Watts v. State
Decision Date | 05 March 1948 |
Citation | 34 So.2d 429,160 Fla. 268 |
Parties | WATTS v. STATE. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from Criminal Court of Record, Orange County; W.M Murphy, judge.
Lloyd Bass, of Jacksonville, for appellant.
J. Tom Watson Atty. Gen., and Ernest W. Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Joe Watts, was informed against in the Criminal Court of Record of Orange County, Florida, in two counts. The first count charged the appellant Watts with breaking and entering a described building situated in Orange County on March 19 1947, the building entered being the property of John L. Hoover. It is charged that he broke and entered the building with the intent to commit a felony, to-wit, grand larceny. The second count charged Watts with the crime of grand larceny in that he unlawfully took personal property of John L. Hoover of the value of $1,095.01. The appellant was placed upon trial on the information and was by an Orange County jury convicted under count two of the crime of grand larceny but was found not guilty as to count one, which charged breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony, to-wit, grand larceny. From a judgment and sentence of four years in the State Prison at hard labor imposed under count two an appeal has been perfected here.
It developed during the progress of the trial, as reflected by the record, that the store of John L. Hoover, situated near the City of Orlando, was broken into on the night of March 19, 1947, and several cases of whiskey taken therefrom valued at a sum of more than one thousand dollars. The whiskey was easily identified by names appearing on the paper wrappers about the whiskey. A portion of the whiskey was later taken from a garage at the home of a state witness, Jimmy Fekany, situated about four blocks from the store alleged to have been unlawfully entered. The whiskey taken from the garage was returned to the owner and Jimmy Fekany testified for the State he paid the appellant $368 for the whiskey at his (Fekany's) home about 3 or 4 o'clock a.m., March 19, 1947. It was delivered to him by the appellant and placed in the garage. Jimmy Fekany identified the appellant and the automobile that the whiskey was transported in, but two other men in the car with the appellant were unknown to him. The appellant in his testimony denied the taking of the whiskey and stated that at the time the store was entered he was in the City of Jacksonville. He testified that he and the state witness, Jimmy Fekany, had had some trouble and were not on good terms.
The record discloses that the appellant took the witness stand and testified in his behalf and was cross-examined by the County Solicitor. Some of the questions propounded were objected to by counsel for appellant and presented to the trial court for a ruling and the objections so made were overruled and denied by the trial court. It is contended here that the following proceedings constitute reversible error: "Cross-examination. By Mr. Ellars: Q. Have you ever been convicted of an offense?
A. Yes, twice.
A. Yes, but they only gave me six months for the whole business.
Counsel for appellant contends that certain arguments made to the jury by the County Solicitor were not justified by the record and were prejudicial to the right of the appellant, but we do not find them to have been so prejudicial as to warrant reversal on that ground.
The first question posed here for adjudication by counsel for appellant is viz.: Where a defendant in a criminal case took the stand and testified in his own behalf and on cross-examination admitted that he had been previously convicted of crime, was it permissible under Section 90.08, F.S.A., and adjudications, to allow the inquiry to go so far as to disclose the details of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted as reflected by the above-quoted portions of the record?
Section 90.08 supra, provides that no person shall be disqualified to testify as a witness in any court of this State by reason of conviction of any crime except...
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