Waymire v. Miami Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 29 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:15-cv-159 |
| Parties | TINA WAYMIRE, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This civil case is before the Court on a number of pretrial motions, namely: (1) Plaintiff's second motion for leave to amend the case caption (doc. 53); (2) Plaintiff's motion in limine (doc. 54) seeking to exclude evidence of employment discipline, Plaintiff's termination, and subsequent charges and a grievance filed against Defendant alleging discrimination; (3) Defendant's motion in limine to exclude the deposition testimony of Sheriff Charles Cox (doc. 56); and (4) Defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence and argument regarding Plaintiff's alleged entitlement to overtime compensation for working in excess of 40 hours per week (doc. 57).1 The parties filed memoranda in opposition. Docs. 62, 63, 64, 65.
During the final pretrial conference held on September 11, 2017, the parties declined the opportunity to have oral argument on these pretrial motions and requested that the Court proceedon the parties' written submissions. The Court has carefully considered all of the foregoing, and the parties' pretrial motions are ripe for decision.
The undersigned, in the decision on summary judgment, previously set forth the nature of the dispute presented in this case. Waymire v. Miami Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 3:15-CV-159, 2017 WL 1163875, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2017). Plaintiff served as a member of the Miami County Sheriff's Office K-9 Unit from 1995 until 2014. Id. She was charged with caring for, maintaining, and housing K-9 Officer Nero ("Nero") seven days a week starting in 2004. Id. Defendant required Plaintiff to ensure that Nero was nourished, in good health and ready and available for service at a moment's notice. Id.
Plaintiff initiated this case on May 1, 2015 alleging that Defendant failed to pay her overtime for off-duty care of Nero in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Doc. 1. Plaintiff claims unpaid overtime from May 1, 2012 through her last day as a K-9 Deputy on April 20, 2014, with the exception of when she was on injury leave with full compensation from September 11, 2013 through January 6, 2014. Id.
Plaintiff seeks leave to correct the case caption to substitute the Board of County Commissioners of Miami County, Ohio ("County Commissioners") as the party Defendant instead of the current named Defendant, the Miami County Sheriff's Office. Doc. 53. Notably, Plaintiff previously sought leave to amend the case caption to name Miami County, Ohio as the Defendant (doc. 21) instead of the Sheriff's Office, which the Court denied (doc. 28). In denying Plaintiff's previous motion, the undersigned noted that, not only is "a sheriff's department . . . not a legal entity capable of being sued" for FLSA claims, but Ohio counties are also not sui juris for purposes of claims under the FLSA. Waymire v. Miami Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 3:15- CV-159, 2016 WL 6995456, at *1 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2016) (citations omitted).2 While the Miami County Sheriff's Office is not sui juris, the Court previously held that Defendant's affirmative defense in this regard has been waived. Id.
The Court previously concluded that, in light of Defendant's waiver of its affirmative defense in this regard, an amendment to name the proper party was not required. Waymire, 2016 WL 6995456, at *1. Plaintiff cites no authority in support of her contention that such amendment is necessary, required, or even proper at this late stage of the litigation. The Court thus DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
In her motion in limine, Plaintiff seeks an Order excluding evidence related to the following: (1) disciplinary actions taken against her by Defendant during her employment; (2) her termination from employment; (3) charges of discrimination she filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC") and the Equal Opportunity in Employment Commission ("EEOC") following her termination; (4) the settlement of her EEOC/OCRC charges and a grievance against Defendant; (5) Defendant's payment of Nero's medical expenses after April 20, 2014; and (6) Sheriff Cox's death.
From the briefing of the parties, it appears that, during Plaintiff's employment with Defendant, disciplinary proceedings and an investigation were commenced against Plaintiff because of the way she spoke to a citizen and for revealing unflattering information about Defendant. Doc. 54 at PageID 1574. Based upon such conduct, and because Plaintiff purportedly lied during an investigation regarding such conduct, Plaintiff was ultimately fired by Defendant. Id. Following her termination, Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with theOCRC and EEOC, as well as a grievance with her union. Id. at PageID 1574-75. The parties ultimately settled the discrimination charges and the grievance pursuant to the terms of a confidential settlement agreement. Id. at PageID 1575.
Plaintiff argues that evidence of any of the foregoing is irrelevant and, to the extent it is relevant, its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Doc. 54 at PageID 1574-75. Plaintiff thus argues that evidence concerning the foregoing should be excluded at trial pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403. Id. In response, Defendant argues that such evidence is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) because "Plaintiff's discipline, termination, administrative appeals, and resolution thereof are probative of Plaintiff's truthfulness especially since her estimate of overtime hours worked is central to this case." Doc. 63 at PageID 1820.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), absent a criminal conviction arising from Plaintiff's purported dishonesty, Defendant cannot offer "extrinsic evidence . . . to prove specific instances of" Plaintiff's dishonesty for the purpose of attacking her "character for untruthfulness." Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). This prohibition extends to "any reference to the consequences that a witness might have suffered as a result of an alleged bad act[,]" such as any investigation, disciplinary proceeding, or termination resulting therefrom. Fed. R. Evid. 608, Advisory Committee Notes; see also United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 257 n.12 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Whitmore, 384 F.3d 836, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Evidence Rule 608(b) does, in the Court's discretion, permit one to inquire of a witness on cross-examination about specific instances of dishonesty. See Davis, 183 F.3d at 257; see also Bauer v. Singh, No. 3:09-CV-194, 2011 WL 320189, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2011). In this case, however, cross-examining Plaintiff regarding her purported dishonesty would necessarily involve a discussion of disciplinary investigations and disciplinary proceedings since -- as the Court understands the issue from the parties' briefing -- Plaintiff's allegedly untruthful statements were made in the course of such disciplinary proceedings and investigation. Plaintiff would suffer significant prejudice should evidence of disciplinary proceedings and her termination be admitted at trial, and such unfair prejudice significantly outweighs the slight probative value such evidence presents. Accord Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion (doc. 54) in this regard is GRANTED and Defendant is precluded from introducing evidence of disciplinary investigations and disciplinary actions concerning Plaintiff, including Plaintiff's termination from employment. This preliminary finding may change depending upon the circumstances presented during trial.
As set forth above, following Plaintiff's termination, she filed charges of discrimination against Defendant with the OCRC and EEOC, as well as a grievance with her union. The parties represent that they ultimately settled the dispute concerning the discrimination charges and the grievance. Doc. 54 at PageID 1575. It is not clear why these proceedings are relevant to the FLSA claims at issue in this case, other than Defendant's suggestion that Plaintiff made false statements during these proceedings that Defendant should be permitted to inquire about on cross-examination of Plaintiff under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). Doc. 63 at PageID 1820. For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED in this regard.
Plaintiff argues that evidence concerning Defendant's payment of Nero's medical bills, following Plaintiff's termination from employment, is not relevant to the issues presented. Doc. 54 at PageID 1575. Plaintiff fails to develop her argument in this regard beyond a conclusory contention. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion in this regard is DENIED at this time and subject to further objection at trial.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the fact of Sheriff Cox's death should be excluded at trial because such fact may evoke sympathy for Defendant. Absent further development of this argument by Plaintiff, the undersigned cannot find -- at this time -- that the fact of Sheriff Cox's death is excludable under Evidence Rule 403. Thus, Plantiff's motion concerning evidence of Sheriff Cox's death is DENIED.
Defendant seeks an Order preventing Plaintiff from...
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