Watts v. State, 83-751
| Decision Date | 27 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-751,83-751 |
| Parties | Jack Lester WATTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jerry Hill, Public Defender, Bartow, and Amelia G. Brown, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Theda James Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
The appellant appeals his conviction for second degree murder on grounds that the trial judge unduly restricted his cross-examination of two key state witnesses, Johnny Lee Ruebin and Christopher Beasley, in violation of his constitutional right to confront and fully cross-examine adverse witnesses against him. We agree in part and reverse for a new trial.
At the trial the testimony revealed the following scenario. On the night in question, the appellant, Beasley, Ruebin, and the victim, Charles Loman, were all at the Hancock Lounge in Tampa. Beasley, who was in the lounge near the screen door, looked out and saw Loman run toward an old brown Cadillac and greet the appellant. Next, Loman and the appellant approached the bar and greeted Beasley. At that time, Beasley saw a gun handle sticking out of the appellant's pants. The appellant and Loman then stood and talked just outside the screen door where Beasley was listening. Finally, Loman went inside and Beasley turned his attention to a pool game. The next time Beasley saw Loman and the appellant, the two of them went back outside and walked around the corner of the building. Three or four minutes later, Beasley followed them outside to the back corner of the building where he stood by a phone booth and watched them as they stood about a foot apart and talked. When Beasley saw the appellant raise the gun and point it at Loman, Beasley backed away. He then saw Loman running around the corner, heard gunshots, and ran into the bar with most of the other people who had been standing outside. Ruebin, who had been among those standing outside, ran around the side of the building as soon as he heard the shots. He saw a 5'11"' man whom he did not recognize jump into the passenger side of a parked 1968 or 1969 Cadillac and watched the car drive away before he ran back into the bar where he found Loman lying on the floor.
At the trial the appellant's attorney cross-examined the state's witnesses, Ruebin and Beasley. To demonstrate their bias or motive, the appellant's attorney attempted to ask them whether they were presently on probation, resided in the county jail, or had a new charge or probation revocation pending. The trial judge refused to allow such questioning.
Counsel then stipulated to proffers of the cross-examinations of Ruebin and Beasley on these matters. The appellant argued that Ruebin, currently on probation, would say that he had no particular compulsion to testify; he was not in custody; he had no charges pending; he was not on probation at the time of the murder when he gave his statement to the police; but he did have a charge pending by the time his deposition was taken. Beasley, currently residing in the county jail, would say that at the time he gave his statement implicating appellant, he was on two years probation. Beasley would further say that by the time of trial he was facing revocation of this probation and that, if this probation was revoked, he could be sentenced to fifteen years in prison in addition to a maximum sentence of twenty years for the new felony charge pending. Beasley would also add that his probation revocation hearing was scheduled for Friday of the week of appellant's trial, that his assigned judge had been made aware of his testimony in appellant's case, and that he had discussed his situation with the state attorney's office.
In a motion for new trial, appellant's attorney contended that the court's restriction of cross-examination of these two witnesses had prevented the jury from hearing appellant's theory of defense. That theory of defense was that because Beasley was on probation, had a felony charge pending and a revocation hearing pending, he had tailored his statements and testimony to the exigencies of that situation. In support of this motion, appellant's counsel attached a copy of Beasley's probation revocation hearing transcript. The transcript reveals that prior to entry of Beasley's guilty plea, the following argument was presented to the court by the prosecutor:
Your Honor, Mr. Beasley is on probation with this Court for burglary. During the course of that period of probation he committed some new offenses.
He delivered a small amount of cannabis at Hancock's Bar. However, prior to him committing the new offenses, he became a material witness in a second-degree murder case.
Mr. Beasley testified this last week. He was the only eye-witness to this crime. He was the dominating factor which led to the conviction of Mr. Watts on a second-degree murder charge.
I know that you do not like to negotiate drug delivery cases, but Mr. Beasley has been in jail for approximately three or four months now. He did cooperate fully. He has stood ready to cooperate.
I cannot speak enough about what this man has done to cooperate. Like I said, his testimony did, in fact, lead to a conviction on a second-degree murder case just this week.
I believe that Mr. Blau and I have worked out an arrangement where if the Court would accept the negotiation that you would continue him on probation, he would plead to the new charges and run it concurrent with the probation he is already on.
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