 24

WATTS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 14, 1912

Appeal from Circuit Court, Colbert County; C. P. Almon, Judge.

Will Watts was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The motion to quash the indictment was based on the fact that certain jurors were impaneled and sworn, and a foreman from their number selected, and the grand jury thus organized, but that one Long absented himself, leaving 17 persons, whose names are here set out, and that the court directed the sheriff again to call from the list of the venire the names of the first 18 persons who appeared on the list of qualified jurors in attendance upon the court, and who had not been excused by the court, the names being as above set out except Long, who had absented himself, and including Gifford M. Dobbs, which said persons, together with Dobbs, were sworn and impaneled as grand jury and returned this indictment. The first plea in abatement is that the grand jury which returned the indictment was not drawn by the officers designated by law to draw them. The other pleas in abatement set up substantially the same state of facts as the motion to quash.

The following charges were refused to the defendant: (16) "The only foundation for a verdict of guilt in this case is that the entire jury shall believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment, to the exclusion of every probability of innocence and every reasonable doubt of his guilt, and if the prosecution had failed to furnish such measure of proof, and to impress the mind of the jury with such belief of his guilt, they should find him not guilty." (26) "I charge you that the danger that will excuse one for killing another need not be real or actual. If the jury believe from all the evidence in this case that the appearances of danger surrounding the defendant at the time of the killing were such as to produce a reasonable belief in the mind of the defendant that his life was in danger, or that he was about to suffer great bodily harm, the defendant being without fault at the time the law holds him harmless, and the jury must acquit." (27) "The law is a reasonable master, and if the evidence shows you that at the time of the killing the appearances of danger surrounding the defendant were such as to produce a reasonable belief in the mind of the defendant that his life was in danger, or that he was about to suffer great bodily harm, and that the defendant was without fault in bringing on the difficulty, then the jury ought to acquit." (28) "If the defendant was without fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, and if the conduct of the deceased was such at the time of the killing as to reasonably impress the mind of the defendant that her intention was to take his life, or do him greatly bodily harm, then I charge you that the law did not require the defendant to wait and see what would be the result of the appearances, but the defendant was authorized to act upon the appearances, and anticipate and avert the threatened danger even to the taking of the life of the accused." (32) Same as 16. (40) "I charge you that the requirement that juries must believe that the defendant is guilty from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is not a fiction of the law, but is intended as a substantial shield against conviction until that degree of proof is made which leads the jury to believe that the defendant cannot reasonably be guiltless under the evidence." (58) "Good character, if proven, when taken in connection with the whole evidence, may have the effect to generate such a doubt as to authorize an acquittal, when the jury would otherwise entertain no doubt." (60 1/2) "If the defendant was without fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, and if the conduct of the deceased was such at the time of the killing as to reasonably impress the mind of the defendant that the intention was to take his life, or do him great bodily harm, then I charge you that the law did not require the defendant to wait and see what would be the result of the appearances, but the defendant is authorized to act upon the appearances, and anticipate and avert the threatened danger even to the taking of the life of the assailant." (64 1/2) Same as 16. (66) Same as 27. (67) Same as 60 1/2. (C) "It is not necessary, under the evidence in this case, that defendant should have been actually in danger of death or great bodily harm at the time he killed his wife. He had the right to act on the appearances of things at the time, taken in the light of all the evidence, and he had the right to interpret the conduct of his wife in the light of any threat that the evidence proves his wife to have made against him. If the circumstances of the killing were such as to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was in danger of great bodily harm, or death, and he honestly believed such to have been the case, then he had a right to shoot his wife in his own defense, although, as a matter of fact, he was not in actual danger; and if the jury believe from the evidence that defendant acted under such conditions and circumstances as above set out, the burden of showing that he was not free from fault in bringing on the difficulty is on the state, and, if not shown, the jury should acquit."

R. C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W. L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SOMERVILLE J.

The defendant killed his wife, Topsey Watts, and was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Under section 7572 of the Code, no objection can be taken to an indictment for irregularities in the organization of the grand jury, "except that the jurors were not drawn in the presence of the officers designated by law," "and neither this objection nor any other can be taken to the formation of a special grand jury summoned by the direction of the court."

Neither...