Wayne v. Alspach
| Citation | 20 Idaho 144,116 P. 1033 |
| Parties | H. S. WAYNE et al., Respondents, v. S. B. ALSPACH et al., Appellants |
| Decision Date | 28 June 1911 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
"SUBJECT MATTER" DEFINED-JURISDICTION OF PERSON-WAIVER OF JURISDICTION-JUDICIAL DISCRETION.
(Syllabus by the court.)
1. The phrase "subject matter" as used in an inquiry as to jurisdiction means the thing in issue or the authority of the court to exercise judicial power over the class of cases or proceedings to which the one under consideration belongs.
2. The court having jurisdiction of the "subject matter," and having acquired jurisdiction of the "person," has complete jurisdiction.
3. If the court has jurisdiction of the "subject matter" and a party litigant invokes such jurisdiction, he cannot afterward be heard to question it.
4. Parties litigant can by consent confer jurisdiction on a court of their "person"; they cannot by consent confer jurisdiction on a court of the "subject matter."
5. Trial courts, or the judges thereof, are vested with a judicial discretion in the granting or refusal of temporary injunctions where the facts are in serious dispute which will not be disturbed on appeal unless such order appears clearly erroneous or to be an abuse of sound judicial discretion.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Canyon County. HON. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.
Upon motion of plaintiffs for an injunction pendente lite and upon answer of defendants asking for a like order, an order for injunction pendente lite was made. Defendants appeal from such order. Order affirmed.
Order affirmed, with costs to respondents.
Ira W Kenward, for Appellants.
The defendants having denied plaintiffs' title, possession and right of possession and also the ousting, and it being admitted that the defendants were in the possession of the real property in dispute, the court erred in disturbing prior to final hearing, said possession. (22 Cyc. 743, and authorities cited; San Antonia Water Co. v. Bodenhamer Water Co., 133 Cal. 248, 65 P. 47; Hagen v. Beth, 118 Cal. 330, 50 P. 425.)
Perky & Crow, for Respondents.
There was no impropriety, whether we consider the second motion for a preliminary injunction as a new and original motion or as a renewal of the old motion, in making and entering the order from which the appeal is taken. The court having considered the second motion upon its merits must be deemed to have given leave that it should be made; but even without leave of court a motion denied merely for irregularity in the motion papers may be renewed. (Marvin v. Lewis, 12 Abb. Pr. ( )
Although notice of application for a preliminary injunction be required by statute, it may be waived by the defendant by voluntarily appearing.
" (22 Cyc. 746-748.)
This is an appeal brought to review the order of the district judge in granting a temporary injunction. The record discloses a controversy among the members of a religious organization denominated the "Church of God of Payette," and who had disagreed as to the proper interpretation of the doctrines, practices and teachings of said church, each side maintaining that they were the true followers of the orthodox church, and each likewise maintaining that the others were seceders and wanderers from the true faith. The plaintiffs below, who are respondents in this court, by their complaint set forth the above-mentioned matters in substance and asked for an injunction against the defendants, who are appellants here, whereby the plaintiffs sought to restrain the defendants from denying to them the use for purposes of worship of the church house or bethel belonging to said religious organization. An order for a writ of preliminary injunction, as it is styled in the transcript, was without notice accordingly issued by the district judge, which by its terms afforded the plaintiffs the temporary relief sought.
Within several days thereafter the defendants, through their counsel, appeared before the district judge at chambers and obtained a revocation of said writ of injunction and the order upon which the same had been based theretofore made, the district judge assigning as the reason for such order of dissolution that the relief granted was a writ of injunction for affirmative relief having the force and effect of a writ of restitution, and by which plaintiffs were restored to the possession of said real property theretofore in the possession of defendants, and that no notice in writing was given of the application to the defendants for five days prior to the making of such order. Within six days after the date of the order of dissolution last mentioned, the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal to this court from said order of dissolution, and filed bond as by law required. However, contemporaneously with the giving of the notice of appeal and filing bond upon appeal to this court, the plaintiffs filed and caused to be served their second notice of application for temporary injunction, and this time served such notice upon the defendants and the notice and a copy of the moving papers upon one of the defendants, and thereby informed the defendants that at a certain time, before the district judge, and which was greater than five days from the time of the service of the notice, that the plaintiffs would cause said application to be heard. By such second application plaintiffs sought the same relief as theretofore asked, and based their request for such temporary injunction upon the complaint and affidavits first filed.
Upon the return day of said motion counsel for defendants filed a special appearance and moved to quash the service of such notice. The record fails to disclose the ruling of the district judge upon said motion to quash; it, however, does disclose that at the same time or upon the return day of said second motion made by plaintiffs for a temporary injunction, the defendants appeared generally by answer; meeting in detail the allegations of the complaint, and also by which they asked affirmative relief against the plaintiffs, seeking to quiet title in the defendants as against the plaintiffs, and further asking that plaintiffs be restrained by temporary injunction from molesting or in any way interfering with the church property in dispute, or defendants' possession thereof. At the time of filing their answer there was filed the affidavits of a large number of the defendants in opposition to the application for temporary injunction made by the plaintiffs, and in support of their own application for a temporary injunction sought by them.
It appears from the record that the application for the temporary injunction made by each of the parties to said action was at the same time presented to the trial judge, and he ordered that the application of each of them be in part granted and in part denied,--that is, he directed that defendants should have possession and use of said church property except during one certain interval on the Sabbath day and two certain intervals during the week-time, when the defendants should permit the plaintiffs the free and uninterrupted use of such church property for the purposes of worship, and enjoining defendants from interfering with such religious or proper social exercises as the plaintiffs may wish to conduct during said designated hours. The defendants thereupon prosecuted their appeal to this court from the order granted last above mentioned, and it is such order which is here upon review.
Appellants designate several specifications of error, and which seem to logically grow from two positions taken by them: (1) That the district judge erred in granting the order appealed from, in that at the time of granting said order the court had lost jurisdiction over the matter involved, because of the plaintiffs' appeal from the order setting aside or dissolving the first order of injunction....
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...the court in which it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may be developed during trial.' See also Wayne v. Alspach, 20 Idaho 144, 116 P. 1033; Sizemore v. Board of County Comm'rs, 36 Idaho 184, 210 P. Though this Court cannot grant the remedy which plaintiffs seek, s......
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...81 Idaho 311, 327, 341 P.2d 432, 441 (1959); Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950); Wayne v. Alspach, 20 Idaho 144, 149-50, 116 P. 1033, 1035 (1911). Boughton elaborated on the definition as follows: Such jurisdiction the court acquires by the act of its creation, a......