Wayne State University v. Cleland

• Decision Date: 09 February 1978
• Docket Number: 78-1142,Nos. 78-1141,s. 78-1141
• Citation: 590 F.2d 627
• Parties: WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Max CLELAND et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 627

590 F.2d 627

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Max CLELAND et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 78-1141, 78-1142.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 19, 1978.

Decided Dec. 21, 1978.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 9, 1978.

James K. Robinson, U. S. Atty., Charles J. Kalil, Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellants.

Richard A. Fulton, C. William Tayler, Kenneth J. Ingram, Sachs, Greenebaum & Tayler, Washington, D. C., Byron H. Higgins, Elmer L. Roller, Detroit, Mich., Gordon A. Gregory, Gregory, Van Lapik & Korney, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Richard M. Montecucco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., for amicus curiae, State of Washington.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Circuit Judge, CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of appellees, Wayne State University and others. ¹ The district court found certain Veterans' Administration (V.A.) regulations governing educational benefits invalid as promulgated without statutory authority. 440 F.Supp. 811 (E.D.Mich.1977). Appellants, the Administrator and other Veterans' Administration officials, urge reversal arguing that 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) bars judicial review of the issues presented and, on the merits, sufficient authority exists to promulgate the regulations in question. For the reasons stated below we affirm the district court on its finding of jurisdiction, reverse its judgment on the merits, and remand the case for determination of constitutional issues not decided by the district court.

Effective October 26, 1976, the Administrator promulgated V.A. regulations 14272(d) ² and 14200(g) ³ and issued Department of Veterans' Benefits (D.V.B.) Circular 20-77-16. ⁴ (Hereinafter "regulations"). These regulations, taken together, require veterans to be enrolled in a course of study which schedules at least twelve "standard classroom sessions" ⁵ per week in order to qualify for full-time educational assistance benefits. Congress has defined full-time course of study in 38 U.S.C. § 1788(a)(4) as follows:

an institutional undergraduate course offered by a college or university on a quarter- or semester-hour basis shall be considered a full-time course when a minimum of fourteen semester hours or the equivalent thereof (including such hours for which no credit is granted but which are required to be taken to correct an educational deficiency and which the educational institution considers to be quarter or semester hours for other administrative purposes), for which credit is granted toward a standard college degree, is required, except that where such college or university certifies, upon the request of the Administrator, that (A) full-time tuition is charged to all undergraduate students carrying a minimum of less than fourteen such semester hours or the equivalent thereof, or (B) all undergraduate students carrying a minimum of less than fourteen such semester hours or the equivalent thereof, are considered to be pursuing a full-time course for other administrative purposes, then such an institutional undergraduate course offered by such college or university with such minimum number of such semester hours shall be considered a full-time course, but in the event such minimum number of semester hours is less than twelve semester hours or the equivalent thereof, then twelve semester hours or the equivalent thereof shall be considered a full-time course.

In 1974 appellee Wayne State implemented a Weekend College Program (WCP) in its College of Lifelong Learning. The WCP utilizes the quarter system and students enrolled in the program must attend classes in three quarters each academic year. During each quarter a full-time student is enrolled for twelve credit hours consisting of a four credit hour workshop course, a four credit hour open circuit televised lecture course, and a four credit hour weekend conference course. The workshop course schedules regular classroom instruction and meets four hours each week of the quarter. The open circuit lecture course requires viewing five thirty-minute lectures each week. The conference course consists of two weekend conferences per quarter, each one 1,000 minutes in length.

For each four credit hour course the regulations require an institution to schedule 200 minutes of classroom instruction each week. Of the three courses in the WCP, only the workshop course meets this requirement. Students enrolled in the WCP pay full-time tuition, are considered full time administratively by Wayne State, and carry a minimum of twelve credit hours per quarter, but do not qualify for full-time benefits under the regulations.

Appellees filed suit in the district court challenging the validity of the regulations as promulgated by the Administrator. Appellees argued Congress had defined full-time study in § 1788(a)(4) and no authority existed in the Administrator to alter that definition. Appellants submitted that § 211(a) barred judicial review of the issues presented and that sufficient authority existed to issue the regulations.

The district court found § 211(a) did not bar judicial review of an action challenging the Administrator's authority to promulgate regulations. The district court held § 211(a) was enacted to preclude review only of the Administrator's decisions concerning individual claims or terminations of benefits under various veterans' benefits legislation. On the merits, the district court noted that Congress defined full time course of study for purposes of receiving full time benefits in § 1788(a)(4). The district court found the Administrator had the authority to define part-time study for purposes of receiving part time benefits, ⁶ but found no authority to alter the congressional definition of full-time study. From this statutory scheme the district court held the Administrator, through the regulations, redefined what Congress had explicitly defined as full-time study without the authority to do so. The district court held the regulations void, enjoined their further enforcement, and entered an order directing the Administrator to continue paying full time benefits to those veterans enrolled in the WCP as long as WCP complies with the congressional requirements contained in § 1788(a)(4).

I

As a general proposition administrative decisions are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 Et seq., except to the extent statutes otherwise provide. ⁷ The issue in the present case is whether § 211(a) provides an exception to the reviewability of administrative decisions. Section 211(a) states in pertinent part that

. . . the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact, under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans . . . shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise. ⁸

We agree with the district court that § 211(a) does not preclude a challenge to the Administrator's authority to promulgate regulations.

The Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974), ⁹ that § 211(a) did not bar judicial review of constitutional challenges to provisions of veteran benefits legislation. The Court reasoned that application of § 211(a) to such constitutional challenges would not serve the two primary purposes of the statute. Id. at 373, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The first purpose is to insure veterans' benefits claims will not burden the courts and the V.A. with expensive and time consuming litigation. The second purpose is to insure that the technical and complex determinations and applications of V.A. policy connected with veterans' benefits claims will be "adequately and uniformly" made. Id. at 370, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The court also stated in Johnson that a construction of § 211(a) barring judicial review of constitutional challenges would call into question the constitutionality of the statute itself, ¹⁰ which construction should be avoided if the statute can otherwise be construed to obviate deciding the constitutional question. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971).

The Johnson rationale is particularly appropriate in the present case. Suits challenging the authority to promulgate regulations will not involve the federal courts in the day to day operations of the V.A. Neither will our construction of § 211(a) spawn suits requesting federal courts to second guess the Administrator on the merits of particular claims for benefits or the termination of such benefits. ¹¹ Suits challenging the statutory authority of the Administrator will not involve the courts in the complex and technical niceties of V.A. policy, but rather will seek a determination whether regulations have been promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of authority. If we construe § 211(a) to bar judicial review of the present case, we would be finding a congressional intent to insulate from judicial review the limits of the Administrator's authority. This construction is not supported by the legislative history of § 211(a). ¹²

Such a construction would also raise serious doubts about the statute's constitutionality. ¹³ We refuse to place such a construction on § 211(a) for neither its text nor its scant legislative history provides the "clear and convincing" evidence of congressional intent required by the Supreme Court before a statute will be construed to restrict access to judicial review. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1502, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Brownell v. We Shung, ...