Watts v. Turnbach

• Decision Date: 12 May 2014
• Docket Number: Case No.: 4:14-CV-0175-VEH
• Parties: ROGER W. WATTS, JR., as Trustee for Bethlehem Management, Plaintiff, v. JAMES E. TURNBACH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

ROGER W. WATTS, JR.,as Trustee for Bethlehem Management, Plaintiff, v. JAMES E. TURNBACH, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 4:14-CV-0175-VEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION

DONE and ORDERED: May 12, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Roger W. Watts, Jr. ("Mr. Watts") is representing himself in this action. (Doc. 1). This matter is before the court on the objections (Doc. 16) of Mr. Watts to Magistrate Judge John H. England, III's report and recommendation (the "R&R") (Doc. 15),¹ which proposes that Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (Doc. 7) (the "Dismissal Motion") be granted and that Mr. Watts's lawsuit be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 15 at 7).

Defendants' Dismissal Motion and supporting brief were all filed on February17, 2014. (Docs. 7, 8). Mr. Watts filed a response and affidavit in opposition to the Dismissal Motion on March 3, 2014. (Docs. 12, 13).

The R&R was entered on April 11, 2014. (Doc. 15). Mr. Watts's objections were filed on April 22, 2014. (Doc. 16). This case was randomly reassigned to the undersigned judge on May 1, 2014. (Doc. 17). The matter, therefore, is now under submission, and for the reasons explained below, the court OVERRULES Mr. Watts's objections, and ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge England's R&R as minimally modified below.

Additionally, the court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Doc. 10) (the "Sanctions Motion") filed on February 28, 2014, and TERMS as MOOT Mr. Watts's Objection Motion To Quash and Dismiss Unrecognized Respondent(s) Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Doc. 14) (the "Objection"), filed on March 12, 2014, for the reasons discussed below.

II. Standards

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Dismissal Standard

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained the standard on motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction:

Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) come in two forms. "Facial attacks" on the complaint "require[ ] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficientlyalleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S. Ct. 358, 66 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1980) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). "Factual attacks," on the other hand, challenge "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered." Id.

These two forms of attack differ substantially. On a facial attack, a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion-the court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396, 70 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1981). But when the attack is factual,

the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction-its very power to hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.

Id. at 412-13 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). Here, the jurisdictional attack by Defendants is facial.

B. District Court Review of Report and Recommendation

After conducting a "careful and complete" review of the findings andrecommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ("A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge."); Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)).² The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A district judge "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This requires that the district judge "give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party." Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6162, 6163). In contrast, those portions of the R&R to which no objection is made need only be reviewed for clear error. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781,784 (11th Cir. 2006).³

"Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct." United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)). It is incumbent upon the parties to timely raise any objections that they may have regarding a magistrate judge's findings contained in a report and recommendation, as the failure to do so subsequently waives or abandons the issue, even if such matter was presented at the magistrate judge level. See, e.g., United States v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360 at 1365 (11th Cir. 2010) ("While Pilati raised the issue of not being convicted of a qualifying offense before the magistrate judge, he did not raise this issue in his appeal to the district court. Thus, this argument has been waived or abandoned by his failure to raise it on appeal to the district court."). However, thedistrict judge has discretion to consider or to decline to consider arguments that were not raised before the magistrate judge. Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Thus, we answer the question left open in Stephens and hold that a district court has discretion to decline to consider a party's argument when that argument was not first presented to the magistrate judge.").

"Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court." Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. "This rule facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act." Id. at 410. Indeed, a contrary rule "would effectively nullify the magistrate judge's consideration of the matter and would not help to relieve the workload of the district court." Williams, 557 F.3d at 1292 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000)).

III. Analysis

A. Motions Addressed by the R&R

The R&R correctly recognizes that federal courts are judicial bodies of limited power and are precluded from acting "beyond [their] constitutional or statutory grantof subject-matter jurisdiction." (Doc. 15 at 5 (citing Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001)). The R&R recommends that a jurisdictional dismissal of Mr. Watts's action is appropriate because neither diversity jurisdiction, as bestowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, nor federal question jurisdiction, as delineated by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is present. (Doc. 15 at 5-7).

The court has studied Mr. Watts's objections (Doc. 16) and nothing contained in them specifically contests or otherwise brings into question the thorough jurisdictional analysis conducted by Magistrate Judge England. Further, the court agrees with the contents of the R&R and concludes that Mr. Watts's dispute is due to be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Relatedly, the court further determines that Mr. Watts's separately filed Motion for Entry of Default by the Clerk of Court (Doc. 4) (the "Default Motion"), which is discussed in the R&R but never expressly addressed in the form of a recommended ruling is, in the absence of any authority for this court to exercise jurisdiction, due to be termed as moot.

B. Defendants' Sanctions Motion and Mr. Watts's Objection

Defendants' Sanctions Motion seeks reasonable costs and attorneys' fees and injunctive relief preventing Mr. Watts "from making any further filing in this Court, or in any other federal or state court related to the Defendants without priorpermission from the Court." (Doc. 10). Defendants' brief in support asserts Mr. Watts's claim is a frivolous one regarding a fictitious judgment based on Sovereign Citizen principles and therefore supports sanctions under Rule 11. In response, Mr. Watts filed a document titled "Objection Motion to Quash and Dismiss Unrecognized Respondent(s) Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions," (Doc. 14), which continues the similar statements to previous filings and does not specifically address any of the Defendants' arguments.

Under Rule 11, "[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). "A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others...