Watts v. United States

• Citation: 362 A.2d 706
• Decision Date: 28 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 7777.,7777.
• Parties: Stanley WATTS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

362 A.2d 706

Stanley WATTS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 7777.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued En Banc March 20, 1975.

Decided July 28, 1976.

Richard A. Levie, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, for appellant.

Carl S. Rauh, Principal Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D.C., argued for appellee. Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty. and John A. Terry and James F. McMullin, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellee.

Before REILLY, Chief Judge, and KELLY, FICKLING, KERN, GALLAGHER, NEBEKER, YEAGLEY and HARRIS, Associate Judges.

HARRIS, Associate Judge:

A jury found appellant guilty of burglary in the first degree, D.C.Code 1973, § 22-1801(a), and two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, id. § 22-502.

In an opinion issued November 26, 1974, a division of this court, by a vote of 2-1, reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that if it found that all elements of the charged offenses had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it "must find" appellant guilty. 328 A.2d 770. The majority accepted appellant's argument that such an instruction was "equivalent to the trial judge's directing a verdict of guilty, which violates appellant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury." Id. at 772.

On February 7, 1975, we granted the government's petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the November 26 opinion. Having reconsidered the case en banc, we now hold that no error warranting reversal occurred and of firm appellant's convictions.

The victims of the assault were Cynthia Celey and Bertha Inabinet. Celey had known appellant for about three years, during much of which they experienced an intimate but stormy relationship. Approximately a year prior to the incident involved in this case, Celey went to the Corporation Counsel's office to complain that appellant had beaten her. Celey and appellant terminated their dating relationship several months prior to the events before us. At that time, appellant threatened her, and thenceforth she lived in fear of him. She testified that she had needed protection from him on several occasions, and that it became necessary to have the windows of her home nailed shut. Several weeks prior to the incident at issue, appellant cut a hole in a window in Celey's home in an effort to gain entrance, but he withdrew when he was noticed by Inabinet.

The offenses in this case occurred early in the morning of December 24, 1972. Celey and Inabinet were asleep in the living room of the house they shared with their respective children. A house guest and the children were sleeping upstairs. Inabinet was sleeping in a chair, fatefully having covered herself with Celey's coat.

At approximately 6:00 a. m., Celey was awakened by a loud crash. She looked up and recognized appellant standing over Inabinet. In his hands were the remains of a china cat which had been hanging on the wall. Appellant had smashed the cat on Inabinet's head, apparently under the impression that he was assaulting his ex-girlfriend. Celey screamed at appellant, calling him by name. Appellant then began an assault on her, first using the shattered remains of the china cat and then striking her with an ashtray. Appellant then fled.¹

In charging the jurors as to one count of the indictment, the trial judge instructed that if they found that the government had proven the existence of each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, "then you must find the defendant guilty as charged. If you do not find the facts to be [sic] you must acquit the defendant."² Appellant contends that this was equivalent to directing a guilty verdict, depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. However, defense counsel did not object to the instruction at trial, and the argument on this question is pressed for the first time on appeal. Thus, unless the action now complained of constitutes plain error, the absence of timely objection effectively insulates the disputed language from appellate interference.³

The obvious reason for requiring that objections to instructions be made before the jury retires is to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any instructional defect and thereby avoid error which otherwise might necessitate a new trial. See e. g., Villaroman v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 240, 241-42, 184 F.2d 261, 262-63 (1950); United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907, 86 S.Ct. 887, 15 L.Ed.2d 663 (1966). In order to discourage the intentional withholding of objections by defense counsel, errors not objected to at trial are unreachable on review unless they fall within the purview of the plain error rule. Under that standard, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial. See Adams v. United States, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 232 (1973); Bunter v. United States, D.C.App., 245 A.2d 839 (1968). Evaluating this case in such a light, we conclude that the challenged instructions did not reach the level of plain error.

Certainly it is impermissible for a trial judge to direct a verdict of guilty. However, it cannot validly be said that the trial court did so in this case. It is axiomatic that "a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L. Ed.2d 368 (1973). Among the carefully delivered instructions were those explaining the presumption of innocence and the government's duty to prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. After the judge enumerated the individual elements of each offense, he instructed the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt. When he had completed this process for all three of the charged offenses, he gave a detailed explanation of the necessity for the jury to keep each offense separate during its deliberations. He charged the jury on the government's need to establish the defendant's presence at the time and place of the offense in the face of appellant's alibi defense. Subsequent instructions reminded the jurors that although the verdict was their "sole and exclusive duty and responsibility", it was their duty to accept the law as the court stated it and to determine the facts fairly and without prejudice. The instructions explicitly and fully explained that the jury was free to exercise its own judgment as to the credibility of witnesses and to reject that testimony which it felt was unreliable or implausible. Finally, the court charged the jury that it must consider the instructions "as a whole" without giving special attention to any particular one. Unlike the cases relied upon by appellant, the instructions here neither told the jury that it must find the defendant guilty if it rejected his alibi defense, see United States v. Hayward, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 420 F.2d 142 (1969), nor that it must return a guilty verdict if it simply "believed" that the defendant had committed the offense. See Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 184 F.2d 394 (1950). See also Baker v. United States, D.C.App., 324 A.2d 194 (1974).

In each of those cases, the defective instructions explicitly or impliedly sanctioned that which the law does not allow, namely, guilty verdicts returned on proof of less than every element necessary to constitute the offense, and evaluation of the government's case under a standard more lenient than that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.⁴ See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

In contrast, the trial court's instructions in this case correctly advised the jury as to both its prerogative as the exclusive factfinder and its solemn obligation to render the verdicts which the law and the facts compelled. Cf. Arshack v. United States, D.C.App., 321 A.2d 845 (1974). There could have been no uncertainty in the jurors' minds that unless they were convinced of appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, no verdict but that of not guilty could be returned. The trial judge's instructions conveyed the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt numerous times. The jury repeatedly was reminded that it had the sole power to determine the verdicts, and was told that it should disregard any intimated or expressed opinion of the trial judge. The jury was fully and properly guided with respect to both its obligations and its prerogatives.

We recognize that the law permits a jury to acquit in disregard of the evidence, and that such an acquittal is unreviewable. See Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 53, 65 L.Ed. 185 (1920). Conceding this power of a jury, we do not feel its exercise should be encouraged.⁵ The present standardized jury instruction on burden of proof provides that the jury "must find" a defendant not guilty if the government fails to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but gives the jury no guidance at all as to its duty if it finds that each element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.⁶ The jury's option to reject both the evidence and the law is effectively communicated to it through various formal and informal channels.⁷ Careful consideration of the totality of the problem has led us to conclude that a meaningful degree of instructional equipoise is needed to guide jurors in arriving at their verdicts. To be silent as to a juror's duty if guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt is to invite acquittals based not on the law and the facts, but on whim, sympathy, or prejudice. A verdict returned on such a basis scarcely is consistent with the profound obligation undertaken by each juror.⁸ We find no error — much less plain error — in the trial court's use of "must find" in lieu of the term "should find" (as was sanctioned in Billeci v....