"(1)
If you find from the evidence that Moore fired the shot
that killed J. Lem Jones, then I charge you, gentlemen of
the jury, that, before you can convict this defendant under
this indictment, you must believe from the evidence, beyond
all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that this
defendant actually participated in the killing of said Lem
Jones, or that he and Moore had by preconcert agreed to do
some act from which the death of Lem Jones or some other
person would proximately result from the doing of such act
or that there was a community of purpose between Moore and
this defendant to kill Jones, or do some act from which the
death of Jones or some other person would flow as a
proximate result of doing such act, or that this defendant
aided and abetted in the doing of said act, or aided and
abetted Moore in killing Jones. If, after considering all
the evidence, you find that Way did not participate in the
killing of Jones, and had not agreed with Moore to do some
act from which the death of Jones or any other person would
flow as a proximate result of the doing of such act, and
that this defendant did not aid and abet in the doing of
said act, nor aid nor abet Moore in the killing of Jones,
then your verdict should be not guilty."
"(37)
If, after a consideration of the entire evidence in this
case, the evidence of defendant's innocence outweighs
or overbalances the evidence of his guilt, you should find
the defendant not guilty."
"(40)
If the evidence is reasonably consistent with
defendant's innocence, you should promptly acquit
him."
"(62)
The court charges the jury that if they believe from the
evidence that the defendant and Waymond Moore went to the
house of Alice Williams on the night the killing is said to
have been done, and an offense was committed by one of them
from causes having no connection with the common object for
which they went there, the responsibility for such offense
rests solely on the actual perpetrator of the crime, and
the jury cannot find the defendant guilty simply because he
happened to be present at the time the offense was
committed."
"(48)
If you find from the evidence that Moore fired the shot
which killed Jones, and that said killing was done
maliciously, still, if Way did not entertain malice towards
Jones at the time of the killing, then Way cannot be
convicted either of murder in the first or second degree,
unless you find that Way, with knowledge of the malice on
the part of Moore, aided, abetted, or encouraged Moore in
the killing."
"(42)
I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, if you believe from
the evidence that Moore fired the shot that killed Jones
without encouragement from this defendant, your verdict
should be not guilty, unless you believe, beyond all
reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that there was a
prearrangement or a conspiracy existing between Way and
Moore that Moore should kill him."
"(3)
If from the evidence in this case you find that Moore and
Way had not by preconcert or agreement conspired to kill
Jones, nor to do any other unlawful act from the doing of
which the death of Jones would naturally and proximately
result, and if you further find that Moore fired the shot
that killed Jones, then, if this be so, I charge you that,
before you can convict this defendant, Way, on the ground
that he aided or encouraged Moore by acts or words at the
time Moore shot Jones, if he did shoot him, you must
believe, beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral
certainty: (1) That said act or words were done or spoken
by Way at the time of the shooting; (2) you must believe,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that Moore had knowledge of
said acts or words if done or spoken; and (3) you must
believe, beyond all reasonable doubt, that Moore had
knowledge that said act or words were done or said for the
purpose of aiding and abetting him in the killing of
Jones."
"(10)
If, from the evidence in this case, you find that Moore
fired the shot that took the life of Jones, then, before
this defendant, Cliff Way, can be found guilty of said
killing, you must find from the evidence, beyond all
reasonable doubt, that Moore and Way entered into a
conspiracy to do so by some understanding or agreement
beforehand, or that Way aided or abetted in said killing;
and I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the mere fact
that Way was present when the killing was done, if he was
present, would not of itself alone be sufficient to
constitute Way an aider or abettor of Moore, unless Way was
present to the knowledge of Moore with intent to aid him.
In order to constitute Way an aider or abettor of said
killing, he must have been present by preconcert, special
or general, or at least to the knowledge of Moore, with the
intent to aid him, provided there was no assistance given
by Way to Moore, or words uttered encouraging Moore to do
the shooting, or such conduct, demonstrations, or menaces
on the part of Way as would aid, incite, encourage, or
induce Moore to do the killing. And if, after a
consideration of all the evidence in the case, you are not
convinced, beyond all reasonable doubt, that there was such
a conspiracy beforehand, or aiding or abetting at the time
of the killing, your verdict should be not guilty."
"(43)
If the evidence is evenly balanced as to the guilt or
innocence of defendant, then you, gentlemen of the jury,
should lean to the side of mercy, and decide in favor of the
defendant."
"(33)
The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a
criminal case is whether the circumstances, as proven, are
capable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis
consistent with the defendant's innocence, and, if they
are capable of such explanation, then the defendant should be
acquitted."
"(68
1/2) The fact, if it be a fact, that defendant's
character was not discussed until after he was accused of
killing Jones, is not evidence that his character is not
good. Under the law, the best character is generally that
which is least talked about. This is negative evidence of
good character which is frequently the most satisfactory
kind."
"(35)
In determining whether the defendant's flight from the
scene of the shooting was from a sense of guilt or not, you
can look to the fact, if it be a fact, together with all the
evidence in the case, that defendant surrendered himself to
the deputy sheriff of Lawrence county."
"(41)
Gentlemen of the jury, the fact, if it be a fact, that the
state has failed to prove a motive upon the part of this
defendant to shoot Lem Jones, if such is the fact, is a
circumstance to which you may look in connection with all the
evidence in determining whether he shot Jones."
"(50)
I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that, if you believe all
the evidence in this case, you should find that the deceased
Jones, was killed by Waymond Moore.
"(51)
If, after considering all the evidence, you find that Moore
fired the shot that killed Lem Jones, your verdict in this
case should be not guilty.
"(52)
I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that there is no
evidence in this case showing a conspiracy or prearrangement
on the part of this defendant and Moore to take the life of
Jones.
"(53)
There is no evidence in this case that the defendant, Way,
entered into a conspiracy with Moore to kill Jones."
"(65)
It is not incumbent on the defendant in this case to produce
evidence to show what became of policeman Jones' pistol,
if he had one on his person at the time he was shot, if you
find that he was shot.
"(66)
There is no evidence in this case that the defendant got
Jones' pistol, if he had one at the time he was
shot."
