Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. BMC Properties
Decision Date | 09 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 970343,970343 |
Citation | 496 S.E.2d 64,255 Va. 75 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | WAYNESBORO VILLAGE, L.L.C. v. BMC PROPERTIES, et al. Record |
Victor V. Ludwig (Nelson, McPherson, Summers & Santos, on brief), Staunton, for appellant.
Robert B. Delano, Jr. (John A. Conrad; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on brief), Richmond, for appellee BMC Properties.
No brief or argument on behalf of appellees Bank of Essex, Alexander F. Dillard, Jr., Trustee and Earl R. Johnson, Trustee.
Present: All the Justices.
The primary issue we consider in this appeal is whether a restrictive covenant is enforceable.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Shenandoah Village Associates, L.P., predecessor in title to appellant, Waynesboro Village, L.L.C., was the original developer of a retail shopping mall in Waynesboro. By recorded deeds of trust, Shenandoah Village conveyed certain real estate, in trust, to secure an indebtedness to Dollar Dry Dock Bank.
Subsequently, BMC Properties executed an agreement with Shenandoah Village to purchase a four-acre tract of land, which was a part of the land encumbered by the deeds of trust. After the deeds of trust were recorded, a certificate of partial release for the four-acre tract was recorded among the land records in Waynesboro. Shenandoah Village conveyed to BMC the four-acre tract of land by a recorded deed dated 1989 which contained the following restriction on the remaining property owned by Shenandoah Village:
Also included in the recorded deed to BMC was the following restriction on the use of BMC's property:
By a recorded deed of trust, BMC conveyed its four-acre tract to Alexander F. Dillard, Jr., and Earl R. Johnson, trustees, to secure payment of an indebtedness to the Bank of Essex.
After Shenandoah Village conveyed the four-acre tract to BMC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) exercised its rights to take control of Dollar Dry Dock Bank as receiver. Apparently, Dollar Dry Dock Bank acquired title to the property that Shenandoah Village Associates had conveyed to the Bank in trust and, by a recorded deed, that property was conveyed to the FDIC. Subsequently, the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, conveyed 135.801 acres of the property to Waynesboro Village, without reference to the restrictive covenants in the 1989 recorded deed.
BMC is a Virginia partnership which owns, develops, and operates lodging facilities and has plans to develop its four-acre parcel as a motel with a restaurant as permitted by the restrictive covenants. BMC spent $350,000 to purchase the land and has spent at least $93,680 in fees to architects, attorneys, engineers, and surveyors for the planning and future construction of a motel. Additionally, BMC has incurred interest and debt service expense to secure loans to finance the acquisition of the property and construction of a motel on its property.
Waynesboro Village filed its bill of complaint against BMC, the Bank of Essex, and Alexander F. Dillard, Jr., trustee, and Earl R. Johnson, trustee, seeking a decree that the aforementioned restrictive covenants do not prohibit Waynesboro Village from using its property "for a motel, hotel, inn or lodging business or similar facility." The defendants filed numerous responsive pleadings and a cross-bill. Additionally, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the restrictive covenants contained in the deed from Shenandoah Village Associates, predecessors in title to Waynesboro Village, L.L.C., and BMC Properties, are expressly intended to create a servitude and burden upon their respective properties so long as the proposed uses of the property are maintained and, thus, the covenants run with the title of the respective land as a matter of law and are enforceable. Because there were no material facts in dispute, the trial court considered argument of counsel and certain exhibits, and entered a final decree which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and decreed that the covenants are enforceable. Waynesboro Village appeals.
Waynesboro Village argues that the trial court erred "either in its determination that the [restrictive covenants are] not ambiguous or in its determination that the correct interpretation of the [r]estriction is that it currently restricts [Waynesboro Village from] using its land for the development of a hotel, motel, or other lodging facility." Continuing, Waynesboro Village says that the restriction which prohibits it from constructing a motel on its property is ambiguous because it may Waynesboro Village says that this purported ambiguity renders the restriction unenforceable. 1
We disagree with Waynesboro Village's contentions. We follow the "plain meaning" rule when construing written instruments:
Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983) (quoting Globe Iron Const. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 205 Va. 841, 848, 140 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1965)).
Capital Commercial Prop. v. Vina Enterprises, 250 Va. 290, 294-95, 462 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1995); Management Enterprises v. The Thorncroft Co., 243 Va. 469, 472, 416 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1992). We have stated that the word "ambiguity" is defined as "the condition of admitting of two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time." Berry, 225 Va. at 207, 300 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 66 (3d ed.1976)).
Additionally, and just as important, we stated in Friedberg v. Riverpoint Bldg. Comm., 218 Va. 659, 665, 239 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1977):
We hold that the restrictive covenants here are unambiguous. It is apparent from a review of the restrictive covenants that they have definite and necessary meanings. The aforementioned reciprocal restrictive covenants were created to establish a general plan of development in which a lodging facility would be developed on the four-acre parcel purchased by BMC and factory outlets, discount retail stores, gas stations and fast food facilities would be developed only on the remaining parcel.
These recorded restrictions are covenants, at common law, which run with the land and are, therefore, enforceable. As we recently stated:
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