Watts v. State
Decision Date | 20 February 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17,17 |
Parties | BARRINGTON DEAN WATTS v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
APPELLATE PROCEDURE—PRESERVATION—RULE 4-325(e)—SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
The Court of Appeals held that a trial court's alleged error when giving jury instructions was preserved when the party alleging the error substantially complied with Maryland Rule 4-325(e). The issue was preserved based upon substantial compliance when, as in this case, the objection is made after the instructions were given, the basis was stated, the trial judge noted the exception on the record, and then overruled the objection. A particular curative instruction did not need to be requested to preserve the issue.
CRIMINAL LAW—SECTION 3-201(b)—STATUTORY INTERPRETATION—ASSAULT STATUTE—DEFINITION OF SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT
The Court of Appeals held that, consistent with the decision in Lamb v. State, 93 Md. App. 422, 428, 613 A.2d 402, 404 (1992), cert. denied, 329 Md. 110, 617 A.2d 1055 (1993), the term "assault" in Section 3-201(b) of the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code includes the following modalities of second degree assault: battery, attempted battery, and intent to frighten.
CRIMINAL LAW—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—JURY INSTRUCTIONS—UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION FOR ASSAULT
The Court of Appeals held that each particular modality of committing a second degree assault was not an independent and distinct crime, but merely a single violation of the assault statute. The Court in Robinson v. State determined that the legislative revisions and consolidation of the assault statute in 1996 intended to create a singular scheme for assault law in Maryland, necessarily abrogating the common law. 353 Md. 683, 701, 728 A.2d 698, 706 (1999). The legislative history of the 1996 revisions to the assault statute revealed that the Maryland General Assembly intended to replicate what it had accomplished when it revised and consolidated the theft statute. Consistent with this Court's interpretation of the theft statute in Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116, 126, 532 A.2d 1357, 1361 (1987), a unanimous jury instruction was not required because violations of the statute only constituted distinct modalities of one crime. Here, Petitioner was not entitled to have the trial judge instruct the jury to unanimously agree to which modality of assault Petitioner had committed.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 126409C
Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
We are asked in this case to review the definition of second degree assault. Specifically, the question this case presents is whether the revised and consolidated assault statute, contained in Section 3-201(b) of the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), contemplates different crimes, or whether the acts constitute second degree assault. Petitioner Barrington Dean Watts was convicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of two counts of first degree assault. Over Petitioner's objection, the jury heard instructions on two different variations of second degree assault, battery and intent to frighten, but was not instructed to reach a unanimous decision about which iteration occurred here. Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in an unreported opinion. First, we determine that the objection made by Petitioner preserved the issue of whether the jury should hear a unanimity instruction after hearing instructions for both forms of assault. We next determine that the assault statute contemplates different modalities of committing the singular crime of second degree assault as opposed to different crimes. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Based on the evidence at trial, the jury could have found that on November 9, 2014, Petitioner, Barrington Dean Watts, entered the apartment of Lavasha Harding, pointed a gun at one of the occupants of the apartment, Andre French, and demanded money. An altercation transpired, during which Petitioner fired three shots. One bullet struck a different occupant, Antonio Woods. After a brief struggle, one of the men involved gainedpossession of the gun and then detained Petitioner until the police arrived shortly thereafter. Petitioner was charged with seven crimes,1 including two counts of first degree assault.
Before the trial judge instructed the jury, the prosecutor and Petitioner's counsel reviewed the jury instructions with the judge. During those discussions, Petitioner's counsel objected to the State's request for instructions on accomplice liability, conspiracy, and a special instruction related to the castle doctrine.2 Thereafter, the trial judge instructed the jury on the law, particularly as it pertained to second degree assault:
At the conclusion of the reading of the jury instructions, the judge called the attorneys to the bench and asked if they took "any exception to the court." The prosecutor took no exceptions. Petitioner's attorney renewed the previous objections as well as noted a new exception to the assault instruction, and the following exchange occurred:
After deliberations, the jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of first degree assault as well as the remaining counts against him.
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court. Wegranted certiorari on the following question, slightly rephrased from the question submitted to this Court:
Are intent to frighten and battery separate assault crimes, thus requiring individualized jury unanimity?4
Watts v. State, 453 Md. 358, 162 A.3d 838 (2017). Additionally, the State filed a conditional cross-petition, presenting us with the following question:
Is Watts's claim of error unpreserved where Watts did not ask for the unanimity instruction he now claims was mandatory?
Id. Because we determine that the jury instruction issue was preserved, we reach the substance of the assault issue.
The threshold issue we must address is whether Petitioner has preserved for our review the alleged jury instruction error. The State contends that Petitioner's claim of error with the jury instructions issued by the trial judge was not raised at trial. The State points to the record as evidence that Petitioner never requested a curative instruction.
Petitioner submits that his counsel's discussion during the bench conference was sufficient to preserve an objection to the alleged error. After the trial judge had instructed the jury, Petitioner's counsel explained at a bench conference that the jury could possibly split its decision with regard to the assault crime, with half of the jury believing thatPetitioner had committed a battery and the other half believing Petitioner had intentionally frightened the occupants. Thus, there would be a lack of jury unanimity.
Maryland Rule 4-325(e) governs the preservation of error in jury instructions and states, in pertinent part, the following:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.
We have explained that the purpose of Rule 4-325(e) is "to give the trial court an opportunity to correct its charge if it deems correction necessary." Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 209, 522 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1987) (citing Bennett v. State, 230 Md. 562, 568, 188 A.2d 142, 144 (1963)). This Court in Gore explicated the requirements for preserving an alleged jury instruction error: "[T]here must be an objection to the instruction; the objection must appear on the record; the objection must be accompanied by a definite statement of the ground for objection unless the ground for objection is apparent from the record and the circumstances must be such that a renewal of the objection after the court instructs the jury would be futile or useless." Id.
This Court has consistently repeated that the failure to object to an instructional error prevents a party...
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