Wayne v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 01 May 1911 |
| Docket Number | 227 |
| Citation | 80 A. 1097,231 Pa. 512 |
| Parties | Wayne v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued February 7, 1911
Appeal, No. 227, Jan. T., 1910, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Chester Co., April T., 1909, No. 73, on verdict for plaintiff in case of William Wayne v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Affirmed.
Trespass quare clausum fregit on appeal by plaintiff from the award of a jury of view. Before HEMPHILL, P.J.
The case turned upon the instruction of the court as to amount of damages the plaintiff was entitled to for the delay of the railroad in settling with him for his land.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $75,125. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were (1, 2) the portions of the charge quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The assignments are dismissed, and the judgment is affirmed.
A. M. Holding and William I. Schaffer, for appellant. -- The elements of damage, in addition to the land taken, were the inconvenience in appellee's farming operations, resulting from the manner of the cutting of his fields, the unsightly appearance of the embankment, the cutting off of his view and the smoke, noise and dirt from the operation of the road.
Nothing whatever was done to disturb the possession of the appellee or to subject him to annoyance, from the time of the location of the road in April, 1905, to the date of the trial in May, 1910. He was still in possession, use, and enjoyment of the land, he had no inconvenience in his farming operations, he still enjoyed the view that he had, without the interference of the embankment, and he was not subjected to any noise, dirt or smoke.
It was therefore a fair question for the jury, whether appellee was damaged at all by reason of the detention of the moneys, which, technically, became due him in 1905: Reading & Pottsville R.R. Co. v. Balthaser, 126 Pa. 1; Richards v. Gas. Co., 130 Pa. 37; Klages v. Phila. & Reading Terminal Co., 160 Pa. 386; Becker v. R.R. Co., 177 Pa. 252; Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Phila., 202 Pa. 78; Mengell v. Water Co., 224 Pa. 120.
All the cases in this state unite in the rule, that in considering such damages the jury should consider "all the circumstances" and decide in view of all the circumstances: Reading & Pottsville R.R. Co. v. Balthaser, 126 Pa. 1; Mengell v. Water Co., 224 Pa. 120; Taylor v. Paul, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 496; Klages v. Phila. & Reading Terminal Co., 160 Pa. 386; Becker v. R.R. Co., 177 Pa. 252.
William W. Porter, with him J. Frank E. Hause and Henry Pleasants, for appellee, cited: Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Phila., 202 Pa. 78; Mengell v. Water Co., 224 Pa. 120; Halfman v. Ins. Co., 160 Pa. 202; Krepps v. Carlisle, 157 Pa. 358; Hamilton v. R.R. Co., 194 Pa. 1.
Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, ELKIN, STEWART and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.
When a railroad company, exercising the right of eminent domain enters upon land and definitely locates its line of road thereon, it thereby appropriates the land taken to a public use. The right of the owner to any use of the land, inconsistent with the use for which it was taken, thereupon ceases; but immediately thereupon his right to damages vests. The law substitutes the damages for the land. But until the amount which would compensate the owner has been definitely ascertained, either by agreement between the parties or judicial determination, the owner's claim is not a debt owing by the company within the legal meaning of that term, but remains simply a claim for damages. Because interest is an incident of debt, and not an incident of unliquidated damages, it follows that when a corporation fails to make compensation to the owner for land taken, at the time of its appropriation, and delays until a final determination of the amount recoverable has been reached, the question is one of damages and not of interest. Whether the owner is entitled to damages on this account, and if so, how much, are questions sometimes for the jury. Prima facie, he is entitled to damages for delay in payment. The law contemplates that in the first instance the parties will themselves agree upon the amount. If they do agree, it is presently payable and interest attaches as an incident. If they fail to agree and either appeals to the court, it becomes a question of damages; and here, again prima facie, the owner is entitled to damages for the delay. But in fact he may not be so entitled. If he has disappointed the law and stubbornly refused to name an amount which he would be willing to accept as compensation; or in the same spirit, has been extortionate in his demands, and has named a sum exorbitant and unreasonable, a jury might well find that he has himself unjustifiably provoked the delay and deny him all damages therefor. But the law will not presume any such conduct on his part. If the corporation would excuse itself for its delay on any such ground, the burden is on it to show the excusing facts; failing in this, the right of the owner to damages in such amount as the jury may assess is unquestionable. The right results as matter of law; the quantum alone is for the jury to determine. The learned trial judge in that part of his charge which we quote below, and which is made the subject of the first assignment, instructed the jury in strict accordance with the rules and principles...
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