Watts v. United States, 7777.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 7777.,7777.
• Citation: 328 A.2d 770
• Parties: Stanley WATTS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

328 A.2d 770

Stanley WATTS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 7777.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued July 16, 1974.

Decided November 26, 1974.

Richard A. Levie, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, for appellant. Michael A. Kramer, Alexandria, Va., also appointed by this court, entered an appearance.

Donald E. Robinson, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and James F. McMullin, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before KELLY, FICKLING and HARRIS, Associate Judges.

FICKLING, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from a jury trial conviction of appellant on one count of first degree burglary¹ and two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon.² The principal issue is whether the trial judge's instruction, which required the jury to find appellant guilty if it concluded that he had committed acts which constituted the offense charged, deprived appellant of his constitutional right of a jury trial. We agree and reverse. In view of our disposition, we need not address the other issues which are raised.

During the early morning hours of December 24, 1972, Miss Bertha Inabinet and Miss Cynthia Celey were asleep in the living room of the apartment which they shared. At approximately 6 a. m., Miss Celey was awakened by a loud noise and observed a figure, whom she later identified as the appellant, standing over Miss Inabinet, holding the remains of a china cat with which he had struck her.³ Miss Celey began to scream and the appellant, discarding the china cat and seizing an ashtray, struck her. Following that, appellant departed. Miss Celey and appellant had known each other prior to this incident and had, at one time, been quite intimate. Their relationship had ended four or five months prior to December 1972.

At the trial two witnesses testified for the defense and stated that Miss Celey, who had described the above incident in her testimony, did not have a good reputation in the community for truth and veracity. The appellant also testified, denied any involvement in the incident, and interposed an alibi defense. Appellant's cousin and a friend both corroborated that defense.

Appellant asserts that the trial judge committed error in instructing the jury that if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had committed acts which constituted the essential elements of the crimes charged, then he must be found guilty.⁴ The appellant claims that such language is equivalent to the trial judge's directing a verdict of guilty, which violates appellant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.⁵ We agree.

The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall have the right to a trial by an impartial jury. From this guarantee derives the principle that a trial judge in a criminal proceeding may not direct a verdict. As Judge Prettyman poignantly stated in Cooper v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 345, 218 F.2d 39, 41 (1954):

If upon the evidence there is a question whether the accused is guilty or is innocent, the jury must decide that question; the judge cannot decide such a question. And the judge cannot decide that upon the evidence the accused is guilty and direct a verdict accordingly; a finding of guilt is for the jury alone. . . .

This principle governs a criminal trial regardless of whether the judge attempts to partially direct a verdict⁶ or the evidence points conclusively toward guilt.⁷

Further, no particular incantation by a judge is necessary to conclude that the verdict was directed.

The rule against directed verdicts of guilt includes perforce situations in which the judge's instructions fall short of directing a guilty verdict but which nevertheless have the effect of so doing by eliminating other relevant considerations if the jury finds one fact to be true. . . .⁸

The obverse of the principle prohibiting directed verdicts in criminal trials is the recognized prerogative of a jury to disregard the evidence or the judge's instructions. This prerogative is embodied in the jury's power to issue a general verdict of not guilty which is irreversible by the court and which does not reveal the jury's rationale. United States v. Dougherty, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 76, 93, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (1972). This is not to say that a jury nullification instruction specifically drawing the jury's attention to the prerogative is mandated; indeed, this court has held that it is not error to refuse such an instruction. Arshack v. United States, D. C.App., 321 A.2d 845, 849-852 (1974). The jury's power to exercise its prerogative is nevertheless intact.

We must keep in mind that a judge's most offhanded remark or inference is considered with the utmost respect by the jury. "[T]he influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and . . . his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling." Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626, 14 S.Ct. 919, 923, 38 L.Ed. 841 (1894). Each word of a jury instruction must be weighed carefully so as to be certain that it does not convey to the jury the impression that it must render a verdict of guilty or that its prerogative is denied.

In the instant case, use of the phrase "must find the defendant guilty"⁹ could have been erroneously construed by the jury as denying its prerogative of finding the defendant not guilty, notwithstanding the evidence. The command "took from the jury an essential element of its function." United States v. Hayward, 136 U. S.App.D.C. 300, 302, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (1969). Therefore, it was reversible error to give such instruction.

Reversed with instruction to grant a new trial.

HARRIS, Associate Judge (dissenting):

As I evaluate this case and all truly relevant authorities, the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury — and assuredly it did not commit plain error.

A few supplemental comments as to the evidence are appropriate. The house which appellant entered unlawfully was shared by Cynthia Celey, Bertha Inabinet, and their respective children. Mrs. Celey had known appellant for about three years, during much of which they had an intimate but stormy relationship. Approximately a year prior to the incident involved in this case, Mrs. Celey went to the Corporation Counsel's office to make a complaint after appellant beat her. Their dating relationship was terminated four or five months prior to the events before us. When they broke up, appellant threatened her, and thenceforth she lived in fear of him. She testified that she had needed protection from him on several occasions, and that it became necessary to have the windows of her home nailed shut. Several weeks prior to the incident before us, appellant cut a hole in a window in Mrs. Celey's home in an effort to gain entrance, but he was observed by Mrs. Inabinet and left.

Mrs. Celey and Mrs. Inabinet had a party at their home on the night of December 23, 1972. At the end of the evening, the children and a female house guest were asleep upstairs. An upstairs hall light was on. In the living room, only the Christmas tree lights were on. Mrs. Celey was sleeping on the couch, while Mrs. Inabinet, unfortunately wearing, Mrs. Celey's coat, slept on a chair.

Mrs. Celey was awakened by a crash. Appellant had gained entry to the home, taken a china cat from the wall, and smashed it over the head of Mrs. Inabinet. (Ten stitches were required to close the wound.) Mrs. Celey screamed at appellant, calling him by name. He looked at her, looked back at the person whom he had assaulted, and looked again at Mrs. Celey. He apparently then realized he had struck the wrong person. He began an assault on Mrs. Celey, first using the remaining half of the shattered china cat and then striking her with an ashtray. He broke her finger and cut her. Then he fled, evidently because of her screaming and the approach of the house guest from upstairs.

So much for the government's rather overwhelming evidence, which was credited by the jury and which we therefore must accept as true on this appeal. Among his instructions to the jury, the trial judge stated that if the jury found that the government had proven the commission of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt, "then you must find the defendant guilty as charged. If you do not find the facts to be you must acquit the defendant."¹ There was no objection to the giving of such an instruction.²

I have no quarrel with the cases cited in the majority opinion; I consider them to have been decided correctly on their particular facts. However, in my view, they lend no support to the majority's result.

Obviously, it is impermissible for a trial judge to direct a verdict of guilty. However, in no sense can it validly be said that the trial court did so in this case. It is axiomatic that "jury instructions are to be considered as a whole, rather than as isolated passages." United States v. Martin, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 359, 363, 475 F.2d 943, 947 (1973). Among the carefully delivered instructions were those explaining the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proving each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This case does not present the type of situation which necessitated reversals of convictions in Baker v. United States, D.C.App., 324 A.2d 194 (1974), and United States v. Hayward, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 420 F.2d 142 (1969). In each of those cases, the jury effectively was instructed that it could return a verdict of guilty without having to find that the government had proven each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. I share the reasoning of those opinions (and specifically concurred in this court's Baker opinion, 324 A.2d at 199), but they provide no true guidance here.

The majority relies heavily upon Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 184 F.2d 394 (1950). I find two flaws in such reliance. Initially, the majority implicitly approves an...