Watts v. Weston

• Decision Date: 14 November 1916
• Docket Number: 11.
• Citation: 238 F. 149
• Parties: WATTS v. WESTON et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

238 F. 149

WATTS v. WESTON et al.

No. 11.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

November 14, 1916

Lowen E. Ginn, of New York City, for plaintiff in error.

Clarke M. Rosecrantz, of New York City, for defendants in error.

Before COXE, ROGERS, and HOUGH, Circuit Judges.

HOUGH Circuit Judge.

A generation has passed since the controversy arose of which this case is the latest fruit. Transfers and devolutions of interest have occurred, but, as there is no question presented requiring reference thereto, the case will be considered as if the present plaintiff and defendant had themselves transacted all the business hereinafter referred to.

The present action began in 1898, was tried in 1900, and the judgment to which this writ was taken entered in 1914; under the mandate directed by this court in Re Watts, 214 F. 80, 130 C.C.A. 520. The verdict which plaintiff assigns as error was directed because the trial court held the judgment affirmed by us in Watts v. Weston, 62 F. 136, 10 C.C.A. 302, a bar to the present suit. That earlier action between these parties began in 1890, and will be referred to as the '90 suit; this litigation will be called the '98 suit.

In 1880 the firm in which defendant was then a partner, and to whose rights plaintiff has succeeded, made a contract with one Knevals whereby the latter agreed to consign to them 'the entire production of coal' from a certain colliery, 'at a price to be agreed upon from month to month on or about the 1st of each month. ' In 1885 Weston retired from the firm, transferred his interest therein and in the Knevals contract to Watts, and agreed to guarantee or indemnify the latter 'against any and all loss or losses, damage or damages, that might arise from or by reason of any default or breach' on the part of Knevals, in respect to the coal agreement aforesaid. Shortly thereafter Knevals 'ceased and refused to consign and deliver' coal under said contract, as is stated in the complaint; in point of fact he wrote a letter absolutely refusing to ship any more coal.

It is most favorable to plaintiff to hold, as we do, that the foregoing facts were either admitted or proven in the suits of both '90 and '98. When they had been shown in the earlier action, the trial court directed a verdict of 6 cents for the plaintiff. The reasons for the direction are set forth in the opinion rendered by us on writ of error. 62 F 136. Our findings are authoritative, because the reasons given by a higher court for affirming the action of a lower court become (so to speak) the legal meaning of that lower court's judgment, whatever may have been the reasoning or opinion of the trial judge.

It follows that the judgment in the '90 suit held, and holds finally as between these parties, that the Knevals contract was valid, that Knevals had committed a breach thereof, that Watts was entitled to recover on Weston's guaranty against such breach, but that the recoverable damages were nominal only.

The single difference between the '90 suit and this of '98 is as follows: At the trial of the earlier action plaintiff sought to amend in order to show a modification (made in 1884) of the Knevals contract, which (we will assume) would have rendered legally possible the ascertainment of substantial damages. Leave so to amend was refused, and the refusal approved as reasonable by this court. In this action plaintiff has pleaded and (we assume) proved the same modification. On this difference alone is this belated writ of error founded.

Obviously Knevals' categorical refusal to ship any...