Wayne v. State

• Decision Date: 21 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 330,330
• Citation: 243 A.2d 19,4 Md.App. 424
• Parties: Ronald WAYNE a/k/a Ronald Elmer Thomas, Henry Dorsey a/k/a Henry Theodore White, Jr., William Jackson a/k/a James Alexander Conney, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 424

4 Md.App. 424

243 A.2d 19

Ronald WAYNE a/k/a Ronald Elmer Thomas, Henry Dorsey a/k/a Henry Theodore White, Jr., William Jackson a/k/a James Alexander Conney, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 330.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 21, 1968.

Leonard E. Wilson, J. Albert Roney, Harry J. Goodrick, Elkton, for appellants.

H. Edgar Lentz, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Thomas N. Biddison, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Donaldson C. Cole, Jr., and Julius A. Jodlbauer, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty., for Cecil County, respectively, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

Appellants Wayne, Dorsey, and Jackson filed petitions on October 6, 1967 in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, pursuant to Maryland Rule 709, waiving grand jury action and seeking immediate trials. Criminal informations were then promptly filed (Numbers 1726, 1727 and 1728) charging appellants jointly under three counts: larceny over $100.00; larceny under $100.00; and receiving stolen property. On October 9, 1967 appellants appeared before Judge Edward D. E. Rollins, for arraignment, at which time, without counsel, and after having been advised of various rights, each pleaded guilty to the first count-larceny over $100.00. The State confessed pleas of not guilty to the remaining counts. Each appellant received a five-year sentence to be served under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction.

On this appeal each appellant contends that he was denied his right to counsel as guaranteed in the Federal Constitution and by Maryland Rule 719.

The record discloses that all three appellants were simultaneously present before Judge Rollins at the arraignment; that Judge Rollins read the substance of the criminal informations to them; and thereafter proceeded to question each appellant separately, but in the presence of each other, as to the matter of counsel and as to the voluntariness of their respective guilty pleas.

To the court's questions, appellant Wayne responded that he did not have an attorney; that he was unable to employ an attorney; and that he did not think it necessary for the court to appoint one for him. After pleading guilty to the first count, the court requested the State to explain the crimes involved in the other counts and their applicable punishments. Thereafter, the State confessed a plea of not guilty to the second and third counts. The right to a court or a jury trial and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses were explained to appellant Wayne. He was then asked by the court, and gave an affirmative response to the question of whether his plea of guilty to the first count was made freely, voluntarily, without-threat or fear to himself or anyone associated with him, without promise of a lesser sentence, probation, reward, immunity or other inducements. The judge concluded by stating: 'You are pleading guilty because in truth and in fact you are guilty and for no other reason, is that correct?' Appellant responded: 'Yes Sir. Your Honor, I am guilty because I was insane because that was the only way I could obtain money to obtain drugs.' The court then accepted the guilty plea and rendered its judgment of conviction.

The court next proceeded with appellant Dorsey and, after it was established that he heard the proceedings in relation to Ronald Wayne, Dorsey stated that he too did not have an attorney, nor was he able to employ counsel. The court then asked, 'Do you understand that the court will appoint an attorney to assist you in your defense,' to which Dorsey replied, 'Yes Sir.' He was then informed of his right to a trial before a jury or before the court, after which he pleaded guilty to the first count, with the State confessing a plea of not guilty to the second and third counts. The court then examined him with respect to the voluntary nature of his guilty plea, and upon being satisfied that the plea was voluntary, it accepted the plea and entered a judgment of conviction thereon.

Appellant Jackson was arraigned next. He stated that he did not have an attorney; that he was unable to employ an attorney; that he did not wish the court to appoint him counsel; that he understood his rights as had been explained to his co-defendants; that he had no questions with reference to a trial; that he understood the penalties involved in each count; and that he waived the reading of the 'indictment.' He then entered a plea of guilty to the first count, following which the State again confessed not guilty pleas to the other counts. Satisfied that the plea was made freely and voluntarily, it was accepted by the court and a judgment of conviction was then entered.

The absolute constitutional right of an indigent accused in a serious State criminal prosecution to have counsel appointed for his defense is, of course, now settled beyond question. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; Manning v. State, 237 Md. 349, 206 A.2d 563; Montgomery v. Warden, 1 Md.App. 30, 226 A.2d 687. In implementation of the constitutional right to counsel, Maryland Rule 719 provides, insofar as here pertinent, 'If at any stage of the proceedings, the accused appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel'; and that 'Unless the accused elects to proceed without counsel or is financially able to obtain counsel' the court shall assign counsel to represent him if the offense charged is one where, as here, the maximum punishment could be imprisonment for a period of six months or more. These requirements of Maryland Rule 719 are mandatory, and must be complied with irrespective of the type of plea entered, or the lack of an affirmative showing of prejudice to the accused. Taylor v. State, 230 Md. 1, 185 A.2d 197. Nothing in Gideon or in Maryland Rule 719, however, changes the long standing rule that an accused has a right to proceed without counsel following a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702, 221 A.2d 908; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131, 200 A.2d 664; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, i.e., 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 viz.:

'Presuming waiver (of the right to counsel) from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.'

Appellant Ronald Wayne

Wayne's contention that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel is based primarily upon the fact that when asked by the court whether he was pleading guilty 'because in truth and in fact you are guilty and for no other reason, is that correct,' he responded:

'Yes Sir. Your Honor, I am guilty because I was insane because that was the only way I could obtain money to obtain drugs.'

Wayne urges that in light of this response, it should have been evident to the court that he had a defense to the charge, namely that he was insane-a defense which he could neither properly articulate not benefit from in the absence of counsel. It is against such a background that Wayne maintains that he did not intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional right to counsel.

The State contends that Wayne's refusal to accept the court's offer to appoint counsel, his desire for a speedy trial by waiving grand jury action, his cognizance of the charges pending against him before deciding to proceed without counsel, his age (23 years), and his total familiarity with criminal proceedings by reason of four prior convictions for larceny and one each for burglary and possessing barbiturates, clearly constituted circumstances showing a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

A plea of guilty may, of course, be entered under circumstances showing a voluntary desire on the part of the accused to do so, with an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense to which he is pleading guilty and the possible consequences of such a plea; and the acceptance of a guilty plea entered under such circumstances will not be set aside on appeal. James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 219 A.2d 17; Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 201 A.2d 353; Cooper v. State, 231 Md. 248, 189 A.2d 620; Blake v. State, 2 Md.App. 492, 235 A.2d 569. On the other hand, the voluntary nature of a defendant's guilty plea must be clearly established prior to the court's acceptance of it, James v. State, supra, and it must be unconditional,...