Wayne M. v. Saul

Decision Date14 April 2021
Docket NumberCiv. No. 3:20CV00465(SALM)
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesWAYNE M. v. ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS

Plaintiff Wayne M. ("plaintiff"), brings this appeal under §205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g), seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner" or "defendant") denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Plaintiff moves for an order reversing or remanding the Commissioner's decision. [Doc. #20]. Defendant has filed a cross-motion seeking an order affirming the decision of the Commissioner [Doc. #26].

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's Motion for Order [Doc. #20] is GRANTED, to the extent plaintiff seeks a remand for further administrative proceedings, and defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. #26] is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Plaintiff filed concurrent applications for SSI and DIB on April 30, 2013, alleging disability beginning March 7, 2012. See Certified Transcript of the Administrative Record, Doc. #18, compiled on August 28, 2020, (hereinafter "Tr.") at 252-67.2 Plaintiff's applications were denied initially on July 12, 2013, see Tr. 156-63, and upon reconsideration on November 21, 2013. See Tr. 165-72.

On December 15, 2014, plaintiff, represented by Attorney Ralph Wilson, appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") I.K. Harrington. See generally Tr. 35-77. Vocational Expert Richard Hall testified by telephone at the December 15, 2014, administrative hearing. See Tr. 60-62, Tr. 71-75. On March 26, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See Tr. 7-34.3 On November 29, 2016, the AppealsCouncil denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. See Tr. 1-6.

On December 30, 2016, plaintiff, then representing himself, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut seeking review of the ALJ's 2015 decision. See Tr. 1469-77; see also Wayne M. v. Colvin, No. 3:16CV02135(DJS) (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 2016). On September 8, 2017, Judge Dominic J. Squatrito ordered the appointment of pro bono counsel for plaintiff. See Wayne M. v. Colvin, No. 3:16CV02135(DJS), Doc. #27 (D. Conn. Sept. 8, 2017). On October 6, 2017, the Clerk of the Court appointed Attorney Melissa A. Buckley as plaintiff's pro bono counsel. See id. at Doc. #28. On December 19, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id. at Doc. #35. On February 14, 2018, the Commissioner filed a Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner. See id. at Doc. #36. On March 28, 2018, Judge Squatrito granted plaintiff's motion, in part, and judgment entered remanding the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. See id. at Docs. #27, #28; see also Tr. 1478-1508.

On August 3, 2018, the Appeals Council issued a Notice of Order of Appeals Council Remanding Case to Administrative LawJudge. See Tr. 1509-14. The Appeals Council ordered, in relevant part:

The claimant filed a subsequent claim for Title XVI disability benefits on November 16, 2017. The Appeals Council's action with respect to the current electronic claim renders the subsequent claim duplicate. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge will consolidate the claims files, associate the evidence, and issue a new decision on the consolidated claims (20 CFR 416.1452 and HALLEX I-1-10-10). On remand, the Administrative Law Judge should apply the prior rules to the consolidated case pursuant to HALLEX I-5-3-30.

Tr. 1511; see also Tr. 1709-16 (subsequent application for SSI).

On May 8, 2019, the ALJ held a second administrative hearing, at which Attorney Spat appeared, but plaintiff did not. See generally Tr. 1415-34. Vocational Expert Susan Gaudet testified at the second administrative hearing by telephone. See Tr. 1422-33. On October 2, 2019, the ALJ held a third administrative hearing, at which plaintiff, represented by Attorney Spat, appeared and testified. See Tr. 1361-1403. Vocational Expert Jane A. Gerrish (the "VE" or "VE Gerrish") appeared and testified by telephone at the hearing. See Tr. 1403-13; see also Tr. 1812-13 (Gerrish resume). On January 21, 2020, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision (hereinafter the "2020 decision"). See Tr. 1322-59. Plaintiff did not file exceptions to the ALJ's 2020 decision, see Doc. #26-1 at 2, thereby making the 2020 decision the final decision of theCommissioner.4 The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The review of a Social Security disability determination involves two levels of inquiry. First, the Court must decide whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in making the determination. Second, the Court must decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is more than a "mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The reviewing court's responsibility is to ensure that a claim has been fairly evaluated by the ALJ. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).

The Court does not reach the second stage of review - evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion - if the Court determines that the ALJ failed toapply the law correctly. See Norman v. Astrue, 912 F. Supp. 2d 33, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("The Court first reviews the Commissioner's decision for compliance with the correct legal standards; only then does it determine whether the Commissioner's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence." (citing Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999))). "Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles." Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).

"[T]he crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with sufficient specificity to enable [a reviewing court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence." Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984) (alterations added) (citing Treadwell v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1983)). The ALJ is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, but a "finding that the witness is not credible must nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the record." Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Carroll v. Sec. Health and Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983)). "Moreover, when a finding is potentially dispositive on the issue of disability, there must be enough discussion to enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support that finding." Johnston v. Colvin, No. 3:13CV00073(JCH), 2014 WL 1304715, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Peoples v. Shalala, No. 92CV04113, 1994 WL 621922, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1994)).

It is important to note that in reviewing the ALJ's decision, this Court's role is not to start from scratch. "In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009)).

Finally, some of the Regulations cited in this decision, particularly those applicable to the review of medical source evidence, were amended effective March 27, 2017. Those "new regulations apply only to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017." Smith v. Comm'r, 731 F. App'x 28, 30 n.1 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). Where a plaintiff's claim for benefits wasfiled prior to March 27, 2017, "the Court reviews the ALJ's decision under the earlier regulations[.]" Rodriguez v. Colvin, No. 3:15CV01723(DFM), 2018 WL 4204436, at *4 n.6 (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2018); White v. Comm'r, No. 17CV04524(JS), 2018 WL 4783974, at *4 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) ("'While the Act was amended effective March 27, 2017, the Court reviews the ALJ's decision under the earlier regulations because the Plaintiff's application was filed before the new regulations went into effect.'" (citation omitted)); see also Tr. 1511 (Order of Appeals Council directing ALJ to apply "prior rules to the consolidated case").

III. SSA LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, every individual who is under a disability is entitled to disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. §423(a)(1).

To be considered disabled under the Act and therefore entitled to benefits, plaintiff must demonstrate that he is unable to work after a date specified "by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Such impairment or impairments must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do hisprevious work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (requiring that the impairment "significantly limit[] ... physical or mental ability to do basic work activities" to...

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